Towards a Better Evaluation of Disaster Management Solutions
Ovidiu Noran
a
and Peter Bernus
b
IIIS Centre for Enterprise Architecture Research and Management, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia
Keywords: Disaster Management Framework, Disaster Risk Reduction, Defence, Resilience, Architecture Frameworks,
Enterprise Architecture.
Abstract: Worldwide, disaster management endeavours are confronted with a rising number of calamitous events
triggered by climate change, pandemics and armed conflicts. The increasing rate and complexity of such
occurrences has determined governments worldwide to attempt improving the disaster management effort by
adopting various specialised artefacts, among which disaster management frameworks feature prominently.
It appears however, that such artefacts display shortcomings such as lack of directly applicable guidance,
ambiguity and a lack of agility in the face of constant change inherent to disaster events. This situation poses
a conundrum to disaster management decision-makers who need to select such frameworks in the knowledge
that they have the necessary qualities, employ a suitable architecture and contain the required elements to
effectively guide the typically trans-disciplinary and cross-organisational disaster management effort. This
paper seeks to assist in this regard by providing a novel, multi-pronged appraisal approach for candidate
disaster management frameworks.
1 INTRODUCTION
As disaster events worldwide appear to constantly
increase in frequency and intensity, the procedures
and policies historically put in place to prepare for,
deal with and recover from such occurrences show
signs of no longer being able to cope with the changed
environment. Consequently, inherent hazards can
evolve into disasters negatively impacting upon
people and valuables, beyond the ability to avoid,
cope and recover from them (Global Access Partners
& Institute for Integrated Economic Research -
Australia, 2021; Parliament of Australia, 2020b). For
this reason, Governments and organisations have
continuously sought ways to enhance disaster
management-related artefacts so as to cope with the
changed situation; however, significant obstacles are
typically encountered having to do with the inevitable
intricacy of the specific components and concepts
involved and also with the absence of suitable
assistance to employ them in practice. Attempts have
also been made to tackle this complexity and bring
structure by employing disaster management
frameworks; however, questions still remain as to
a
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2135-8533
b
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5371-8743
how suitable and adequate for specific organisations
and events these frameworks are, how are they to be
used in practice at various levels and how they can
effectively underpin the essential need for adequate
collaboration in this domain.
As such, decision makers need assistance in their
effort to make sense of, select, structure and actually
use the plethora of existing and emerging candidate
artefacts (including frameworks) claiming relevance
and efficiency. They also need to know if these
constructs actually have the desired properties for the
task at hand and especially, if- and how do they cope
with the high complexity and chaotic characteristics
of the environment they are intended to operate in.
The geographical focus of this paper is Australia, due
to its high rate of many types of disaster events such
as fire, floods, storms, and tsunamis. Therefore, this
is considered a good starting point that provides the
required variety of case studies and artefacts relevant
to disaster management.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: a
brief description of relevant concepts and related
challenges in disaster management is followed by an
introduction to the artefacts and principles proposed
Noran, O. and Bernus, P.
Towards a Better Evaluation of Disaster Management Solutions.
DOI: 10.5220/0011638100003467
In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems (ICEIS 2023) - Volume 2, pages 445-456
ISBN: 978-989-758-648-4; ISSN: 2184-4992
Copyright
c
2023 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. Under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
445
to be used. Then, it is explained how these artefacts
can assist in the assessment of the disaster
management frameworks, illustrating with several
examples and a preliminary framework assessment.
The paper closes with conclusions and proposed
further work.
2 DISASTER MANAGEMENT
ARTEFACTS
2.1 Resilience: Aspects and
Approaches
There is a multitude of definitions for resilience in the
relevant literature, with the common leitmotif being
the capacity to cope with, and recover from adverse
events. Therefore, resilience appears particularly
relevant to disaster management and as such it is
briefly analysed in the present context.
A study performed by an Australian economic
think tank (Global Access Partners & Institute for
Integrated Economic Research - Australia, 2021)
identifies several aspects that contribute to improving
resilience: shared awareness, teaming and
collaboration and preparedness. These translate into
the need to clearly represent and thus achieve a
common shareholder grasp of the current and future
situations, of the relations between entities of interest
and of adequate and systemic life-long planning.
Further investigations by a Royal Commission in
disaster management arrangements (Commonwealth
of Australia, 2020) has also found hazards, exposure
and vulnerability as relevant factors in determining
resilience.
Moreover, a report by the Global Facility for
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2016)
recommends that risk and resilience assessments need
to shift from a snapshot approach towards a ‘useful
life’-long appraisal that can constantly guide decision
makers in attaining a resilient future state.
