An OWL Multi-Dimensional Information Security Ontology
Ines Meriah
1 a
, Latifa Ben Arfa Rabai
1 b
and Ridha khedri
2 c
1
Universit
´
e de Tunis, Institut Sup
´
erieur de Gestion de Tunis, SMART Laboratory, Tunis, Tunisia
2
Department of Computing and Software, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Keywords:
Information Security, Security Dimension, OWL Security Ontology, Multi-Dimensional Security Ontology,
Dimensional View.
Abstract:
To deal with problems related to Information Security (IS) and to support requirements activities and archi-
tectural design, a full conceptualisation of the IS domain is essential. Several works proposed IS ontologies
capturing partial views of the IS domain. These ontologies suffer from incompleteness of concepts, lack of
readability, portability, and dependability to a specific IS sub-domain. Following a rigorous and repeatable
process, we systematically developed a comprehensive IS ontology. This process includes four steps: con-
cept extraction, XML generation, OWL generation and dimensional view extraction. The obtained ontology
is multidimensional, portable and supports ontology modularization. It is presented under XML format and
OWL format. It comprises 2660 security concepts and 331 security dimensions.
1 INTRODUCTION AND
MOTIVATION
The need for an ontology that outlines the domain
knowledge related to information security is essen-
tial for several stages of software development. It can
be used to support the requirements stage to improve
traceability of non-functional requirements and elic-
itation and documentation of requirements. At the
architecture design stage, it helps the designer put
the necessary mechanisms to support non-function re-
quirements. Particularly, when the non-function re-
quirements that we are considering are those related
to security, any supporting tool is extremely valuable.
In this paper, we are concerned with the elicitation of
an information security ontology that is modular and
that support securing information systems in general.
The system’ security aspect has a major effect in
modern distributed software systems. For require-
ments management activities it is essential to an-
swer questions about the dependencies among non-
function requirements and particularly about secu-
rity requirements. One also would wonder whether
it is necessary to revise security in connection with
changes in the functional requirements and wonder
a
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8713-0216
b
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5657-4682
c
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2499-1040
about which project artefacts are affected by the
change (Murtazina and Avdeenko, 2019). It is a trace-
ability issue and ontologies could be of great help for
requirements analysts in tackling this issue. More-
over, in IS domain, ontology presents security con-
cepts and provides details about their relationships.
An IS ontology is considered as a required container
for the security of systems and their applications. Ac-
cording to (Sanagavarapu et al., 2021), an IS ontol-
ogy facilitate threat intelligence, reasoning of attacks
and anomaly detection. The ontological representa-
tion of IS domain helps in contextual readiness and
awareness to defend a malicious attack and protect
IT assets. Another perspective on the need for a se-
curity ontology at the requirements level is related
to having a precise terminology to articulate secu-
rity requirements. In a business environment, security
and software stakeholders use existing IS ontologies
to determine security risks and articulated the appro-
priate requirements for the countermeasures (Meriah
et al., 2021). The security terminology should be effi-
ciently organized in an IS ontology. Security concepts
are extremely large in number, dynamic and evolv-
ing over the time. However, it is necessary to obtain
comprehensible IS ontology to help resolve security
problems and write the correct security requirements.
Although there are several existing security machine
learning models to identify security requirements and
issues, most security stakeholders suffer from the lack
372
Meriah, I., Rabai, L. and khedri, R.
An OWL Multi-Dimensional Information Security Ontology.
DOI: 10.5220/0011841300003464
In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Evaluation of Novel Approaches to Software Engineering (ENASE 2023), pages 372-380
ISBN: 978-989-758-647-7; ISSN: 2184-4895
Copyright
c
2023 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. Under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
of readable view of IS domain (Meriah et al., 2021).
This problem arises from the complexity of the field
on the one hand, and the lack of effective commu-
nication and collaboration between stakeholders on
the other hand. What aggravates further the issue is
that security decision makers interpret IS terminology
differently, which leads to misunderstanding among
them when they assess threats or evaluate security risk
scenarios (Pereira and Santos, 2012), (Martins et al.,
2020). For example, the security terms of attack,
threat and risk are confused and used as synonyms
(Li and Chen, 2020). The challenge for requirements
analysts is to remove ambiguities of IS concepts and
become familiar with security terminology that is in-
creasing and changing over the time (Elnagar et al.,
2020).
Security concepts can be observed and regrouped
regarding several dimensions (Jouini et al., 2021).
