

# Kex-Filtering: A Proactive Approach to Filtering

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**Keywords:** IP Blacklist, Hash, Botnet, Hassh, SSH Configuration, Honeypot, Network Fingerprint.

**Abstract:** Kex-Filtering is a method to identify malicious nodes by analyzing their configuration when they try to connect as clients to an SSH server. The process adopts the *hassh* hashing network fingerprinting standard to discover and record the distinct configurations of malicious SSH clients. The method computes an MD5 hash during the SSH handshake when the client and server exchange their SSH configurations, including a specific range of algorithms to establish a secure SSH channel. Kex-Filtering fully exploits that, to simplify botnet management, a large number of nodes of a botnet share the same configuration of their SSH clients. Experimental data collected through honeypots confirm that Kex-Filtering stops a large percentage of attacks and it results in a very low number of false positives and negatives even when using few hashes.


## 1 INTRODUCTION


IP blacklists are the most popular method to identify and block SSH attacks. One of its weaknesses is low effectiveness against rapidly expanding large-scale botnets that continually evolve and add new nodes. It is challenging to continuously update conventional IP blacklists to keep pace with the rapid evolution and extension of botnets.


This paper introduces Kex-Filtering, a new method to identify attacks from a botnet. Its definition is based on data we have collected in 8 months from 4 honeypots in the Azure and the AWS data centres. The honeypots have been the targets of more than 20,000 attacks where 98.5 per cent of these attacks were automated and most were produced by botnets categorized as Mirai-like, the new generation of botnets leverages derivative or enhanced Mirai-like code that does not rely on compromised IoT devices or other vulnerable systems only. According to our data, *libssh 4* was the most common client fingerprint in SSH attacks, accounting for over 65 per cent of total incidents. This led us to define and evaluate Kex-Filtering, an approach to identify malicious


nodes based on a fingerprint of the SSH client configurations in these nodes. This approach to discovering connections from botnet nodes largely differs from conventional IP-filtering methods because it does not use a blacklist of IP addresses to filter incoming SSH connections. Instead, Kex-Filtering analyzes the configuration of the client connecting to the SSH server and compares it against known malicious configurations. A successful comparison implies that the client belongs to a botnet. Experimental results confirm that Kex-Filtering is much more effective than traditional IP blacklists because even a small blacklist with less than 15 patterns can block up to 98.5 per cent of attackers with a very low number of false positives. Furthermore, the proposed solution is proactive because it filters out an IP address autonomously, upon discovering it is configured maliciously. Lastly, Kex-Filtering detects an attack as soon as the TCP handshake is completed, effectively preventing the attacker from executing malicious commands. This can stop and identify attacks at the root.

Kex-Filtering should be seen as an integration rather than as a replacement for standard IP blacklists as it adds to filtering the capability to dynamically update an IP blacklist with the addresses of those hosts that match known malicious client configurations. In this way, Kex-Filtering not only blocks connections from these IPs but, as confirmed by the data we have collected, it strongly simplifies the identification and

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blacklisting of SSH attackers, particularly those using nodes belonging to botnets.

We review related work in Sect.2. The following sections describe, respectively, the architecture of the honeypots to collect data and how the analysis of the data collected by our honeypots has suggested the definition of Kex-Filtering. Sect. 5 describes the experiments we have run to evaluate Kex-Filtering and then Sect. 6 compares its performances against the one of IP blacklists. The last section outlines future works.

## 2 RELATED WORKS

Previous work has suggested adopting a filtering mechanism based on duplicate hashes. This includes (Gasser et al., 2014) that has used the results of a massive internet scan implemented in 2013 and (Bythwood et al., 2023) but they do not evaluate the effectiveness of the adoption of duplicate hashes. (Dulaunoy et al., 2022) uses SSH hashes to classify SSH servers rather than to identify botnets. Also (Heino et al., 2022) outlines the feasibility of filtering based on hashes but it is focused on web applications. The number of hashes collected in (Shamsi et al., 2022) is too low to result in effective filtering. Our work generalizes the solutions previously proposed (Heino et al., 2023) and it includes a performance evaluation of the adoption of *hassh* filtering to discover malicious SSH connections. The performance evaluation is built on the large amount of data the honeypots have collected.

An alternative method for SSH fingerprinting is JA4SSH (Foxio, 2024). While *hassh* aims to fingerprint SSH applications, JA4SSH focuses on fingerprinting SSH sessions by analyzing the encrypted traffic exchanged during the connection. Even this fingerprint may detect attack patterns and behaviours but this paper will primarily focus on the adoption of the *hassh* fingerprinting to discover malicious nodes before they can implement an attack.

