

Quantitative Metrics for Mutation Testing

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Abstract: Mutant generation is the process of generating several variations of a base program by applying elementary modifications to its source code. Mutants are useful only to the extent that they are semantically distinct from the base program; the problem of identifying and weeding out equivalent mutants is an enduring issue in mutation testing. In this paper we take a quantitative approach to this problem where we do not focus on identifying equivalent mutants, but rather on gathering quantitative information about them.

1 EQUIVALENT MUTANTS: AN ENDURING NUISANCE

Mutation testing is a long-standing technique in software testing research, and is finding its way into field practice; it consists of generating a set of variants of a base program by applying standard atomic changes to the source code of the program. In (Papadakis et al., 2019), Papadakis et al. present a sweeping survey of mutation testing, starting from its emergence in the late seventies to the present; they analyze the evolution of the level of interest in mutation testing, as reflected by the number of publications that appear in relevant venues. They also survey the various applications of mutation testing, the tools of mutant generation, the extensions of the mutation concept to other software artifacts, and the main technical challenges of mutation testing. Interestingly, they cite the problem of equivalent mutants and redundant mutants (two aspects we will address in this paper) among the research questions that remain largely unresolved.

Mutants are used for a wide range of purposes in software testing, and are useful only to the extent that they are semantically distinct from the base program; but it is very common for mutants to be semantically equivalent to the base program, despite being syntactically distinct. Equivalent mutants are a major nuisance in mutation testing because they introduce a significant amount of bias in mutation-based analysis. Consequently, much research has been devoted to the identification of equivalent mutants in

a pool of mutants generated from a base program by some mutation generation policy (Offut and Pan, 1997; Yao et al., 2014; Inozemtseva and Holmes, 2014; Aadamopoulos et al., 2004; Papadakis et al., 2014; Schuler and Zeller, 2010; Just et al., 2013b; Nica and Wotawa, 2012; Delamaro et al., 2001; Andrews et al., 2005; Namin and Kakarla, 2011; Just et al., 2014b; Gruen et al., 2009; Just et al., 2013a; Just et al., 2014a; Kintis et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2017; Hierons et al., 1999; Carvalho et al., 2018). At its core, the detection of equivalent mutants consists in analyzing a base program (say P) and a mutant (say M) to determine whether P and M are semantically equivalent, while they are (by construction) syntactically distinct. This is clearly a very difficult problem, since it relies on a detailed semantic analysis of P and M ; if we knew how to perform a detailed semantic analysis of P alone (let alone P and M) we could probably determine whether P is correct, and do away with testing altogether. In the absence of a simple, general, practical solution, researchers have resorted to approximate solutions and heuristics. These include, for example, inferring equivalence from a local analysis of P and M in the neighborhood of the mutation(s); this produces sufficient but unnecessary conditions, hence leads to a loss of recall; definite equivalence requires, inconveniently, that we analyze the programs in full. Other approaches include overapproximations and comparison of the programs' functions (through slicing) or the programs' dynamic behavior (through execution traces); these approaches yield necessary but insufficient conditions of equivalence, hence lead to a loss of precision.

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It is fair to claim that despite several decades of research, there is no general, simple, scalable solution for dealing with equivalent mutants in mutation testing.

2 A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH

The problem of equivalent mutants takes many forms in mutation testing, including:

- *Mutant Equivalence.* When we generate, say 100 mutants of some program P , and we want to check whether some test data T can detect (kill) all the mutants, we ought to consider only those mutants that are not equivalent to P ; indeed the mutants that are semantically equivalent to P cannot be detected (killed) regardless of how adequate test data set T is. In this paper we define a function we call REM (Ratio of Equivalent Mutants) to capture the ratio of equivalent mutants that a program P is prone to generate, for a given mutant generation policy.
- *Mutant Redundancy.* Let us assume that out of the 100 mutants we have generated, we have determined that 80 are not equivalent to P ; let us further assume that test data set T is able to detect (kill) all 80 mutants. What this tells us about T depends to a large extent on how many of these 80 mutants are equivalent to each other: at an extreme, if all 80 mutants were semantically equivalent to each other, then all we know about T is that it was able to distinguish one mutant from P ; at another extreme, if no two mutants were semantically equivalent, then we would know that set T is able to distinguish as many as 80 distinct mutants from P . Hence it is important to know how many equivalence classes the set of 80 mutants has, modulo the relation of semantic equivalence. In this paper we define a function we call NEC (Number of Equivalence Classes) to capture the number of equivalence classes of the set of mutants modulo semantic equivalence (excluding the equivalence class of P); and we show how we can estimate NEC .
- *Mutation score.* Imagine that we run the 100 mutants we have generated on test data T , and we find that 60 mutants are detected (killed) and 40 are not; it is common to take 0.6 ($=60/100$) as the *mutation score* of T . We argue that this metric is flawed, for two reasons: first, the mutation score ought to be based not on the total number of generated mutants, but rather on those that are estimated to be non-equivalent to P

