“I’s Dined with Ukraine”: Empirical Analysis on Consumer
Preference Change After Russo-Ukrainian War
Hanqi Ma
Princeton High School, Princeton, U.S.A.
Keywords: Russo-Ukrainian War, Bayesian Analysis, Latent Dirichlet Allocation.
Abstract: Recently, the Russo-Ukrainian war has become a major shock to the global market. This study investigates
the impact of conflict on consumer preference and consumer rationality with empirical analysis. This paper
applied the Difference-in-Difference method to measure the external shock’s (war) effect on Ukrainian and
Russian restaurants. The restaurants in the control group in the DiD model are selected with the
identification strategy of spatial matching. After eliminating the impact of Covid by controlling the Covid
Stringency Index as a covariate, the paper constructed a Bayesian structure time series Causal Impact
analysis on each Ukrainian and Russian restaurant visitor count to reflect the change in consumer preference
caused by the external shock. Then, the paper proposed the mechanism behind the changes in customer
visits by adopting a topic modeling approach - Latent Dirichlet Allocation and word cloud method to
analyze customer reviews of these restaurants on Yelp. The results showed that terms such as “Support” and
“Support Ukraine '' had become the trending words in Yelp comments since the start of the war, confirming
that consumers tend to show their support by dining in Ukrainian restaurants.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has been a hot topic
on the international stage in the past century. When
wars or major pandemics occur, consumers change
their preferences and buying patterns in the short or
long term (Glick & Taylor, 2010). These consumer
behavioral changes could result in many more
consequences. One example is when the prohibition
caused by war from 1910 to 1933 caused less
alcohol consumption and a lower suicidal rate
(Zwanka & Buff, 2021). This paper is interested in
analyzing consumer preference change after the
outbreak of the war: whether people reacted
differently to Ukrainian and Russian products or did
it have no impact on consumer preferences. Because
product sale information is unavailable, consumer
flows in restaurants would be a preferred way of
research since foot-tracking data is available.
Therefore, this paper specifically analyzed the
consumer flow of Ukrainian and Russian restaurants
to investigate the war's effect on consumer
preference. Analyzing every restaurant across the
globe is impossible, so this paper focused on
restaurants in New York City. Sufficient data to
analyze are available for three Russian restaurants
(Mari Vanna, Anyway Cafe, Matryoshka) and four
Ukrainian restaurants (Veselka, Ukrainian East
Village Restaurant, Streecha, and Russian Samovar).
Russian Samovar is marked as a Russian restaurant
on Yelp. Still, this paper finds evidence indicating
that it is owned by a Ukrainian and has supported
Ukraine since the beginning of the war (Wasserman,
1989). Therefore, it is considered a Ukrainian
restaurant. These six restaurants have sufficient
raw_count and normalized_visits data from January
2021 to June 2022.
2 DATA
This study used the SAFE GRAPH data set, which is
collected from the physical world and makes
monthly updates to their data to assure the accuracy
of their dataset. The data is collected by identifying
device services with location components, as devices
with location services can be identified to determine
every user’s time spent at different locations. SAFE
GRAPH can account for the potential biases of
different types of devices and geographic biases.
SafeGraph tested for geographic bias by comparing
424
Ma, H.
“I’s Dined with Ukraine”: Empirical Analysis on Consumer Preference Change after Russo-Ukrainian War.
DOI: 10.5220/0012034100003620
In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME 2022), pages 424-432
ISBN: 978-989-758-636-1
Copyright
c
2023 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. Under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
its determination of the state-by-state numbers of
home_location devices in the panel to the accurate
proportions reported by the 2016 US Census. The
result shows that the SafeGraph panel density
closely mirrors true population density, as the
overall average percentage point difference is < 1%,
with a maximum of +/-3% in each state.
Furthermore, SAFE GRAPH can eliminate potential
bias by collecting data from different cellular
carriers. The result shows that the data was collected
from 6 major carriers in the US.
Table 1: Shows the distribution of the six carrier types in the SAFE GRAPH dataset. The distribution shows that Verizon is
the most common carrier, and the distribution in the dataset is similar to the distribution on the public market.