The deployment of honeypots in clouds has been previously examined. Earlier research (Kelly et al., 2021) has explored the correlation between the popularity of cloud providers and the frequency of attacks. Unlike studies focused on popularity, currently the adoption of honeypots shifts its emphasis to a more security-centered approach. A similar shift can be observed in the recent work by *Orca Security* (Security, 2023). They deployed honeypots storing cloud access keys across multiple providers and measured the interval from deployment to the discovery and exploitation of the keys.

## 3 HONEYPOTS FOR DATA COLLECTION

The definition of Kex-Filtering has been suggested by the analysis of data collected by a set of honeypots. We have used four honeypots, two of which were hosted on AWS and the other two on Azure cloud. The resulting dataset spans 8 months and in these months more than 20000 distinct IPs of attackers have produced more than 400000 attacks.

All these honeypots used Cowrie (Oosterhof, 2015) a medium-interaction honeypot and supported the SSH protocol. Furthermore, for further investigations, in one honeypot on each cloud, we configured the Dionaea low-interaction honeypot *citesethia2019* for multi-protocol support.

Table 1: Deployment Details of the Honeypots.

Honeypot	Cloud Plt.	Protocols
Azure A	Azure	SSH, FTP, SMB, HTTP
Azure B	Azure	SSH
AWS A	AWS	SSH, FTP, SMB, HTTP
AWS B	AWS	SSH

Each honeypot server exploits both virtual machines (VMs) and Docker containers (Inc., 2013) to build a scalable and isolated environment where VMs act as protective barriers between the network and the hosted honeypots. We have used this solution to effectively confine potential security breaches within the containers themselves, thereby preserving the host system’s integrity.




Figure 1: Architecture of the Honeypot Machine.

To improve the robustness of our honeypots, each one also includes a sophisticated alert system that activates immediately when access is granted to either the host or the virtual machine. In addition, we have deployed a protective protocol to suspend the operations of either the Docker container or the VM as soon as an unauthorized login is attempted. To se-

cure access to the VMs themselves, we have hardened them with a two-factor authentication (2FA) system. For real-time monitoring and time-series data analysis, we have integrated the Prometheus <sup>1</sup> time-series database with our VMs and honeypots using custom scripts. In this way, we can measure not only log data but the environment metrics of the VMs too. Lastly, since Prometheus is primarily a metric collection tool, we have paired it with Grafana <sup>2</sup> for data visualization. (Labs, 2021).




Figure 2: Honeypot Server Architecture.

Each honeypot securely transmits the data it collects to a server (see Fig. 2) hosting both Prometheus and MongoDB through the Tailscale network <sup>3</sup> for enhanced privacy and security.

The integration of Tailscale, for safe data transferring, Prometheus for time series generation, Grafana for data visualization, and MongoDB for efficiently storing the dataset for finer-grained analysis, results in a robust and secure ecosystem for collecting, storing, and analyzing honeypot data.

## 4 FINGERPRINTING BOTNETS

This section describes Kex-Filtering in some detail, starting from the fingerprinting of the configuration of some botnet nodes.

### 4.1 Hash Fingerprinting

We have adopted the *hashh* hashing method to fingerprint and record the configurations of SSH clients. This method generates a unique MD5 hash for a specific combination of the encryption algorithms the client supports. The hash is computed during the SSH handshake and after the initial TCP three-way handshake when the client and server exchange their SSH

<sup>1</sup><https://prometheus.io>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.grafana.com/>

<sup>3</sup><https://tailscale.com>

configurations as shown in Fig. 3. One of the data the client and the server exchange is the list of supported algorithms that play a crucial role in establishing a secure SSH channel. These configurations are transmitted via SSH\_MSG\_KEXINIT packets in clear text. We use the algorithms in the list and their transmission order to produce a fingerprint to identify particular client applications or their unique setups (Salesforce, 2018). We refer to this aspect of the SSH protocol as KEX (key exchange), and henceforth, *hashh* hashes will be denoted as "KEX hashes".

```
{
  "eventId": "cowrie.client.kex",
  "hashh": "f55...",
  "kexAlgs": [
    "curve25519-sha256",
    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org",
    "ecdh-sha2-nistp256",
    "ecdh-sha2-nistp384",
    "ecdh-sha2-nistp521",
    "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512",
    "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512",
    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256",
    "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256",
    "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1",
    "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1",
    "ext-info-c"
  ],
  "keyAlgs": [
    "ssh-ed25519",
    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521",
    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384",
    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256",
    "rsa-sha2-512",
    "rsa-sha2-256",
    "ssh-rsa",
    "ssh-dss"
  ],
  "encCS": [
    "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
    "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
    "aes256-ctr",
    "aes192-ctr",
    "aes128-ctr",
    "aes256-cbc",
    "aes192-cbc",
    "aes128-cbc",
    "3des-cbc"
  ],
  "macCS": [
    "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com",
    "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",
    "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com",
    "hmac-sha2-256",
    "hmac-sha2-512",
    "hmac-sha1"
  ]
}
```

Figure 3: Some Information the SSH Handshake Exchanges.