($(1 - REM) \times 100$, in this case); second, the mutation score ought not count the number of individual mutants detected, but rather the number of equivalence classes covered by the detected mutants. Indeed, whenever one mutant is detected by test data T , all the mutants in the same class are also detected; at an extreme case, if all 80 mutants form a single equivalence class, and test data T detects one of them, it automatically detects all 80; to say in such a situation that T detected 80 mutants is misleading; it is more meaningful to say that T detected one equivalence class (the fact that the equivalence class in question has 80 elements is rather insignificant, if we are interested to assess the adequacy of T). Hence we argue that the mutation score should be defined in terms of equivalence classes, not in terms of individual mutants; in this paper, we introduce a metric to this effect, which we call EMS (Equivalence-based Mutation Score).

As we shall see in this paper, NEC is defined in terms of REM , and EMS is defined in terms of NEC ; hence REM plays a pivotal in this study. To gain some insight into how to estimate REM , we ask two related questions:

- What makes a program prone to generate equivalent mutants?
- Given a base program P and a mutant M , what may cause the mutant to be equivalent to the base program?

To answer the first question, we make the following observation: A program that is prone to generate equivalent mutants is a program that can continue performing the same function despite the presence and sensitization of mutations in its source code. Now, mutations are supposed to simulate faults in programs; if we replace "mutations" by "faults" in the above statement we find that a program that is prone to generate equivalent mutants is a program that can continue performing the same function despite the presence and sensitization of faults in its source code. This is exactly the characterization of fault tolerant programs, and we know too well what attribute makes programs fault tolerant: it is redundancy. Hence if we can quantify the redundancy of a program, we can use the redundancy metrics to predict the REM of a program.

To answer the second question, we consider the following circumstances that may cause a mutant to be equivalent to a base program (using the terminology of Laprie et al (Avizienis et al., 2004; Laprie, 1991; Laprie, 2004; Laprie, 1995)).

- *The mutation is not a fault*, i.e. it never generates a state that is different from the original program; this arises in trivial circumstances such as when the mutation applies to dead code, but may also arise in more common cases, such as, e.g. changing $<$ onto \leq when the operands being compared are never equal (e.g. an array of unique identifiers).
- *The mutation is a fault, but it causes no error*; i.e. it does cause the generation of a different state, but the state it generates is correct (as correct as the state generated by the base program); as an example, imagine that the mutation causes a list of items to be visited in a different order from the original program, but the order is irrelevant.
- *The mutation is a fault, it does cause errors, but the errors do not cause failure*. In other words the mutation causes the generation of an erroneous state, but the error is subsequently masked by downstream code.
- *The mutation is a fault, it does cause errors, the errors do cause failure, but the failure falls within the tolerance of the equivalence oracle*. If the equivalence oracle does not test for comprehensive equality between the final state of P and the final state of M , it is conceivable that M and P are considered equivalent while their final states are distinct.

3 REDUNDANCY METRICS

In this section, we review some metrics which, we feel, may be statistically related to the REM of a program; these metrics reflect various forms of program redundancy, and they are related with the circumstances we cite above for a mutant to be equivalent to a base program. These metrics are defined by means of Shannon’s entropy function (Shannon, 1948); we use the notations $H(X)$, $H(X|Y)$ and $H(X,Y)$ to denote, respectively, the entropy of random variable X , the conditional entropy of X given Y , and the joint entropy of random variables X and Y ; we assume that the reader is familiar with these concepts, their interpretations, and their properties (Csiszar and Koerner, 2011). For each metric, we briefly present its definition, its interpretation, how we calculate it, and why we believe that it is correlated to (because it affects) the REM of a program. Because the REM is a ratio that ranges between 0 and 1, we resolve to define all our metrics as values between 0 and 1, so as to facilitate the derivation of a regression model. For the sake of simplicity, we compute all entropies under the as-

Table 1: Entropy of Declared State.