Carrie
r
Count Ratio
Verizon 10,303,871 35.64%
AT&T 7,267,146 25.13%
T-Mobile 7,129,894 24.66%
S
p
rint 3,685,988 12.75%
Altice 323,221 1.11%
C-S
p
ire 204,800 0.71%
The dataset we used has 866188 rows and 48
columns, with each row representing a specific
location's data in a specific week. Some key
statistics this study used include raw_visit_ counts
and normalized _visits_by _total_visits, These
statistics were all collected and analyzed with
different methods, yet they all reveal the day-by-day
consumer flow to POI in New York City.
raw_visit_counts were collected by randomly
counting the number of visits to a POI. Normalized
data are more complicated and accurate for this
study than raw data because they analyze the portion
of visits or visitors in a POI compared to visits or
visitors in the New York region. Normalized data
will result in very small numbers, but they are more
accurate by limiting the potential impact from
external factors such as the general population flow
in the city.
3 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE
MODEL AND RESULTS
3.1 Model Specifications
To estimate the causal effect of the Russo-Ukrainian
war on the consumer preferences toward Ukrainian
and Russian restaurants, we formulate a panel
regression model entailing the restaurants of interest
and their weekly foot traffic before and after the war
through causal identification strategies. The method
aims to construct counterfactuals to estimate the
effect of an intervention due to the external shock.
By comparing the pre-intervention and post-
intervention data for both the control group and
experimental group, DiD can observe the outcome
trend after the intervention and can estimate an
external shock’s actual effect on the experimental
group. DID is a version of fixed-effect estimation
using panel data, e.g.:
γ
= hypothetical consumers visits to Ukrainian
and Russian restaurants if the war did not occur
γ
= actual consumers visits to Ukrainian or
Russian restaurants after the war occured
γ
and γ
are both potential outcomes, but only
one of them can be observed in reality, i.e., γ
when
the war actually occurred. Therefore, using DID
allows to estimate γ
based on several assumptions:
the irrelevancy between outcome and intervention,
similar trend between control and experimental
groups in pre-intervention period, and that
exchangeability cannot be assumed between control
and experimental groups (Li, Wang & Zhong, 2022).
“I’s Dined with Ukraine”: Empirical Analysis on Consumer Preference Change after Russo-Ukrainian War
425
Figure 1: Difference in Difference graphical representation with linear regression.
In the study’s setting, the control group (blue) is
the non-Ukrainian/Russian restaurants, and the
experimental group (red) is the four Ukrainian or
three Russian restaurants. The DiD model enables us
to establish the counterfactual of the expected post-
intervention trend, and predict the intervention effect
by comparing it with the observed post-intervention
trend. Since DID is a fixed effect model, panel
regression can be used to estimate potential
outcomes along with dummy variables as the
following equation:
Y

a

bγ

cX
ε

Where Y

is the number of visits to Ukrainian or
Russian restaurant i at week t, γ is the intervention
dummy variable that equals to 1 for Ukrainian or
Russian restaurants in post-intervention period, X is
dummy variables for fixed effects such as week and
placekey, and ε is the error term. This paper
compared the result by controlling for different
variables (week, placekey, or both) to validate the
consistency and significance of the result. For the
DID model, we counted 30 weeks before the first
day of the war (February 24, 2022) as the pre-
intervention period and 12 weeks after that as the
post-intervention period.
3.2 Results
We estimate the effect of war on raw visit counts for
the four Ukrainian restaurants shown in Table 2.
Overall, the results are consistent and robust when
both placekey and week fixed effects are included as
control variables, as the intervention effect is
estimated to be 9.40 (p<0.05). The adjusted R2 is
0.653, showing that the model successfully explains
65.3% of the observations. When only the placekey
is controlled, the result is still significant, with the
estimated intervention effect of 13.47 (p<0.01), and
the adjusted R-square to be 0.627. When the control
variable is none or week, the result failed to produce
a large adjusted R2, but it still yielded a strong and
significant intervention effect (p<0.001). The result
indicates that four Ukrainian restaurants had
received an average of 9.4 more customers. Given
that the calculated average number of raw_count
customers to the Ukrainian restaurant during the pre-
intervention period is 45.56, this means that
Ukrainian restaurants experienced a 20.6% increase
in customers just because of the Russo-Ukrainian
war.
Table 2: Raw_visit_counts DiD result for Ukrainian
restaurant customer flow.