The data our honeypots have collected confirms that attacks from distinct nodes sharing the same hash apply nearly identical strategies and execute the same commands. This suggests that nodes within the same botnet are usually configured with the same SSH client and hence they have the same KEX hashes. Consequently, the KEX hash can detect attacks from all the nodes from the same botnet.

This method has identified one of the most dominant botnets. This botnet is linked to the Outlaw criminal gang and it includes more than 8000 IP addresses that have attacked our honeypots. It is responsible for more than 48 per cent of the attacks against the botnets we have deployed.

## 4.2 Kex Hashes Distribution

We show the effectiveness of Kex-Filtering through the HASSH hashes produced by the four previously described honeypots.




Figure 4: Top 3 KEX hashes in Azure & AWS

As shown in Fig. 4 the top three KEX hashes cover 94 per cent of attacks in the AWS dataset and approximately 90 per cent of those in the Azure one. We also notice that 70 per cent of the attacks against Azure share the same KEX hash (Hash 1).

This confirms the potential of Kex-Filtering, as it succeeds in blocking about 92 per cent of attacks when using just 3 KEX Hashes. Our dataset included about 100 unique KEX hashes collected across both cloud providers. This is a much smaller dataset than one storing attacking IPs (over 20000). It is also smaller than a standard IP blacklist.




Figure 5: Distribution of KEX hashes Across Providers.

Fig. 5 shows the hashes distribution with a large intersection between the KEX hashes collected by the honeypots in the two clouds. The intersection among attack vectors across the two clouds confirms that Kex-Filtering identifies the same botnets in both clouds.

After discovering the similarity in KEX hash distributions for both clouds, we have merged and analyzed the two datasets. The resulting bar chart shows the top 15 KEX hashes for the overall data and their prevalence as a percentage of total occurrences in both environments.

The data in Fig. 6 shows the striking prevalence of just one KEX hash that is identified by its initial sequence "f555...". This hash is remarkably widespread for both cloud providers. According to our dataset, about 63 per cent of the SSH attacks on our honeypots




Figure 6: Top 15 KEX hashes in Azure & AWS.

in the two environments are associated with this hash. The prominence of this single KEX hash offers a significant opportunity for mitigating the largest fraction of these attacks. The adoption of a filter that only targets this hash could potentially neutralize up to 63 per cent of SSH attacks. This confirms the effectiveness of Kex-Filtering. The outcomes of our analysis further support this effectiveness because a concise set of just 15 blacklisted hashes can discover and block 98.5 per cent of the SSH attacks in the dataset.

## 4.3 Effectiveness of KEX Hashes

The collected data reveals the strikingly limited number of KEX hashes that are used. This observation suggested an investigation into the underlying reasons, building upon our analysis of the OutLaw Crypto-Botnet's source code. As already mentioned, several botnets, notably those based on the Mirai source code, mostly use the same attack code and therefore use the same SSH clients with the same configuration. This shared configuration simplifies the attacker tasks because the creation of a distinct configuration for each botnet node is much more complex and expensive. This implies that a large number of botnet nodes share the same KEX hash and that botnets using similar, unchanged codes can be readily identified through their KEX hashes.




Figure 7: Percentage of Attackers with OutLaw KEX hash.

The widespread use of the KEX hash 'f555' has been directly linked to attacks attributed to the OutLaw botnet. The correlation of IP addresses identified as OutLaw nodes and those using the 'f555' hash confirms that no node identified through Kex-Filtering is

a false positive and all the nodes are actual members of an operating botnet. This confirms that the proposed method can discover malicious nodes and identify the botnet they belong to. This information may be essential to fully exploit information from threat intelligence about possible attackers and their TTPs (Xiong et al., 2022)




Figure 8: Distribution of Unique IP per Hash.

Fig. 8 shows the distribution of unique IPs associated with each KEX hash. Notably, the hash beginning with 'f552' emerges as the predominant choice among attackers, consistent across all cloud providers. Remarkably, the five hashes in the graphs jointly represent about 82 per cent of the attackers when considering both Azure and AWS. This shows that by filtering just these five KEX hashes, Kex-Filtering can both detect and block in the initial stages of the SSH handshake nearly all malicious actors targeting the SSH protocol.