Data type	Entropy (bits)
bool	1
char	8
int	32
float	64

sumption of equal probability. Under this assumption, our estimates are in fact upper bounds of the actual entropy.

3.1 State Redundancy

What we want to represent: When we declare variables in a program, we do so for the purpose of representing the states of the program; for a variety of reasons, it is very common to find that the range of values that program variables may take is much larger than the range of values that actual/ feasible program states may take. We want *state redundancy* to reflect the gap between the declared state and the actual state of the program.

How we define it: If we let S be the declared state of the program, and σ be the actual state of the program, then the state redundancy of the program can be measured by the difference between their respective entropies; to normalize it (so that it ranges between 0.0 and 1.0) we divide it by the entropy of the declared state. Recognizing that the entropy of the actual state decreases (hence the redundancy increases) as the execution of the program proceeds from the initial state to the final state, we define, in fact two different measures of state redundancy, one for each state.

Definition 1. *Given a program P whose declared state (defined by its variable declarations) is S , we let σ_I and σ_F be its initial and final actual states, we define its initial state redundancy and its final state redundancy as, respectively:*

$$SR_I = \frac{H(S) - H(\sigma_I)}{H(S)},$$

$$SR_F = \frac{H(S) - H(\sigma_F)}{H(S)}.$$

How we calculate it: To compute $H(S)$ we use a table that maps each data type to its width in bits, As an example, we consider the following program:

```
void P()
{int year, birthYear, age;
  read (year, birthYear);
  assert ((2019 <= year <= 2169) // initial
    && (1869 <= birthYear <= 2019)); // state
  age = year - birthYear; // final state
}
```

The declared space of this program is defined by three integer variables, hence $H(S) = 96$ bits. Its initial state is defined by two variables (*year* and *birthYear*) that have a range of 151 distinct values and an integer variable (*age*) that has free range, hence $H(\sigma_I) = 32 + 2 \times \log_2(151) = 46.48$ bits. As for the final state, it is determined fully by the values of *year* and *birthYear*, since *age* is a function of these two, hence its entropy is merely: $H(\sigma_F) = 2 \times \log(151) = 14.48$ bits. Hence:

$$SR_I = \frac{96 - 46.48}{96} = 0.516.$$

$$SR_F = \frac{96 - 14.48}{96} = 0.85.$$

Of course, there is more redundancy in the final state than in the initial state.

Why we feel it is correlated to the REM of a program: State redundancy reflects the amount of duplication of the information maintained by the program, or the amount of extra bits of information that are part of the declared state; the more duplicated bits or unused bits are lying around in the program state, the greater the likelihood that a mutation affects bits that are not subsequently referenced in the execution of the program (hence do not affect its outcome).

3.2 Non Injectivity

What we want to represent: A function f is said to be *injective* if and only if it maps different inputs onto different outputs, i.e. $x \neq x' \Rightarrow f(x) \neq f(x')$. A function is non-injective if it violates this property; it is all the more non-injective that it maps a larger set of distinct inputs onto a common output.

How we define it: For the purposes of this metric, we view a program as mapping initial states onto final states. One way to quantify non-injectivity is to use the conditional entropy of the initial state given the final state: this entropy reflects the uncertainty we have about the initial state given that we know the final state; this entropy increases as more initial states are mapped to the same final state; to normalize it, we divide it by the entropy of the initial state.

Definition 2. Given a program P on space S , the non-injectivity of P is denoted by NI and defined by:

$$NI = \frac{H(\sigma_I|\sigma_F)}{H(\sigma_I)},$$

where σ_I and σ_F are, respectively, the initial and final actual state of P .

Because σ_F is a function of σ_I , the conditional entropy can be simplified (Csiszar and Koerner, 2011),

yielding the following formula:

$$NI = \frac{H(\sigma_I) - H(\sigma_F)}{H(\sigma_I)}.$$

In (Androutsopoulos et al., 2014), Androutsopoulos et al. introduce a similar metric, called *squeeziness*, which they find to be correlated to the probability that an error arising at some location in a program fails to propagate to the output.