Dependent
Variable
raw_visit_
counts
raw_visit_
counts
raw_visit_
counts
raw_visit_
counts
Model Pooled
OLS
Pooled
OLS
Pooled
OLS
Pooled
OLS
Interventio
n effect
31.695 *** 32.121 *** 13.466 ** 9.404 *
[7.323] [7.510] [4.741] [4.797]
Placekey No No Yes Yes
Wee
k
No Yes No Yes
Adjusted
R2
0.051 0.052 0.627 0.653
# of Obs 942 942 942 942
Table 3 shows the result calculated with
normalized_visits_by_total_visits data for Ukrainian
restaurants, and it is very consistent with results
ICEMME 2022 - The International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering
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shown in table 2. When controlling both week and
placekey, the intervention effect is estimated to be
5.872e-7 (p<0.05) and adjusted R2 to be 0.641.
When the control variable is placekey, the
intervention effect is estimated to be 8.729e-7
(p<0.01) and adjusted R-square equals 0.642. When
the control variable is none or week, the intervention
effect is strong and significant, but the adjusted R2
is small, indicating the model is not a good fit to the
data. During the pre-intervention period, the average
number of normalized_visits is 2.849e-6, meaning
that 20.6% of more customers decided to eat in these
Ukrainian restaurants because of the effect of the
war.
Table 3 Normalized_visits_by_total_visits DiD result for Ukrainian restaurants customer flow.
Dependent Variable normalized_visits normalized_visits normalized_visits normalized_visits
Model Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
Intervention effect 1.932e-6 *** 2.004e-6*** 7.729e-7 ** 5.872e-7 *
[4.40e-7] [4.52e-7] [2.85e-7] [2.91e-7]
Placekey No No Yes Yes
Wee
k
No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.043 0.624 0.641
#of Obs 942 942 942 942
Table 4 shows the result generated from Russian
restaurants’ raw_visit_counts data. The result is very
similar to that of Ukrainian restaurants. When the
control variable is none or week, the intervention
effect is insignificant and the adjusted R2 proves the
model’s unfitness. But when placekey is being
controlled, the intervention effect of -2.655 (p<0.01)
becomes significant with the adjusted R2 to be 0.755
showing the model’s good fit. When both variables
are being controlled, the estimated intervention
effect is -3.597 (p<0.01) and the adjusted R2 equal
to 0.78. The average raw_count customers to the
Russian restaurants during the pre-intervention
period is 16.698, which means that the war caused a
21.5% decrease in consumer flow to Russian
restaurants.
Table 4: Raw_visit_counts DiD result for Russian restaurants customer flow.
Dependent Variable raw_visit_counts raw_visit_counts raw_visit_counts raw_visit_counts
Model Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
Intervention effect -3.094 -3.218 -2.655 ** -3.597 **
[1.727] [2.119] [1.018] [1.160]
Placekey No No Yes Yes
Week No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.003 -0.042 0.755 0.780
# of Obs 493 493 493 493
Table 5 shows the result calculated with
normalized_visits_by_total_visits data for Russian
restaurants, and it is different from the result on
table 4. When controlling both week and placekey,
the intervention effect is estimated to be -1.341e-7
and adjusted R2 to be 0.731, but it is not statistically
significant enough (p>0.05). When the control
variable is placekey, the intervention effect is
estimated to be -1.644e-7 (p<0.05) and adjusted R-
square equals 0.719. When the control variable is
none or week, the intervention effect is strong and
significant, but the adjusted R2 is small, indicating
the model is not a good-fit to the data. The average
number of normalized_visits to the Russian
“I’s Dined with Ukraine”: Empirical Analysis on Consumer Preference Change after Russo-Ukrainian War
427
restaurants during the pre-intervention period is
1.826e-6, which means that the war caused a 17.6 %
decrease in consumer flow to Russian restaurants
Table 5: Normalized_visits_by_total_visits DiD result for Russian restaurants customer flow
Dependent Variable normalized_visits normalized_visits normalized_visits normalized_visits
Model Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
Intervention effect -3.552e-7 ** -2.969e-7 * -1.644e-7 * -1.341e-7
[1.35e-7] [1.57e-7] [7.80e-8] [9.37e-8]
Placekey No No Yes Yes
Wee
k
No YesNoYes
Adjusted R2 0.006 -0.04 0.719 0.731
# of Obs 493 493 493 493
4 BAYESIAN STRUCTURAL
TIME SERIES MODEL AND
RESULTS
4.1 Model Specifications
This paper adopted the Bayesian Structural Time
Series Model and applied the Causal Impact analysis
on each individual Ukrainian and Russian restaurant
(Brodersen, Gallusser & Scott.,2015). This method
will predict a counterfactual on a time-series model
and predict an external shock’s intervention effect as
shown in Figure 2. The Russian Samovar restaurant,
although labeled as a Russian restaurant on Yelp,
was classified as an Ukrainian restaurant in this
study because most of its employees are Ukrainians.