## 5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

Building upon the preliminary results previously described, this section investigates the practical application of Kex-Filtering.

To achieve a robust evaluation, we have developed a standalone system independent of the one to collect hashes. This avoids any bias due to the evaluation setup.

The system we have developed is a custom rule-based intrusion prevention system (IPS) that correlates the KEX hashes of connecting clients with the repository of hashes collected by our honeypots. As soon as the IPS discovers a hash match within the dataset, ie a potentially malicious connection, it immediately stops the SSH handshake. Furthermore, in response to a KEX hash match, the IPS dynamically updates an IP blacklist to block traffic originating from the corresponding host not only on SSH but across all the services.

## 5.1 Performance Analysis

We ran the IPS for two days using the most significant 50 hashes from the honeypot data. The decision to increase the number of hashes from the original 15 hashes is due to the distinct network environment under test. This test, even if very short, has produced some insights into the effectiveness of the proposed method.




Figure 9: Timeline of Blocked Connections by Kex-Filtering.

In total, the IPS was targeted by 202 SSH connections. During the first 24 hours, the system effectively blocked 99.5 per cent of attempted attacks, 52 connections out of 53. Remarkably, just 2 of these hashes have accounted for over 60 per cent of the blocked attackers (as shown in Fig: 10)




Figure 10: Hits Distribution in Blacklisted Hashes (first 24h).

The bar chart in Fig: 10 shows that in the first 24 hours, our IPS works at the expected rate. It also confirms that KEX-Filtering is effective even when it uses few hashes.

The effectiveness has a drastic drop in the next 24 hours, as it blocks just a mere 35 per cent of the malicious traffic (14.8 per cent blocked in these 24 hours). The reduced effectiveness is due to a data shift because our honeypots collected the data three months before we deployed the IPS. In the elapsed months, new botnets with fresh KEX hashes have emerged and one of them has targeted our IPS (Quinonero-Candela et al., 2009), (Storkey, 2009).

In particular, on the second day, the IPS was targeted by a new swarm of attacks identified by a KEX hash beginning with "aca". This source of attacks uses distinct IP addresses for each connection.

The usage of distinct IP addresses with the same KEX hash strongly suggests the attacker operates through a botnet. This confirms that nodes with the




Figure 11: The Hashes Observed by the IPS (second 24h).

same KEX hash belong to the same botnet and it validates the effectiveness of the proposed method. Moreover, it also confirms the effectiveness of Key-Filtering even when using a small set of hashes provided that this set is dynamically updated to cover new botnets.

A possible solution uses honeypots to gather new data that is used to continuously update the IPS systems about new botnets.

The next analysis shows how the blocking rate of the proposed method correlates with the number of used KEX hashes. It confirms that even when Key-Filtering uses just a few entries, it can stop most of the attackers blocked by the whole hash list. This highlights the effectiveness of Kex-filtering even with a small list.




Figure 12: Blocking Rate as a Function of KEX Hashes.

Fig. 12 shows how the blocking rate of the IPS we have developed changes depending on the number of hashes present in the blacklist it uses. In this chart, the KEX hashes are arranged by their effectiveness in the experiment. We observe that when Kex-Filtering employs just a single hash (the first point on the chart), the percentage of blocked connections jumps to 65%. This points out that in the 48 hours of activity, a significant percentage of the attackers that Key-Filtering blocks come from the same botnet. If we move to the right on the x-axis of the graph, we see that when Key-Filtering uses about 20 hashes its effectiveness is close to a horizontal line in the two days. The next

chart shows the same data as in Fig. 12, but now the data are structured according to the popularity of KEX hashes leveraging historic honeypot data:




Figure 13: Blocking Rate vs the Number of Hashes.

Fig. 13 shows the performance of the first entries of the blacklist, ordered by efficiency on the honeypot data. Initially, the performance of these entries is not satisfactory but the inclusion of less than 20 additional entries results in a remarkable surge in performance, reaching a block rate of 90%. This suggests that the hash of the botnet targeting our honeypot was eventually added to the blacklist.




Figure 14: Percentage of False Positives.

According to Fig 14, just 2% of the collected Kex hashes belong to benign ssh clients (myceliumbroker, 2024). This shows that Kex-Filtering can effectively identify malicious SSH clients, as it successfully distinguishes them from benign ones. In fact, none of the hashes in the blacklist for this test belongs to well-known benign SSH clients.