How we calculate it: We have already discussed how to compute the entropies of the initial state and final state of a program. As an illustration, we find that the non-injectivity of the program cited in Section 3.1 is:

$$NI = \frac{H(\sigma_I) - H(\sigma_F)}{H(\sigma_I)} = \frac{46.48 - 14.48}{46.48} = 0.69.$$

Why we feel it is correlated to the REM of a program: One of the main sources of mutant equivalence is the ability of programs to mask errors that have infected the state, by mapping the erroneous state onto the same final state as the correct state. This happens all the more frequently that the function of the program is more non-injective; hence non-injectivity measures exactly the capability of the program to mask errors caused by the sensitization of mutations.

3.3 Functional Redundancy

What we want to represent: Not all programs can be faithfully modeled as mappings from initial states to final states, as we do in Section 3.2; sometimes a more faithful model of a program may be a heterogeneous function from some input space X to some output space Y . Programs exchange information with their environment through a wide range of channels: they receive input information (X) through read statements, passed by-value parameters, access to global variables, etc; and they send output information (Y) through write statements, passed by-reference parameters, return statements, access to global variables, etc. We want a metric that reflects non-injectivity (hence the potential for masking errors) for this model of computation.

How we define it: We let X be the random variable that represents all the input information used by the program, and we let Y be the random variable that represents all the output information that is delivered by P .

Definition 3. Given a program P that takes input X and returns output Y , the functional redundancy of P is denoted by FR and defined by:

$$FR = \frac{H(X|Y)}{H(X)}.$$

Because Y is a function of X , we know (Csiszar and Koerner, 2011) that the conditional entropy ($H(X|Y)$) can be written as ($H(X) - H(Y)$). Also, the entropy of Y is less than or equal to the entropy of X , and both are non-negative, hence FR ranges between 0 and 1 (we assume, of course, that $H(X) \neq 0$).

How we calculate it: The entropy of X is the sum of the entropies of all the input channels and the entropy of Y is the sum of the entropies of all the output channels. We consider the following program:

```
int P(int year, birthyear)
{read (year, birthYear);
  assert ((2019 <= year <= 2169)
    && (1869 <= birthYear <= 2019));
  age = year - birthYear;
  return age;
}
```

Random variable X is defined by program variables $year$ and $birthYear$, hence its entropy is $H(X) = 2 \times \log_2(151) = 14.48$. Random variable Y is defined by variable age , whose values range between 0 and 150, hence $H(Y) = \log_2(151) = 7.24$ bits. Hence

$$FR = \frac{14.48 - 7.24}{14.48} = 0.50.$$

Why we feel it is correlated to the REM of a program: Functional redundancy, like non-injectivity, reflects the program's ability to mask errors caused by mutations; whereas non-injectivity models the program as a homogeneous function on its state space, functional redundancy models it as a heterogeneous mapping from an input space to an output space.

All the metrics we have discussed so far pertain to the base program; we refer to them as the program's *intrinsic metrics*. The metric we present in the next section deals not with the base program, but rather with the oracle that is used to rule on equivalence.

3.4 Non Determinacy

What we want to represent: Whether two programs (in particular, a program and a mutant thereof) are equivalent or not may depend on how thoroughly we check their behavior. For example, it is possible that out of three program variables, two represent the intended function of the programs and the third is merely an auxiliary variable. In such a case, the oracle of equivalence ought to check that the relevant variables have the same value, but ignore the auxiliary variable.

From this discussion we infer that the equivalence between a base program P and a mutant M may depend on what oracle is used to compare the output of P with the output of M , and we are interested to define

Table 2: Non Determinacy of Sample Oracles.

$\Omega()$	$H(S_P S_M)$	ND
$(x_P = x_M) \wedge (y_P = y_M) \wedge (z_P = z_M)$	0	0
$(x_P = x_M) \wedge (y_P = y_M)$	32	0.33
$(x_P = x_M)$	64	0.66
true	96	1.0

a metric that reflects the degree of non-determinacy of the selected oracle.

We are given a program P on space S and a mutant M on the same space, and we consider an oracle $\Omega()$ on S defined by an equivalence relation on S . We want the *non-determinacy* of $\Omega()$ to reflect how much uncertainty we have about the output of M for a given input if we know the output of P for the same input.