The restaurant also showed its support to Ukraine
after the war happened (Alyson, 2022), such as
hosting fund-raisers or posting a blue and yellow
flag on the door and a sign that says, “Stand by
Ukraine. No War.”
Figure 2: Bayesian structure time-series model and Causal Impact methodology graphical representation.
In the real world, there is the observed data Y1,
and the goal is to estimate the counterfactual data
Y0, what would happen if the war never occurred.
Since there isn’t an actual experiment, the “control”
group doesn’t exist, so the goal of synthetic control
is to estimate something that just looks like a control
group (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller, 2015).
The difference between the counterfactual data
and observed data at time t is the intervention’s
effect. Constructing a Bayesian time-series model,
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the Causal Impact method can estimate the post-
intervention trend by analyzing the pre-intervention
and controlling for certain fixed characteristics or
“covariates.” The Causal Impact model is based on
two important assumptions: 1) There is a controlled
time-series that is not affected by the intervention. 2)
The relationship between covariates and time-
series, established in pre-intervention, remains stable
throughout the post-intervention. In this study, the
covariate being used is the covid Stringency Index,
which measures the actual effect of Covid in New
York.
The Causal Impact model will produce some key
statistics such as the predicted customer count,
actual customer count, intervention absolute effect
and relative effect, their standard deviation, the
posterior tail-area p value, and each value’s 95%
confidence interval. The model also produces a
graph set showing the predicted vs. actual value,
point effect, and cumulative effect. Figure 3 shows
the graphs produced with the raw_visit_counts of the
Ukrainian restaurant Vesekla. The first graph shows
the actual customer flow versus the predicted
customer 25 to 35 weeks before the war and 10
weeks after the war. The second graph shows the
point effect of y versus predicted over time. The
third graph shows the cumulative effect after the
intervention. A Bayesian structure time-series model
along with Causal Impact analysis will be applied to
each of the seven Ukrainian or Russian restaurants
to estimate the war’s effect on consumer preference
change.
Figure 3: Causal Impact graphing result for Veselka restaurant.
4.2 Results
Table 6 shows the result of causal Impact analysis
on Ukrainian restaurants. For each restaurant, the
patterns found in raw_visit_counts and
normalized_visits_by_total_vists are very similar.
Table 6: Bayesian structure time-series with Causal Impact result for Ukrainian restaurants.
Dependent
Variable
raw_visit_counts normalized_visits_by_total_visits
Restaurant number 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Actual 88.0 15.62 19.8 110.3 0.53 0.1 0.14 0.69
Prediction 74.19 16.71 11.87 37.83 0.44 0.1 0.07 0.22
S.D. (4.53) (2.31) (3.88) (14.92) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.1)
Relative effect 18.61%*** -6.5% 66.8%*** 191.6%** 20.0%*** -4.9% 99.9%*** 215.2%***
“I’s Dined with Ukraine”: Empirical Analysis on Consumer Preference Change after Russo-Ukrainian War
429
*
S.D. (6.1%) (13.8%) (32.7%) (39.5%) (5.5%) (13.1%) (35.8%) (45.1%)
95% confidence
interval
[6.2%,
30.2%]
[-33.3%,
21.0%]
[4.0%,
132.2%]
[117.2%,
271.8%]
[9.5%,
31.2%]
[-30.8%,
20.6%]
[27.5%,
168.0%]
[128.6%,
305.4%]
Veselka (1)'s result shows that during the post-
intervention period, the response variable had an
average value of approx. 88.0. By contrast, in the
absence of an intervention, we would have expected
an average response of 74.19. In relative effect, the
response variable showed an increase of +18.6%.