Literature describing the elements and technologies
that can enhance resilience has also been reviewed
(e.g. (Bernus, Noran, & Goranson, 2020; Connor &
Zhang, 2006; Southwick, Bonanno, Masten, Panter-
Brick, & Yehuda, 2014)). The main pervading theme
here was that tackling the resilience Universe of
Discourse using sets of viewpoints is highly
beneficial in coping with the complexity inherent to
disaster management. These findings are
incorporated in the proposed appraisal approach (see
the Enterprise Architecture Framework Evaluation in
Section 3.3).
2.2 Frameworks: Features and
Requirements
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction has supervised the creation of the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030
(United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction,
2015), which aims to ‘decrease disaster risk and
losses’ (ibid.). This framework appears to be the
precursor of- and inspiration for most of the other
major efforts in establishing national and regional
disaster management frameworks.
A review of such frameworks in Australia has
found that they have been created for each major
phase of disaster management. Thus, for Preparation
and Mitigation there is a Risk Reduction Framework
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2018) and a Disaster
Preparedness Framework (Australian Government,
2018); for Response there is a Resilience Framework
(Global Access Partners & Institute for Integrated
Economic Research - Australia, 2021) and for
Recovery there are also dedicated frameworks (e.g.
the state-level Recovery Framework in Victoria
(2020)). Reference models (‘guides’) also seem to
have been developed in order to provide some high-
level guidance for framework creation (see e.g. the
Disaster Recovery Framework Guide (2020)).
After examining the various frameworks
developed for the ‘Before’ (mitigate and prepare),
‘During’ (respond) and ‘After’ (recover) phases of
disaster management, it has been concluded that, in
fact, their components often extend into other disaster
management phases. This reflects the fact that in
reality, the various phases of disaster management are
partly overlapping. As an example, one needs to
Prepare to attain as high a degree of resilience as
possible, Respond when an event occurs and then
Recover; however, as recovery comparatively takes a
longer period of time, it is highly likely to overlap
with future iterations of disaster management efforts.
Similarly, Preparation may occur while at the same
time mitigating the effect/s of previous events and
disasters and Response may also take place while a
previous Recovery effort and other phases relevant to
other (also possibly cascading) disaster events are still
occurring (see Fig. 1). This cyclic approach is also
incremental in nature, as every iteration must
consider lessons learned from previous activities.
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Figure 1: Possible Disaster Management Phase overlaps.
An effective disaster management framework should
be able to represent, convey and facilitate this
overlapping, iterative and incremental approach.
In Australia, a parliamentary enquiry (Parliament
of Australia, 2020a) and think tank report (Global
Access Partners & Institute for Integrated Economic
Research - Australia, 2021), have found that
vulnerability, a key term that defines the boundary
between hazards and disasters, is inherently linked to
the potentially cascading and compounding character
of such events, such as “[…] pandemic with
associated supply chain failures, or increasing
frequency and severity of cyber-attacks” (ibid.),
currently met with an inadequate response
(Blackburn, Borzycki, & Jackson, 2021).
The above finding reflects the fact that the ability
to adequately cope with one or more disaster events
is closely linked to the proper understanding of the
current situation (be it e.g. a lack of trusted supply
chains, extremely limited domestic manufacturing, or
inadequate energy security (Blackburn, 2018)) and
the complexity of the often compounding and
interacting disaster events (Gissing, Timms,
Browning, Crompton, & McAneney, 2021; Pescaroli
& Alexander, 2018). This again emphasizes the need
for the supporting artefacts to adequately represent,
help to understand, and address the current and future
situations and compounded disasters. This important
set of requirements is reflected further in the structure
of the proposed framework assessment process.
2.3 Main Current Issues of Disaster
Management Frameworks
In the international context, the main issues
highlighted by the United Nations Office for Disaster
Risk Reduction report (2014) are as follows:
- Information gathered via assessments is often not
properly used also because policy makers do not
know how to make sense of the large amount of
data to obtain information (i.e. they are data rich,
but information poor (Bernus & Noran, 2017));
- Future risks are being created in the present due
to poor present and future states understanding;
- Lack of coordination between Disaster Risk
Management and climate change policies due to
poor constraint and mutual influence modelling;
- Insufficient Disaster Management funds due to
improper Resource modelling;
- Incomplete vulnerability understanding due to
low or non-existing human role modelling;
- Poor coordination between stakeholders, and a
lack of information sharing due to improper
modelling of the relations between stakeholders
and other relevant entities, from several
viewpoints;
- Improper Eco-system management – showing all
relevant relations between entities, during their
entire useful lives, not just at a point in time.