Definition 4. Given a program P and a mutant M on space S , and given an oracle $\Omega()$ defined as an equivalence relation on S , we let S_P and S_M be the random variables that represent the final states of P and M for a common input. The non-determinacy of $\Omega()$ is denoted by ND and defined by:

$$ND = \frac{H(S_P|S_M)}{H(S_P)}.$$

Given that $\Omega()$ defines an equivalence class over S , this metric reflects the amount of uncertainty we have about an element of S if all we know is the equivalence of this element by relation $\Omega()$.

How we calculate it: The conditional entropy $H(S_P|S_M)$ is really the entropy of the equivalence classes of S modulo the equivalence relation defined by $\Omega()$. It represents the amount of uncertainty we have about an element of S if all we know is its equivalence class; if $\Omega()$ is the identity relation then all equivalence classes are singletons and $ND = 0$; else it is the base 2 logarithm of the size of equivalence classes. As an example, we consider space S defined by three variables, say x, y, z of type integer, and we show in the following table a number of possible oracles with their respective non-determinacies. For all these oracles, $H(S_P) = 3 \times 32 = 96$; the only term that changes is $H(S_P|S_M)$.

Why we feel it is correlated to the REM of a program: Of course, the weaker the oracle that tests for equivalence, the more mutants will be found to be equivalent to the base program.

3.5 A Posteriori Justification

In section 2, we had asked two questions: First, what attribute makes a program prone to generate equivalent mutants; second, under what circumstances can

a mutant behave in a way that is equivalent to a base program. The metrics we introduced in section 3 answer the first question, since they capture different aspects of redundancy. In table 3, we discuss why we feel that the selected metrics answer the second question, in the sense that they reflect the likelihood of occurrence of each circumstance that we had identified.

Table 3: Metrics vs Circumstances of Equivalence.

Metrics	Circumstances of Equivalence
SR_I	Mutation not a Fault
SR_F	Mutation is a Fault Causes no Error
FR, NI	Mutation is a Fault Causes Errors Errors Masked
ND	Mutation is a Fault Causes Errors Errors Propagate Failure Undetected

3.6 A Java Compiler

In order to automate the calculation of these redundancy metrics, and ensure that our calculations are applied uniformly, we use compiler generation technology (*ANTLR*, <http://www.antlr.org/>) to parse Java code and derive these metrics for individual methods in Java classes. For each method, we must estimate the following quantities:

- The entropy of the declared space, $H(S)$.
- The entropy of the initial actual space, $H(\sigma_I)$.
- The entropy of the final actual space, $H(\sigma_f)$.
- The entropy of the input space, $H(X)$.
- The entropy of the output space, $H(Y)$.

The entropies of the declared space, the input space, and output space are fairly straightforward; they consist in identifying the relevant variables and adding their respective entropies, depending on their data type, as per table 1.

For the entropy of the initial actual space, we are bound to rely on input from the source code, as we have no other means to probe the intent of the programmer (re: how they use declared variables to represent the actual program state). To this effect, we introduce a special purpose assert statement, which the engineer may use to specify the precondition of the method whose REM we want to compute. We propose the following statement

```
preassert (<precondition>)
```

whose semantic definition is exactly the same as a normal assert statement, but this one is used specifically to analyze the entropy of the initial actual state. When the method has an exception call at the beginning as a guard for the method call, then it is straightforward to have a `preassert()` statement immediately after the exception statement, with the negation of the condition that triggers the exception. The entropy of the initial actual state is computed as:

$$H(\sigma_I) = H(S) - \Delta H,$$

where ΔH is the reduction in entropy represented by the assertion of the `preassert()` statement. This quantity is defined inductively according to the structure of the assertion, as shown summarily below:

- $\Delta H(A \wedge B) = \Delta H(A) + \Delta H(B)$.
- $\Delta H(A \vee B) = \max(\Delta H(A), \Delta H(B))$.
- $\Delta H(X == Y)$, where X and Y are expressions of the same type, equals the entropy of the common type. For example, if x and y are integer variables, then $\Delta H(x + 1 == y - 1)$ is 32 bits.
- $\Delta H(X < Y) = \Delta H(X <= Y) = \Delta H(X > Y) = \Delta H(X >= Y) = 1$ bit. So for example $\Delta H(x + 1 > 0) = 1$ bit, since this equality reduces the range of possible values of x by half, whose \log_2 is then reduced by 1.