The 95% interval of this percentage is [6.2%,
30.2%]. This means that the positive effect observed
during the intervention period is statistically
significant and unlikely to be due to random
fluctuations. The probability of obtaining this effect
by chance is very small (Bayesian one-sided tail-
area probability p = 0.0). This means the causal
effect can be considered statistically significant.
Streecha (2)’s result shows that during the post-
intervention period, the response variable had an
average value of approx. 15.62. In the absence of an
intervention, we would have expected an average
response of 16.71. In relative effect, the response
variable showed a decrease of -6.6%. The 95%
interval of this percentage is [-33.4%, 20.8%]. This
means that, although it may look as though the
intervention has exerted a negative effect on the
response variable when considering the intervention
period as a whole, this effect is not statistically
significant and so cannot be meaningfully
interpreted. The apparent effect could be the result
of random fluctuations that are unrelated to the
intervention. This is often the case when the
intervention period is very long and includes much
of the time when the effect has already worn off. It
can also be the case when the intervention period is
too short to distinguish the signal from the noise.
Finally, failing to find a significant effect can
happen when there are not enough control variables
or when these variables do not correlate well with
the response variable during the learning period. The
probability of obtaining this effect by chance is p =
31.1%. This means the effect may be spurious and
would generally not be considered statistically
significant.
Ukrainian East Village Restaurant (3)’s result
shows that the response variable had an average
value of approximately during the post-intervention
period. 0.14. By contrast, without intervention, we
would have expected an average response of 0.07. In
relative effect, the response variable showed an
increase of +99.9%. The 95% interval of this
percentage is [31.2%, 170.5%]. This means that the
positive effect observed during the intervention
period is statistically significant and unlikely to be
due to random fluctuations. The probability of
obtaining this effect by chance is very small
(Bayesian one-sided tail-area probability p = 0.0).
This means the causal effect can be considered
statistically significant.
Russian Samovar(4)’s result shows that during
the post-intervention period, the response variable
had an average value of approx. 110.3. By contrast,
in the absence of an intervention, we would have
expected an average response of 37.83. In relative
terms, the response variable showed an increase of
+191.6%. The 95% interval of this percentage is
[117.2%, 271.8%]. This means that the positive
effect observed during the intervention period is
statistically significant and unlikely to be due to
random fluctuations. The probability of obtaining
this effect by chance is very small (Bayesian one-
sided tail-area probability p = 0.0). This means the
causal effect can be considered statistically
significant.
Table 7: Bayesian structure time-series with Causal Impact result for Russian restaurants.
Dependent
Variable
raw_visit_counts normalized_visits_by_total_visits
Restaurant
numbe
r
5 6 7 5 6 7
Actual 29.23 3.42 7.0 0.18 0.02 0.04
Predicted 35.46 5.66 20.02 0.21 0.04 0.12
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430
S.D. (2.79) (0.99) (2.39) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Relative effect -17.6%** -39.7%*** -65.0%*** -15.3%* -42.6%*** -63.4%***
S.D. (7.9%) (17.5%) (11.9%) (8.4%) (17.1%) (11.6%)
95% confidence
interval
[-32.5%, -1.7%] [-75.9%, -7.3%] [-87.1%, -40.2%]
[-31.5%,
1.3%]
[-76.1%, -9.1%]
[-86.7%, -
41.3%]
Table 7 shows the result of causal Impact
analysis on Russian restaurants. For each restaurant,
the patterns found in raw_visit_counts and
normalized_visits_by_total_vists are also similar.
Mari Vanna (5)’s result shows that during the
post-intervention period, the response variable had
an average value of approx. 29.23. By contrast, in
the absence of an intervention, we would have
expected an average response of 35.46. In relative
effect, the response variable showed a decrease of -
17.56%. The 95% interval of this percentage is [-
32.54%, -1.7%]. This means that the negative effect
observed during the intervention period is
statistically significant. The probability of obtaining
this effect by chance is very small (Bayesian one-
sided tail-area probability p = 0.01). This means the
causal effect can be considered statistically
significant.
Matryoshka (6)’s result shows that during the
post-intervention period, the response variable had
an average value of approx. 3.42. By contrast, in the
absence of an intervention, we would have expected
an average response of 5.66. In relative effect, the
response variable showed a decrease of -39.65%.