Compiling all the findings, the summary of main
issues presented by the reviewed current Disaster
Management Frameworks appear to be as follows:
- unclarity as to what a disaster management
framework should actually contain;
- lack of proper disaster management framework
theoretical background: for example, underlying
metamodels describing concept definitions such
as viewpoints, levels of abstraction, hierarchies,
as life cycle and life history;
- confusion as to what stakeholders are to be
involved and how do they relate to each other;
- inadequate representation of the relation between
entities during the whole life of the involved
entities, rather than in a snapshot manner;
- no reference to life cycle of the participant entities
(including stakeholders) and no clear modelling
of the human role;
- no explicit set of qualities expected from a disaster
management-specific framework (e.g. reliability,
maintainability, ease of use, adaptability etc);
- lack of shared situational awareness mainly due to
interoperability issues;
- calls to learn lessons from analogous Defence
Command and Control (C2) failures (Vassiliou,
2014) and high-level requirement descriptions,
however, with no detail of exactly how these
concepts and capabilities may integrate into the
disaster management concept.
As current Disaster Management Framework (DMF)
propositions will continuously evolve and new ones
will be developed, the authors suggest an assessment
Prevent / Mitigate E1
Prepare E1
Respond E1
Recover E1
Etc
Respond E2
Recover E2
Prevent / Mitigate E2
Prepare E2
Prevent / Mitigate E3
Prepare E3
Time
Disaster Management Phase
Simultaneous Phases:
Recover E1, Recover E2,
Prevent E3, Prepare E3
Prevent E1 &
Prepare E1
Overlap
E1 E3: Multip le (p os sibly cas cading) Dis as ter Events
E1
E2
E3
Towards a Better Evaluation of Disaster Management Solutions
447
structure intended to appraise candidate DMFs in line
with the above issues and thus potentially also guide
their further development.
3 PROPOSED ASSESSMENT
STRATEGY
The assessment procedure proposed evaluates how
the candidate artefact performs in structuring and
assisting areas that are deemed essential for effective
disaster management. The aspects assessed in each
step have been determined according to the findings
of Section 2 and are further explained in this section.
Figure 2: Proposed assessment strategy.
As can be seen in Figure 2., the first step looks for the
presence of Non-Functional Requirements (NFRs)
(also called ‘-ilities’, or quality attributes) that are
required to be present in the assessed artefact so that
it adequately performs in supporting the disaster
management Universe of Discourse (UoD). The
second step evaluates the architecture of the artefact
itself, in order to determine if it contains the required
perspectives and aspects and also if it structures them
in the most appropriate manner for the intended
domain. The last step is the most comprehensive,
allowing to assess more complex concepts and thus
ensuring that the assessment procedure suitably
evaluates the ‘requisite variety’ (Ashby, 1991) of the
candidate framework in respect to the complexity of
its intended UoD. More precisely, it evaluates
whether the framework is able to guide Mitigation,
Preparedness, Response and Recovery efforts
matching the content and interactions’ complexity of
actual disaster situations.
Importantly, as depicted in Figure 2, each step is
underpinned by internationally recognised and
adopted standards. As one of the major identified
problems is interoperability (see Section 2.3), the
presence of said standards acts as a bridge towards
common understanding, acceptance and agreement in
respect to adopting a unified assessment procedure.
3.1 Quality Attributes of Disaster
Management Frameworks as
Systems-of-Systems
The Disaster Management Universe of Discourse can
be considered a highly dynamic and complex System
of Systems that interact in a complex manner
(Commonwealth of Australia - Department of Home
Affairs, 2018). Therefore, in its turn a Disaster
Management Framework should be an adaptable
system of systems whose complexity should match or
exceed that of the Disaster Risk Management UoD
(Ashby, 1991) and that should be continuously
learning so as to maintain system qualities in the face
of expected and unexpected changes.
The international Standard ISO 25010-2011
(ISO/IEC, 2011) gives guidance on quality attributes
of systems and on additional attributes relevant to
system use. Boehm et al. (2014) define an ‘Initial
Definition of an -ilities Ontology’ based on value for
the stakeholder, where the -ilities defined summarize
the class hierarchy of the primary stakeholder -ilities
classes of Mission Effectiveness, Resource
Utilization, Dependability and Flexibility, joined by
their primary means-ends subclasses, and the primary
composite -ilities of Affordability and Resilience
(ibid.). Based on the set of requirements in the
Standard and on the above-mentioned hierarchy,
previous efforts (Noran & Bernus, 2022) have
produced an enhanced list of -ilities for assessment as
shown in Table 1, featuring the addition of ubiquity
(the capacity of being used irrespective of location),
evolvability (understood as adaptive [self-]evolution
(Brown, 2014)) and viability (i.e., the system’s
capability of long-term survival), all of which are
very relevant in view of the rationale for the candidate
DMFs targeted by the proposed evaluation process.