This is not a perfect solution, but it is adequate for our purposes.

For the entropy of the final actual space, we have to keep track of dependencies that the program creates between its variables. We do so using a Boolean matrix (called D , for Dependency), which is initialised to the identity (T on the diagonal, F outside, to mean that initially each variable depends only on itself); whenever we encounter an assignment statement, of the form $(x = E(y, z, u, v))$, we replace the row of x in D with the logical OR of the rows of all the variables that appear in expression E . At the end of the program we add (i.e. take the logical OR) of all the rows of the matrix; this yields a vector that indicates which program variables affect the value of the final state of the program. The sum of the entropies of the selected variables is the entropy of the final actual state. If the assignment statement is embedded within an if-statement, an if-then-else statement or a while loop, then the variables that appear in the condition of the if or while are added to the variables that are on the right hand side of the assignment, since they affect the value of the assigned variable.

4 A STATISTICAL MODEL

In order to test our assumption that our redundancy metrics are statistically correlated with the REM of a program, we have conducted an empirical experiment, whereby we select a set of Java classes from the *Apache Common Mathematics Library* and run our Java compiler to compute the redundancy metrics of each method of each class. On the other hand, we apply a mutant generator to these classes using a uniform set of standard mutation operators, then we execute the base program and the mutants on benchmark test data sets, and record how many mutants are killed by the test. Simultaneously, we keep track of coverage metrics, and exclude from consideration any method whose line coverage is below 90%. By keeping in our sample only those Java classes for which line coverage is high (in fact the vast majority reach 100% line coverage) we maximize the likelihood that mutants that are found to survive after undergoing the test are equivalent to the base program. Under this assumption, we use the ratio of surviving mutants of each method over the total number of mutants as the REM of the method. Our data sample includes about two hundred methods, but when we exclude those whose size is below 20 LOC we end up with 66 methods; because we treat individual methods rather than whole classes, this condition excludes many small methods. The requirement of anonymity preclude us from posting this data online, but we may post it once the requirement is lifted.

We perform a statistical regression using *REM* as the dependent variable and the intrinsic redundancy metrics (i.e. those metrics that pertain to the program, not the equivalence oracle) as the independent variables. We use a logistic model, i.e. a model such that $\log(\frac{REM}{1-REM})$ is a linear combination of the independent variables. The metric that pertains to the equivalence oracle (*ND*) is not part of the regression analysis, but is integrated in the equation in such a way that if $ND = 0$ we obtain the regression formula involving the intrinsic metrics, and if $ND = 1$ (extreme case when the oracle tests trivially for **true**, i.e. all the mutants are found to be equivalent) we want the REM to be 1. The resulting formula is:

$$REM = ND + (1 - ND) \times (-3.27 + 1.35 \times SR_F + 1.26 \times FR).$$

With this equation in place, we can now have a tool that automatically computes the redundancy metrics, then derives the REM using this formula. Figures 1 and 2 show a sample input and output screen for this tool; not all the functionality alluded to in the input screen is operational as of the date of writing; for

now, the mutant generators are fixed, and the user does not have the option to select mutation operators.

5 EQUIVALENCE AND REDUNDANCY

5.1 Mutant Equivalence

Given a set of M mutants of a base program P , and given a ratio of equivalent mutants *REM*, the number of equivalent mutants is estimated to be $M \times REM$. Hence we cannot expect any test data set T to kill more than $N = M \times (1 - REM)$ mutants (modulo the margin of error in the estimation of *REM*).

5.2 Mutant Redundancy

In (Papadakis et al., 2019), Papadakis et al. raise the problem of mutant redundancy as the issue where many mutants may be equivalent among themselves, hence do not provide test coverage commensurate with their number. If we have sixty mutants divided into twelve classes where each class contains five equivalent mutants, then we have only twelve distinct mutants; and if some test data set T kills these sixty mutants, it should really get credit for twelve mutants (twelve casualties, so to speak), not sixty, since whenever it kills a mutant from one equivalence class, it automatically kills all the mutants of the same class. Of course, it is very difficult to determine, in a set of mutants, which mutants are equivalent and which are not; but again, the *REM* enables us to draw some quantitative data about the level of redundancy in a pool of mutants.

