Authors:
Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi
1
;
Miloš Klouček
2
;
Paweł Morawiecki
1
;
Ivica Nikolić
3
;
Josef Pieprzyk
4
and
Sebastian Wójtowicz
1
Affiliations:
1
Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
;
2
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
;
3
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
;
4
Polish Academy of Sciences and Queensland University of Technology, Poland
Keyword(s):
SAT Solvers, SAT-based Cryptanalysis, Logic Cryptanalysis, Authenticated Encryption, CAESAR.
Related
Ontology
Subjects/Areas/Topics:
Applied Cryptography
;
Cryptographic Techniques and Key Management
;
Data Engineering
;
Databases and Data Security
;
Formal Methods for Security
;
Identification, Authentication and Non-Repudiation
;
Information and Systems Security
Abstract:
We investigate six authenticated encryption schemes (ACORN, ASCON-128a, ICEPOLE-128a, Ketje Jr,
MORUS, and NORX-32) from the CAESAR competition. We aim at state recovery attacks using a SAT
solver as a main tool. Our analysis reveals that these schemes, as submitted to CAESAR, provide strong resistance
against SAT-based state recoveries. To shed a light on their security margins, we also analyse modified
versions of these algorithms, including round-reduced variants and versions with higher security claims. Our
attacks on such variants require only a few known plaintext-ciphertext pairs and small memory requirements
(to run the SAT solver), whereas time complexity varies from very practical (few seconds on a desktop PC) to
‘theoretical’ attacks.