ISO25010
NFR
Evaluation
List of
necessary
-ilities
Evaluation factors,
objectives,
methods,
value analysis
Ontology /
Metamodel
Viewpoints
Life cycle
Life history
Self-Evolution
Agility
Candidate
Disaster Management
Framework
NFR assessed
Framework
Architecture
Evaluation
ISO42030
Architecture – assessed
Framework
Enterprise
Architecture
Framework-
based
Evaluation
ISO42030
Annex A
Assessed
Framework
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Table 1: Enhanced list of -ilities for Disaster Management
Frameworks (additions in italics).
Individual -ilities
Quality of Service: Performance, Accuracy,
Usability, Scalability, Versatility
Resource Utilization: Cost, Duration, Personnel,
Scarce Quantities (size, weight, energy, …)
Protection: Safety, Security, Privacy
Robustness: Reliability, Availability,
Maintainability
Flexibility: Modifiability, Tailorability /
Extendability, Adaptability
Composability: Interoperability/Portability,
Openness/Standards Compliance, Service-
Orientation
Evolvability
Ubiquity
Composite -ilities
Comprehensiveness/Suitability: all of the above
Dependability: Quality of Service, Protection,
Robustness
Resilience: Protection, Robustness, Flexibility
Affordability: Quality of Service, Resource
Utilization
Viability
The following gives a short explanation as to how the
-ilities in Table 1 may apply to an assessed candidate
DMF. As some of the qualities are related, they will
be treated as a group (or expanded upon only once)
where relevant.
Thus, the DMF must eliminate ambiguity as all
stakeholders should be able to understand and agree
on the current and future situations and on the
transition required; it should be usable by all the
envisaged relevant stakeholders, and also be
applicable to a range of scenario sizes irrespective of
any major changes made to it by other entities. In
other words, the framework must be able to self-
evolve to a certain extent so as to adapt to changes in
its environment (see Evolvability in Table 1, noting
that the assessment of the self-evolution capability
will also be analysed in Section 3.3). Where the
necessary changes exceed the capacity of the
framework to adapt itself, the controlling entities
should be able to readily change it (see modifiability,
tailorability and extendability in Table 1).
As resources are typically limited in crisis
situations, the Framework in question should display
an efficient use of resources – be it financial, human,
time or energy. The use of the proposed Framework
should allow modelling of the risks for response
crews and should support security or privacy in all of
the disaster management phases. The assessed
Framework
should be robust, i.e. it should be
available when and where required (see Ubiquity in
Table 1), should be consistent in its approaches and
readily modifiable if so required. In order to maintain
integrity, an underlying meta-model should be
present to provide unambiguous terminology and
underpin consistency following any changes.
Interoperability, together with portability, openness
and standards compliance should be present to ensure
that the entities involved in disaster management
planning, response and recovery can effectively work
together, which is currently not a trivial aspect (Noran
& Bernus, 2011). The framework’s capacity of long-
term survival (viability in Table 1) should also be
present as it is essential in view of the incremental and
evolutionary approaches taken to disaster
management and of its typically overlapping phases
(see Figure 1). This would ensure a unified and
consistent approach using a single framework instead
of a heterogeneous collection of paradigms promoted
by the contributors to the various phases of disaster
management efforts.
3.2 Architecture Evaluation of the
Disaster Management Frameworks
The variety of viewpoints and apparent lack of
underlying guiding paradigm reflected in the
reviewed risk reduction management document raises
two issues for the prospective users. Firstly, how can
it be ensured that all the appropriate aspects have
been covered in an appropriate manner? The answer
to this issue is provided in this paper by using an
Enterprise Architecture Framework-based
assessment as shown in Section 3.3.
A second Issue relates to ensuring that the
represented aspects have been organised in the most
suitable way for the intended purpose. This matter is
dealt with in this section by employing architecture
evaluation. For this purpose, the authors resort to the
use of a generic architecture evaluation standard,
namely ISO42030 (ISO/IEC, 2019b), which aims to
organize and document architecture evaluations for
the enterprise, systems and software fields of
application. According to this standard, the
evaluation of alternatives should be performed in two
passes: 1) eliminate proposals that do not satisfy
mandatory non-functional requirements, and 2)
compare candidate solutions using an appropriate
decision- making method (see Figure 3).