## 5.2 Auto-Learning Hashes

We investigate the usage of KEX hashes identified as malicious in some days to create a dynamic list of hashes to be used the next day. This could result in a highly effective setup of Kex-Filtering. The only problem to be considered in a production server environment is due to false positives. We mitigate this problem by defining a whitelist of IP addresses to avoid blocking known good hashes.

This experiment considered the hashes collected in the previous days as malicious because the node running the IPS is never accessed by a non-malicious actor.

The analysis presented here is based on a week-long deployment of the IPS on the same machine used for the analysis previously described.




Figure 15: Blocked Attackers as a Function of Training.

Fig. 15 shows how the number of training days affects the percentage of attacks blocked on the following day. According to these results, the data collected in just one day results in an effectiveness rate on the following day of about 95 per cent. The effectiveness steadily increased to full protection (100 per cent) when using the previous four days as training. However, on the fifth day, efficiency decreased to 70 per cent. This may be due to a new botnet that was idle in the previous days, as in previous analyses. Despite this, the effectiveness of Key-Filtering consistently remains very high.

## 6 KEX-FILTERING VS IP BLACKLISTS

This section compares the performance of our solution against the one of state-of-the-art IP blacklists. This experiment has compared the performances of the two solutions in the two days of deployment.

### 6.1 Configuring the Solutions

We have considered three types of IP blacklists: a daily blacklist based on the IPs observed in the previous 24 hours, and two historical blacklists that also consider previous malicious IPs. These two lists are the "Alpha" IP Blacklist and the more complete "Alpha 7" blacklist that, on average, includes about 54,700 IPs. We used open-source blacklists produced by the Stratosphere Lab. <sup>4</sup>

On each day, we extracted the attackers' IPs and cross-referenced them against the IP blacklist for the same day.

Fig. 16 shows that on the first day, the IP Blacklist blocks over 80 per cent of the attackers, while

<sup>4</sup><https://www.stratosphereips.org>




Figure 16: Blocking rate of Daily IP Blacklist vs Kex-Filtering.

Kex-Filtering blocks 99.5 per cent of the attackers. These percentages take into account that the deployment started at 7 PM while the blacklist we have used covers three consecutive days.

On the second day, the IP blacklist only blocks 3 per cent of attackers, just 2 out of 67 IPs, whereas Kex-Filtering blocked 14.8 per cent of malicious connections. Despite its large performance decline, because of the reasons previously explained, Kex-Filtering is still more effective than IP blacklist.




Figure 17: Blocking rate of AIP Alpha vs Kex-Filtering.

Kex-Filtering results in a better performance while the IP blacklist blocked very few attackers, even when using it in the next 24 hours.




Figure 18: Blocking Rate of AIP Alpha7 vs Kex-Filtering.

These IP blacklists include more than 54,700 entries. In the first 24 hours, their performance and the one of Kex-Filtering are similar as they both detected

almost any attackers. However, on the second day, despite its size, the IP blacklist only blocks 7.3 per cent of malicious traffic, while Kex-Filtering blocks about 14.7 per cent of the same traffic. As already discussed, the under-performance of the IP blacklist may be due to a new botnet it did not include.

## 6.2 Overall Evaluation

Our experimental evaluation confirms the better performance of Kex-Filtering provided that we adopt the same update strategy of IP blacklists. As an example, developments (Deri and Fusco, 2023) show that a solution that merges the six most popular file-based IP blacklists discovers less than 50 per cent of attackers. Furthermore, current botnets such as the OutLaw defeat conventional IP blacklists by launching attacks from new hosts as they expand. Instead, evading Kex-Filtering is more challenging because this requires updating the SSH clients in the current botnet nodes with a large overhead due to the sheer volume of botnet nodes. Even the adoption of distinct SSH client configurations for each victim node is highly complex as it requires a large and diverse set of configurations that should be properly managed. This results in a large overhead for the botnet owner. Instead, Kex-Filtering only requires a check against a small dataset of hashes where each hash can block attacks from several nodes. This enhances efficiency and it strengthens the defence against a broader range of attackers. This is in stark contrast to IP blacklist which usually involves tens of thousands of entries (i.e. the Alpha7 blacklist includes more than 54700 IPs), where each one blocks attacks from a single host only. Furthermore, IP blacklists usually have a short life because of the volatile nature of IP addresses. Instead, the life of Kex hashes should be as long as one of the current botnet nodes, offering reliable identification and filtering with a low rate of false positives.

## 7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Our experimental evaluation confirms the effectiveness of Kex-Filtering a simpler technique than IP filtering. However, given their relative merits, we plan to integrate Kex and IP filtering to define a more comprehensive solution for mitigating and detecting attackers. A first example is the simple IPS previously described that uses the output of Kex-Filtering to update IP blacklists.

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