The *REM* of the base program is computed using a regression formula whose independent variables are the redundancy metrics extracted from the source code of the program. Since the mutants are generated from the base program by means of elementary syntactic changes, it is reasonable to consider that the mutants have the same *REM* as the base program. If we interpret the *REM* as the probability that any two mutants are semantically equivalent, then we can estimate the number of equivalence classes by answering the following question: *Given a set of size N , and given that any two elements of this set have a probability REM to be in the same equivalence class modulo some relation EQ , what is the expected number of equivalence classes of this set modulo EQ ?*

We denote this number by $NEC(N, REM)$, and we write it as follows:




Figure 1: Input Screen.




Figure 2: Output Screen.

$$NEC(N, REM) = \sum_{k=1}^N k \times p(N, REM, k),$$

where $p(N, REM, k)$ is the probability that a set of N elements where each pair has probability REM to be equivalent has k equivalence classes. This probability satisfies the following inductive conditions.

- *Basis of Induction.* We have two base conditions:
 - *One Equivalence Class.* $p(N, REM, 1) = REM^{N-1}$. This is the probability that all N elements are equivalent.
 - *As Many Equivalence Classes as Elements, or: All Equivalence Classes are Singletons.*

$p(N, REM, N) = (1 - REM)^{\frac{N \times (N-1)}{2}}$. This is the probability that no two elements are equivalent: every two elements are not equivalent; there are $N \times (N - 1)$ pairs of distinct elements, but because equivalence is a symmetric relation, we divide this number by 2 ($M_i \neq M_j$ is the same event as $M_j \neq M_i$).

- *Inductive Step.* When we add one element to a set of $N - 1$ elements, two possibilities may arise: either this adds one to the number of equivalence classes (if the new element is equivalent to no current element of the set); or it maintains the number of equivalence classes (if the new element

is equivalent to one of the existing equivalence classes). Since these two events are disjoint, the probability of the disjunction is the sum of the probabilities of each event. Hence:

$$p(N, REM, k) = p(N-1, REM, k) \times (1 - (1 - REM)^k) + p(N-1, REM, k-1) \times (1 - REM)^{k-1}.$$

The following recursive program computes the number of equivalence classes of a set of size N whose elements have probability REM of being equivalent.

```
#include <iostream>
#include "math.h"

using namespace std;

double p(int N, int k, double R);

int main ()
{
    float R=0.158; int N=65;
    float mean = 0.0; float ps=0.0;
    for (int k=1; k<=N; k++)
        {float prob=p(N,k,R); ps = ps+prob;
         mean = mean + k*prob;}
    cout<<"ps:"<<ps<<" mean:"<<mean<<endl;
}
double p(int N, int k, double R)
{if (k==1) {return pow(R,N-1);}
 else
 if (N==k) {return pow(1-R, (k*(k-1))/2);}
 else {return p(N-1, k, R) * (1-pow(1-R, k))
        +p(N-1, k-1, R) *pow(1-R, k-1);}}
```

Execution of this program with $N = 65$ and $REM = 0.158$ yields $NEC(N, REM) = 14.64$, i.e. our 65 mutants represent only about 15 different mutants; the remaining 50 are redundant.

6 MUTATION SCORE, REVISITED

The quantification of redundancy, discussed in the previous section, casts a shadow on the traditional way of measuring the mutation score of a test data set T : usually, if we execute a set of M mutants on some test data set T and we find that X mutants have been killed (i.e. shown to be different from the base program P), we assign to T the *mutation score* X/M . This metrics ignores the possibility that several of M mutants may be equivalent, and several of the X killed mutants may be equivalent. We argue that this metric can be improved and made more meaningful, in three ways:

- Because of the possibility that mutants may be equivalent to the base program P , the baseline ought to be the number of non-equivalent mutants, i.e. $N = (1 - REM) \times M$.
- Because of the possibility that those mutants that are not equivalent to P may be equivalent amongst themselves, we ought to focus not on the number of these mutants, but rather on the number of equivalence classes modulo semantic equivalence. This is defined in the previous section as $NEC(N, REM)$.
- Because of the possibility that the X mutants killed by test data set T may be equivalent amongst themselves, we ought to give credit to T not for the cardinality of X , but rather for the number of equivalence classes that X may overlap. We refer to this number as $COV(N, K, X)$, where $K = NEC(N, REM)$ is the number of equivalence classes of the set of N mutants modulo equivalence.