Towards a Better Evaluation of Disaster Management Solutions
449
Figure 3: ISO42030-proposed evaluation process.
The first pass has been already dealt with in Section
3.1. In regards to the decision-making method
specified in the second pass, ISO 42030 also requires
that, based on business goals, architecture governance
derives the evaluation objectives, specifying what
kind of answers are expected from the architecture
evaluation. Objectives can e.g., include determining
if the solution will increase efficiency (and if so, then
to what extent), or if it will improve current
capabilities and / or services quality, or if it will
promote new features (e.g., agility). The second pass
is presented in more detail in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Proposed components for the Architecture
Evaluation of Disaster Management Frameworks.
The comparison of potential solutions is to be
performed by defining evaluation factors that
influence the answers, and selecting methods known
to deliver these answers. Such factors (which are
normally derived from business drivers) may contain:
disaster risk mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery cost, schedule and quality. Suitable
evaluation methods here typically include the use of
analysis reports or expert panels.
Due to the high complexity of the Disaster
Management UoD, it may happen that he answers to
the above evaluation are rather vague; therefore, to
achieve a meaningful comparison of architectural
solutions one must establish the value of a particular
architecture (i.e., perform value analysis). Thus, it
may be required to determine if the quality
requirements are met, or whether there is a potential
trade-off or optimisation possibility; there may also
be a need to establish how architectural decisions
contribute to the expected quality attributes (for
example, ‘will a centralised, or rather federated
disaster management framework best underpin its
agility?’). Note that this value assessment process
must also include determining to what extent the
chosen architecture supports achieving the business
goals. The value of the chosen approach may be
demonstrated using key performance indicators based
on adequately selected metrics, e.g. disaster response
promptness, extent, cost, etc.
Should the desired measures be not readily
available when inspecting the proposed architecture,
then architectural analysis may also be required,
comprising the creation of e.g., simulation models
that can be used for sensitivity analyses. It is to be
noted that the cost of architecture analysis is typically
high, as it needs to explore alternatives in detail
(Martin, 2017); as such, it should only be used when
absolutely necessary.
3.3 Evaluation using an Enterprise
Architecture Framework
A typical approach in dealing with complexity is to
structure the concepts into various categories
according to a classification structure. This effort
should be underpinned by a metamodel whose role is
to uphold the integrity and consistency of this
ordering. In this approach, the above-mentioned
categories would become viewpoints exhibiting main
stakeholder group concerns articulated in the various
disaster management phase requirements. This
approach is hereby proposed to be applied to
candidate DMFs using a classification structure from
the domain of Enterprise Architecture, namely
ISO15704:2019 Annex A: Generalised Enterprise
Architecture and Methodology (GERAM) (ISO/IEC,
2019a). This Enterprise Architecture Framework
(EAF) has been selected for being the abstraction and
synthesis of the elements of several other mainstream
EAFs; GERAM is an established and proven artefact,
having been used in several projects within many
domains, which includes Disaster Management
(Noran & Bernus, 2011). The modelling framework
Eliminate
unsatisfactory
proposals
Evaluation
Framework
Architecture
Evaluators
Architecture
Evaluation
Report
Evaluate and
Compare compliant
solutions
Governance Mandated
Evaluation Objectives
(incl Mandatory NFRs)
Mandatory NFR
compliant system
Disaster Management
Ecosystem
Characteristics
Architecture Description
of proposed Disaster
Management Framework
Evaluation
objectives,
factors,
methods
Architecture
Evaluators
Disaster Management
Framework
Architecture
Evaluation
Generic
Evaluation
(ISO42030)
principles
Architecture
Analysis
Evaluation
Factors
Evaluation
Objectives
Evaluation
Methods
Value
Analysis
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(MF) of the Reference Architecture component of
GERAM (called GERA) contains a set of viewpoints
which can be employed to organise candidate
frameworks so as to assess their completeness for the
envisaged use and also to support a common
stakeholder understanding of the present, future and
necessary transition. The GERA MF is represented in
Figure 5, together with an example of modelling
construct obtained by selecting a specific set of
dimensions.
The presence of (or need for) a metamodel and /
or ontology underpinning the assessed framework can
be modelled using the Generic Instantiation level,
while the contents and appropriateness of potential
templates and relevant standards can be represented
using the Partial model level (see Figure 5 top).