The 95% interval of this percentage is [-75.95%, -
7.29%]. This means that the negative effect observed
during the intervention period is statistically
significant. The probability of obtaining this effect
by chance is very small (Bayesian one-sided tail-
area probability p = 0.0). This means the causal
effect can be considered statistically significant.
Anyway Café (7)’s result shows that during the
post-intervention period, the response variable had
an average value of approx. 7.0. By contrast, in the
absence of an intervention, we would have expected
an average response of 20.02. In relative terms, the
response variable showed a decrease of -65.03%.
The 95% interval of this percentage is [-87.08%, -
40.22%]. This means that the negative effect
observed during the intervention period is
statistically significant. The probability of obtaining
this effect by chance is very small (Bayesian one-
sided tail-area probability p = 0.0). This means the
causal effect can be considered statistically
significant.
To summarize, the Bayesian time-series model
significantly proved the change of consumer
preference through investigating the customer flow
on three Russian and three Ukrainian restaurants.
The only restaurant which failed to produce a
statistically significant result is the Russian
restaurant Streecha, with a p-value of 31.07% and
95% confidence interval of [-33.26%, 21.05%].
Even so, it’s almost certain to conclude, with the
result produced by the Causal Impact analysis, that
the consumer preference has been shifted by the
outbreak of Russo-Ukrainian war. The consumers, in
response to the war, are more willing to dine in
Ukrainian restaurants and reluctant to dine in
Russian restaurants.
5 DISCUSSION
The DiD and Causal Impact results have shown the
shift in consumer preference due to the impact of the
Russo-Ukrainian war. When controlling for
variables like week or placekey, the DiD model was
able to generate robust results to prove an
approximately 20.6% increase in customers to
Ukrainian restaurants and a 21.5% decrease in
customers to Russian Restaurants. The Bayesian
structure time-series model and Causal Impact
method specifically analyzed each restaurant. The
method produced statistically significant results for
three of the four Ukrainian restaurants showing the
war’s positive impact on customer flow.
Furthermore, the model successfully proved the
war’s negative impact on all three Russian
restaurants.
This paper, different from many other previous
studies, focuses on the micro-level impact of the
Russo-Ukrainian war. By investigating the customer
flow of Ukrainian and Russian restaurants in New
York City, the study successfully proved that the
war has a robust effect on changing people’s
consumer preferences. People in New York, for
instance, decided to dine in Ukrainian restaurants to
show their attitude and support toward the
Ukrainians. On the other hand, Russian restaurants
“I’s Dined with Ukraine”: Empirical Analysis on Consumer Preference Change after Russo-Ukrainian War
431
like Mari Vanna suffered customer losses and
decreased revenues. In some extreme cases, people
expressed their anger toward Russia by harassing
and threatening Russian people and their businesses
(Anne & Haleluya, 2022). Many restaurant owners
can also sense this change in consumer preference.
Some owners, for example, decided to rebrand their
restaurants from “Russian” to “Ukrainian” or
“Eastern European” to avoid customer losses
(Kailey, 2022). This phenomenon will not last short,
however. Consumer preference will likely continue
to change and favor Ukrainian products in the next
few years, especially given that the war is continuing
and showing no sign of calling a truce. This paper
also confirmed the result of previous research stating
that major crisis and international events, such as
covid, are likely to affect consumer behaviors and
activities (Anastasiadou, Chrissos & Karantza,
2020).
6 FUTURE INSIGHT AND
IMPROVEMENT
While the result produced by this research is robust
and convincing, there could still be some potential
flaws that might lead to errors. One limitation of this
research is the small sample size. Because of the
unavailability of sufficient data, the only observation
units are the seven restaurants in New York City.
For future research, more samples should be added
across different regions to confirm the result's
significance. Another way this research could be
improved is by adding more control variables. Many
factors could impact a restaurant's customer flow.
This research did not account for all the possible
factors and may have ignored some unfound
possibilities and confounding factors.
Future research could also use additional data to
examine each restaurant's influence level from the
war. Although this research confirmed the war's
impact on consumer preferences, it is uncertain why
some Ukrainian restaurants experienced higher
customer growth than others. Future research could
build on top and study some notable characteristics
of a restaurant that would determine its level of
influence from external shocks like war or covid.
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