Each dimension takes a specific manageable perspec-
tive on IS, where one can have a better understand-
ing of the characteristics of concepts by accurately
defining concepts with their features or attributes. For
example, the security dimension of confidentiality
represents the concept of confidentiality with its at-
tributes such as confidentiality impact, confidentially
key and confidentiality mode, and the security dimen-
sion of network represents the concept of network
with its details like network access, network file, net-
work traffic and network defense. In general, an on-
tological dimension is a component of the ontology
that has a high level of cohesion between its con-
cepts. The concepts of such component present a
level of connectivity (through the relationships be-
tween them), which makes the component presents a
sub-domain of the domain under consideration. An-
other way to consider the dimension in an ontology
is to take as possible dimensions the concepts that
are immediately connected to the root. For instance,
in our case, the concepts attack, threat, or risk re-
lated to the root concept ”Thing” (as shown in Fig-
ure 5) are possible dimensions that can give perspec-
tives on the domain of IS. According to the design
principle of low coupling and high cohesion, an ontol-
ogy that exhibits high cohesion between its elements
and low coupling with other components is deemed
to be well designed. Decomposing ontologies into
modules (i.e., sub-ontologies) using dimensions could
be considered as an approach to ontology modularisa-
tion (LeClair et al., 2019; LeClair et al., 2022; LeClair
et al., 2020). These dimensions help focus the atten-
tion of the requirement analyst to one aspect of the
system security by eliciting the requirement from one
aspect at the time. This paper proposes an IS ontology
that has several dimensions and modules.
In this paper, we propose a multi-dimensional on-
tology of IS domain. The ontology is presented under
an OWL format, in which several dimensional views
can be extracted according to the user’s security re-
quirements and needs. The proposed ontology would
support security stakeholders to use only the views
that are relevant to their concerns, which reduces the
burns of partially using a large ontology. Several soft-
ware programs are used to support the generation of
multi-dimensional IS ontology in OWL format. We
used python for writing view extraction programs and
prot
´
eg
´
e editor to visualise the obtained ontology in
the form of dimensional views.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2
presents related works. In this section, we describe
existing IS ontologies, detail their structure in term
of security concepts, and provide a critical analysis
of them regarding security dimensions. Section 3
presents an overview of the systematic process of the
multi-dimensional IS ontology generation. Section 4
gives an illustrative example of OWL ontology gen-
eration process and the dimensional views obtained.
Section 5 compares the proposed ontology with three
OWL IS ontologies. Section 6 presents the highlights
of the proposed IS ontology and point to related future
works.
2 RELATED WORK
Several IS ontologies have been presented in the lit-
erature. This section discusses the organization of se-
curity concepts under existing IS ontologies.
Herzog et al. (Herzog et al., 2007) propose the
first OWL-based IS ontology for security researchers
and professionals. The ontology models the ba-
sic concepts of security risk analysis namely Asset,
Threat, Countermeasure, Vulnerability, Security goal,
and Defence strategy. Each basic concept is hierar-
chically classified into specific sub concepts. In (Ra-
manauskait
˙
e et al., 2013), a generic ontology based
IS standards is developed to optimize the use of sev-
eral standards in organization. The proposed ontology
includes five classes: Organization, Asset, Threat,
Vulnerability and Countermeasure(Meriah and Rabai,
2019). The standard mapping and the hierarchy struc-
ture of each class enable to provide details relevant
to the high level IS cited concepts. In these ontolo-
gies, the authors consider only the organizational and
risk assessment perspectives for modeling IS domain.
We should consider other security aspects to provide
a complete view of IS domain.
Other IS ontologies provide specific security as-
pects for modeling security knowledge. For example,
An OWL Multi-Dimensional Information Security Ontology
373
the OWL security ontology in (Solic et al., 2015) is
used to estimate the level of system’s security. Thus,
by considering the IS elements of Network security,
Software and hardware issues, Human influence, Se-
curity policy, and Disaster recovery plan. These con-
cepts model involved security issues in information
systems. In addition, the ontology proposed in (Li and
Chen, 2020) organizes the security requirement as-
pects of IS to four concepts Asset, Security property,
Countermeasure, and Security requirements. The au-
thors provide details of each security requirement
concept using key words extracted from IS documents
and standards. In fact, concepts in these ontologies
are dependent to IS sub-domains as they are used to
support IS models and frameworks.
In the literature, another category of IS ontologies
are presented in the form of modules. Fenz and Ekel-
hart in (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) present a unified IS
ontology to support security risk management in in-
formation systems. The proposed ontology is divided
in three subontologies: Security, Enterprise, and Lo-
cation. Security subontology includes four classes
Threat, Vulnerability, Attribute, and Rating. Enter-
prise subontology includes three classes Asset, Enter-
prise and Person while the location subontology in-
cludes only the Location class. Souag et al. (Souag
et al., 2015) present a core security ontology which
model security requirement concepts with their rela-
tionships. The structure of the ontology is based on
three dimensions: Organization, Risk, and Treatment.
In (de Franco Rosa et al., 2018), an OWL ontology
called Security Assessment Ontology (SecAOnto) is
developed to describe security assessment aspects in
organizations. The concepts are organized in three di-
mensions: System assessment, Information security,
and Security assessment.
All the cited ontologies in this section provide an
intuitive description of security dimensions and con-
cepts without providing how the dimensional decom-
position of their ontologies is established. In addition,
we find that a clear ontological view of these dimen-
sions is missed, which might affect the interpretation
of the IS domain.