Figure 5: GERA MF and a sample creation of a modelling
construct for dynamic business models.
3.3.1 Life Cycle, Vulnerability
The life cycle context present on the vertical axis in
the proposed MF (see Figure 5 top) allows to meet the
disaster event and management life-long modelling
requirement established in Section 2.1. This is
exemplified in Figure 6, where the typical phases of
disaster management are mapped onto the GERA life
cycle phases. In addition, it can be seen that the time-
abstracting MF construct allows for selected
modelled phases to be repeated as required. It should
be noted that a representation considering time is also
possible (exemplified later on in the paper).
Various other modelling constructs, focused on
specific viewpoints, allow filtering selected aspects in
order to manage the inherent UoD complexity (see
Section 3.3.3 for more details).
Figure 6: Disaster Management life cycle mapping on the
GERA-derived construct.
In turn, Figure 7 illustrates a scenario of how the
modelling constructs obtained (as shown in Figure 5)
can be used to represent the relations between entities
relevant to disaster management together with the
necessary collaboration and interoperability (Noran,
2011) of the participant entities, in a so-called
‘dynamic business model’. Thus, for example, one
can see the cooperation of the government (Govt),
various disaster management organisations (DMO)
and local communities (Com) working together to co-
design and deliver risk reduction and management
programs (Duckworth, 2021) (see arrows from these
entities to the Disaster Management Project (DMP),
Disaster Management Framework (DMF) and
Disaster Response Units (DRU)).
The required agility of relevant entities (e.g. the
Disaster Management Framework (DMF), Disaster
Response Unit (DRU), etc.) is represented by arrows
going from their Operation life cycle phase back to
their own Architectural, Detailed Design and
Implementation life cycle phases. This signifies that
the entities can re-design themselves, as long as the
extent of this re-organisation does not go over a set
threshold, after which higher authority (typically, the
designing entities) are invoked.
Management
and Control
Cust Service
C
Entity
D
Op
I
DD
PD
R
Id
M
P
Simplify
Human
Machine
Resource
Information
Function
Particular level
Hardware
Software
Design
P
relim. design
e
tailed design
Identification
Concept
p
lementation
Operation
e
commission
Requirements
Organisation
Management
and Control
Product or Service
Human
Machine
Resource
Organisation
Information
Function
Generic
Partial
Particular
Hardware
Software
LC phases
Views
Instantiation
Design
Prelim. design
Detailed design
Identification
Concept
Implementation
Operation
Decommission
Requirements
Management
and Control
Product or Service
Human
Machine
Resource
Organisation
Information
Function
Generic
Partial
Particular
Hardware
Software
LC phases
Views
Instantiation
Design
Prelim. design
Detailed design
Identification
Concept
Implementation
Operation
Decommission
Requirements
MF of GERA
Mgmt.
Operation
Implementation
Det. Design
Prel. Design
Requirements
Concept
Identification
Prevention /
Mitigation
Preparation
Response
Recovery
Decommission
GERA MF
Construct
Disaster Management
Phases and Iterations
Towards a Better Evaluation of Disaster Management Solutions
451
Figure 7: Possible Disaster Management scenario (dynamic business model).
Importantly, one can also use this model to analyse
proposed scenarios. Thus, one can investigate the
possibility for the Defence Forces to create a Special
Disaster Operations unit (ADF/SDO in the figure) in
order to better prepare and execute disaster relief
operations, as this seems to increasingly be the case
(Jennings, 2020).
Vulnerability and related concepts derived from
the reviewed documents (see Section 2.2) can also be
analysed here, from the system-of-systems point of
view modelled by the relevant entities in the context
of their lifecycles and showing the automation extent.
For this purpose, a suitable modelling construct
showing human role (present in the structure shown
in Figure 5 top) can be derived from the GERA MF.
3.3.2 Disaster Compounding
Concurrent and compounding disasters have been
described in relevant literature, although mostly
limited to one other factor only (i.e., societal pressure
during other disasters (Gissing et al., 2021)). In the
real world, however, there are many other types of
interconnected disasters that need modelling; for
example, Earthquake/ Tsunami (Noran & Bernus,
2011), or Fire-Clouds–Storm-Lightning–Fire
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2020). This kind of
inter-relation (initially shown using a simplified life-
cycle focused representation in Figure 8) can also be
further modelled using the above-described approach
by selecting appropriate viewpoints to depict the
required influences and necessary intervention by
appropriate DRUs (see e.g. (Noran & Bernus, 2011)).
Figure 8: Disaster / effect compounding representation.