To compute $COV(N, K, X)$, we designate by C_1, C_2, \dots, C_K the K equivalence classes, we designate by f_i , for $(1 \leq i \leq K)$, the binary functions that take value 1 if and only if equivalence class C_i overlaps with (i.e. has a non-empty intersection with) set X , and value 0 otherwise. Then $COV(N, K, X) = E(\sum_{i=1}^K K f_i)$. If we assume that all classes are the same size and that elements of X are uniformly distributed over the set of mutants, then this can be written as:

$$cov(N, K, X) = K \times p(f_i = 1) = K \times (1 - p(f_i = 0)),$$

for an arbitrary i . For the first class to be considered, $p(f_1 = 0) = \frac{K-1}{K}^X$, since each element of X has a probability $\frac{K-1}{K}$ of not being in class C_1 ; for each subsequent element, the numerator and denominator each drops by 1. Hence we have the following formula:

$$COV(N, K, X) = K \times \left(1 - \frac{K-1}{K}^X \times \prod_{i=0}^{X-1} \frac{N-i}{N-i}\right).$$

The following program computes this function, for $N = 65$, $K = 15$ and $X = 50$.

```
#include <iostream>
#include "math.h"
using namespace std;

double cov(int N, int K, int X);

int main ()
{
    int N=65; int K=15; int X=50;
    cout << "cov: " << cov(N,K,X) << endl;
}
```

```
double cov(int N, int K, int X)
{
    float prod=1;
    for (int i=0; i<K; i++)
        {prod = prod *
            (N-i/(float) (K-1))/(float) (N-i);}
    return K*(1-prod*pow((K-1)/(float)K,X));
}
```

Execution of this program yields $COV(65, 15, 50) = 12.55$. We propose the following definition.

Definition 5. Given a base program P and M mutants of P , and given a test data set T that has killed X mutants, the mutation score of T is the ratio of equivalence classes covered by X over the total number of equivalence classes amongst the mutants that are not equivalent to P .

We denote the mutation score by $EMS(M, X)$. The following proposition gives an explicit formula of the mutation score.

Proposition 1. Given a program P and M mutants of P , and given a test data set T that has killed X mutants, the mutation score of T is given by the following formula:

$$EMS(M, X) = \frac{COV(N, NEC(N, REM), X)}{NEC(N, REM)},$$

where REM is the ratio of equivalent mutants of P and $N = M(1 - REM)$ is the number of mutants that are not equivalent to P .

In the example above, for $N = 65$, $REM = 0.158$, and $X = 50$ we find

$$EMS(77, 50) = \frac{12.55}{15} = 0.84.$$

7 CONCLUSION

7.1 Summary

In this paper, we argue that the determination of mutant equivalence and mutant redundancy by inspection and analysis of individual mutants is very expensive and error-prone, at the same time that it is in fact unnecessary, for most purposes. As a substitute, we propose to analyze the amount of redundancy that a program has, in various forms, and we find that this enables us to extract a number of mutation-related metrics at negligible cost. Central to this quantitative analysis is the concept of ratio of equivalent mutants, which measures the probability that any two mutants, or a mutant and the base program, are semantically equivalent.

7.2 Assessment and Threats to Validity

A lot of our work rides on the estimation of the REM , which in turn rides on the estimation of the redundancy metrics, and on the precision/ convergence of the regression model. This is all the more critical that the estimate of the number of equivalence classes, $NEC(N, REM)$, depends a great deal more on REM than on N . Hence any error that arises in the estimation of REM is likely to greatly affect the precision of $NEC(N, REM)$; this, in turn, affects the precision of $COV(N, K, X)$, and that of $EMS(M, X)$. This puts a heavy onus on us to double check the way the redundancy metrics are computed.

7.3 Prospects

Our current plan is to refine and upgrade a tool we are currently developing to automate this quantitative analysis, and to validate this tool through field testing. Also, we want to select a set of mutant generation policies, and build a separate regression model for each policy, so that for a given base program, the calculation of the corresponding REM uses the regression formula that matches the selected mutant generation policy. Finally, we have plans to validate our work empirically, by comparing our estimates of REM against actual values, and by assessing the precision of our other metrics, such as $NEC(N, REM)$ and $COV(N, K, X)$.

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