Note that this kind of mapping can also be performed
for the interdependent effects of one or more
DMP
DMO
Gov’t
DRO
COM
DRU
D
Op
I
DD
PD
R
C
Id
DML
Life cycle phases: Id: Identification; C = concept; R = requirements, PD = preliminary design, DD = detailed design,
I = implementation, Op = operation, D = decommissioning. Other aspects: P = Production / Service, M = management
M
P
M
DMF
Legend:
DMO: Disaster Mgmt Orgs
ADFHQ: Defence Force Headquarters
ADF /
SDO: Defence Force
Special Disaster Ops
DRU: Disaster Response Unit
DMP: Disaster Mgmt Project
DML: Disaster Mgmt Laws
DRO: Disaster Response Operation
DMF: Disaster Mgmt Framework
Gov’t: Government
COM: Communities
:Operation -Service &
Management
: Operation - Service only
: Possible scenario
: Agility
ADF HQ
ADF/
SDO
: Possible scenario
PDE
Legend:
PDE: Primary Disaster Event or Effect;
SDE / TDE: Secondary / Tertiary
D
Op
I
DD
PD
R
C
Id
TDE
SDE
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disasters; for example, power interruption may
impact on other services, then flowing into various
other areas and communities.
To summarise, this approach allows to analyse
patterns present in complex and highly dynamic
systems interacting in a cascading fashion and to
formulate suitable preparedness and response.
3.3.3 The Time Dimension: Life History
Time is not represented explicitly in the proposed
MF, although it is present in the form of a life history
concept, which can be depicted graphically by adding
an orthogonal time dimension to the modelling
constructs obtained from the GERA MF (see Figure
9); this can enable a more thorough analysis of the
disaster management scenarios represented.
Such an approach may be required because, as shown
in Figure 1, Section 2.2 and Figure 8, disaster events
and disaster reduction, response and recovery actions
may compound and overlay, augmenting the
complexity of the situation and necessitating more
detailed modelling. As an example, Figure 9 presents
the scenario of setting up Disaster Response
Organisations and Units, while also illustrating the
overlap of Disaster Response Operations that they
create and operate. Thus, the Government and
Disaster Risk Task Force set up Disaster Risk
Response Organisations, which then, with
involvement from Community Organisations, set up
Disaster Response Units and Operations. This
representation is similar to that shown in Figure 7;
however, due to the time dimension, it can give
additional detail such as concurrency and succession.
Note also the possibility to represent both
management and mission fulfilment of the involved
entities aspects, as necessary.
Importantly, this enriched model provides additional
information as to ‘who does what’ - but also ‘when’.
3.3.4 Additional Potential Assessments
Further assessments may assist with the current
difficulties in the actual implementation of the
proposed Frameworks as described by the United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2014).
These can be performed by creating constructs using
various combinations of aspects contained by the
above-described GERA MF. Thus, Management vs.
Service / Mission Accomplishment provides clarity in
regards to task allocation for decision makers and
operators. The Software vs. Hardware division allows
to represent the implementation of required functions
Figure 9: Life histories of entities relevant to the disaster management scenario.
Gov’t & Disaster
Risk Task Force
...
Disaster Risk
Response
Organisations
Disaster
Response
Unit (DRU)
LEGEND: mission fulfillment of entity:
management of entity:
operational relationship (interaction or support:
generative relationship (conceive/design/create):
Influence relationship:
Community
Organisations
...
...
.
.
.
Disaster
Response
Operation
general policies,
principles
participate
create
DRU
design &
implement
1
st
operation
participate in
DRU governance
identify the need for, concept and mandate of operation(s)
define
DRU
Laws
time
general policies,
principles
participate in
operation governance &
give feedback
2
nd
operation
operations
may overlap
Towards a Better Evaluation of Disaster Management Solutions
453
and their physical deployment. Automation extent
shows e.g. what information and resources are
necessary to, and what functions can be performed by
machines rather than humans, so as to avoid putting
disaster response crews at unnecessary risk; this also
aids in mitigating vulnerability.
Data and properly derived information (Bernus &
Noran, 2017) that is adequate in quantity and quality
and is delivered when and where required can
significantly help all phases of the disaster
management. This aspect can be modelled using the
Information viewpoint of the GERA MF.
The way the candidate DMFs are actioned in all
disaster management phases can be modelled using
the Function viewpoint of GERA MF.
The essential aspect of organisational
cooperation, which has proven to be a weak point in
many disaster relief operations (Paturas, Smith,
Albanese, & Waite, 2016), can be modelled in the
Organisation viewpoint.
Finally, the paramount aspect of resourcing
featuring prominently in disaster management
(Chang, Wilkinson, Seville, & Potangaroa, 2010) can
be modelled through the Resource viewpoint.
Explicit examples of these aspects’ mappings are
not possible here due to available space and will be
disseminated separately.
4 CASE STUDY
The following will attempt to illustrate the use of the
proposed assessment procedure by evaluating a DMF,
namely the Australian Disaster Preparedness
Framework (ADPF, see Figure 10, right) (Australian
Government, 2018). Note that this represents only a
preliminary evaluation, to be followed by more
comprehensive efforts in future work.
4.1 Non-Functional Requirements
The first step of this assessment is limited to the NFRs
deemed most important, i.e. adaptability, ubiquity,
evolvability and viability (or possible synonyms
present in the target document).
Adaptability: the ADPF states that national
preparedness needs to be adaptable as part of the
preparedness principles. However, there is no
mention as to how this will be achieved.
Ubiquity: the ADPF mentions the need for national
preparedness to be linked to foreign governments and
international agencies. This is the only possible
mention of ubiquity present in the document,
however once again no details (even high level) are
given of how this could be achieved.
Figure 10: Australian Disaster Prevention Framework.
Evolvability: the document mentions the need to be
‘adaptable’ to changes in the nature of disasters and
context of application. The only other potential
mention of evolvability is ‘continuous improvement’.
Viability: there is no mention of this NFR or of a
similar term throughout the document.
Recommendation: the framework should give more
attention and at least high-level guidance to the NFR-
linked aspects, besides a mere mention in the
document. NFRs such as viability should be included.
4.2 Architecture Evaluation
Evaluation Objectives for this framework may
include whether the ADPF increases efficiency,
improves current capabilities or quality, or if it
promotes agility.
Efficiency is mentioned in the document in terms of
the management of disasters along their entire
lifecycle. However, the ADPF appears to give no
details as to how this will be achieved. Capabilities
appear to have received more attention within the
Govern area of the framework; however, Agility is
only mentioned under the form of adaptability.
In terms of the Evaluation Factors, such as
disaster risk mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery cost, schedule and quality, the ADPF
appears to only cover Preparedness. As the scope of
the document appears to be limited to this phase
(although sometimes also touching on the Recovery
phase), this may be sufficient.
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Recommendation: the ADPF should provide more
guidance on streamlining the disaster management
efforts and on the adaptability of the framework.
4.3 Enterprise Architecture
Framework-based Evaluation
From the point of view of the disaster management
life cycle, it appears that the ADPF only covers the
Mitigate/ Prepare phases (see Fig. 6), which may be
appropriate in view of its name (‘Preparedness’)
although as mentioned references to other phases
exist (e.g. Recovery).
The ADPF claims to aim to promote collaboration
although this is not detailed in the document, even at
high level (it could be achieved e.g. via a Functional
viewpoint). The importance of data is stated in the
document; however, once again there is no detail
given on how this may be used to underpin an
effective preparation effort; moreover, there appears
to be no distinction between data and the Information
derived from it. The Organisation and Resources
viewpoints get mentioned in the document however
no details (even high level) are provided as to how
collaboration will happen, authorities will be
allocated and resources will be shared and managed.
A minimal guide for the use of the framework is
provided, although it does not follow a consistent
approach (various concept categories are mixed in the
same diagram) and in the absence of details, it is not
very useful. Moreover, there is no sample scenario
illustrating at least one of the proposed steps.
Recommendations: 1) The ADPF will need to be
complemented with other frameworks covering
Response and Recovery. 2) Information, Functional,
Organisation and Resources viewpoints are highly
recommended at least as high-level guidance for the
use of the framework. 3) Generally, at least one
example of each aspect covered should be provided.
4) Sample scenario/s should be provided, even at
generic level to clarify the application of the
framework for disaster management decision makers.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER
WORK
This paper has adopted a novel, holistic approach
towards clarifying the still evolving concept of
disaster management framework and assessing such
candidate artefacts for their qualities, architecture,
and completeness of their viewpoints in the context
of their intended use. This work may assist policy
makers establish whether a proposed disaster
management framework is suitable for their purpose
in regard to necessary qualities, suitable structure and
applicable viewpoints and concepts, selected
according to their intended domain, geographical
location, as well as available and required resources.
Future research will extend the preliminary
assessment to include all required elements and
perform the appraisal of other proposed disaster
management frameworks in order to validate and
further refine the proposed assessment approach.
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