To the best of our knowledge, we lack a well defined
systematic and/or automatic methodology to classify
the ontology concepts into several IS specific aspects
to generate multiple views regarding the final on-
tology user needs. Then, developing and propos-
ing a multidimensional ontology to present dimen-
sional views for most ontology concepts is undoubt-
edly needed by the IS ontology community.
3 THE PROPOSED OWL
ONTOLOGY GENERATION
PROCESS
To overcome the lack of a systematicly generated
multiple views of an IS ontology, we propose in
this section a multi-dimensional ontology that con-
tains domain concepts with their hierarchical rela-
tionships. The generation process of this ontology
starts with online IS dictionary and leads to dimen-
sional views generated from OWL ontology concepts.
The dimensional views obtained provide an overview
of the IS domain and help organizations to have de-
tails about particular IS concepts and identify their
security needs and requirements. For example, from
the OWL multi-dimensional ontology generated, on-
tology users can extract dimensional views such as
control, privacy, and authentication dimensions. The
generation process of OWL multi-dimensional IS on-
tology is fully automatic. As presented in Figure 1, it
includes four steps:
1. Concept extraction: It is for the extraction of do-
main concepts from web dictionary.
2. XML generation: It leads to a hierarchical repre-
sentation between concepts in the form of XML doc-
ument.
3. OWL generation: It transforms the XML structure
of the ontology into its corresponding OWL represen-
tation.
4. Dimensional view extraction: It supports the ex-
traction of dimensional views relevant to a given con-
cepts in OWL ontology.
Figure 1: The proposed generation process of OWL Multi-
dimensional IS ontology.
ENASE 2023 - 18th International Conference on Evaluation of Novel Approaches to Software Engineering
374
3.1 Concept Extraction
We have focused on online dictionaries presenting a
large number of concepts in IS domain. Domain dic-
tionaries provide to their users a well-defined vocabu-
lary for searching and indexing. For constructing do-
main ontologies, dictionaries are often used to rec-
ognize domain concepts and identify such similarity
between them (Harjito et al., 2018).
Domain concepts in dictionary are particularly
noisy including an amount of useless information.
Pre-processing tasks are necessary to exclude worth-
less symbols and obtain a cleaned space of concepts.
To extract domain concepts, the classical tasks of pre-
processing adapted in this stage consist of:
Filtering useful domain concepts while excluding
punctuation characters, special characters, numbers,
abbreviations, and stop words.
Removing some domain concepts that include ad-
jectives or adverbs.
Removing words with less than three characters.
Converting the string-labels of the obtained con-
cepts to lowercase.
In this first step that of concept extraction, we have
used different Python libraries to identify required
concepts. BeautifulSoup library is used to gather con-
cepts from HTML pages while the re library is used
to identify abbreviations. In other hand, we use NLP
techniques like tokenization, POS and stop word re-
moval to identify concept patterns. In fact, tokeniza-
tion splits compound terms into a list of words called
tokens. Then, POS is used to assign the correspond-
ing POS tagging to each token. It consists of identify-
ing the grammatical category of words such as noun
(NN), verb (VB), adjective (JJ). Stop words removal
is another method, which manages textual data and
removes compound words including stop words (CC)
(e.g., after, before, and, or).
3.2 XML Generation
A structural representation of domain concepts is re-
quired to capture concept relationships. In fact, XML
is a simple and flexible data source which provides
to their intended users a common syntax (Nguyen,
2011). In general, the structure of XML represents in-
formation in the form of tags to relive the low seman-
tics of HTML. Tags in XML can be represented as a
structured tree giving a hierarchical representation of
concepts (BRAY, 2000), (Nguyen, 2011). To generate
an XML document in this second stage, two essential
tasks are performed. The first is to map all extracted
concepts to XML Tags. The second is to provide con-
cept hierarchies. As a result, we obtain concept rela-
tionships as structured tree regarding hierarchical lev-
els. Table 1 shows concept patterns identified from
the generated XML document and illustrates exam-
ples of IS concepts with their hierarchical levels. Con-
cepts in level one present unique terms while concepts
in level two and three present compound terms. We
note that concepts in the second level of hierarchy in-
clude only two terms while concepts at the third level
include at least three terms. We follow this structure
to obtain concept relationships in the form of XML
document.
Table 1: Identification of concept patterns from XML doc-
ument.
Concept patterns IS Concept examples Depth
NN computer 1
NN NN computer security 2
NN NN NN computer security incident 3
NN NN NN NN access security log man-
agement
3
3.3 OWL Generation
To obtain the graphical representation of the ontol-
ogy, it is needed to consider the XML document.
Then, we generate the OWL file as XML structure.
The obtained structure can be used for semantics and
for reasoning. With only the XML format of con-
cepts, it is difficult to do operations like classification,
check consistency, selection, and comparison. Fur-
thermore, to ensure the interoperability of concepts,
after converting the XML to OWL ontology, we use
the python library of MinDom for parsing XML as
a tree and mapping its elements to OWL classes (di-
mensions) and OWL sub-classes (attributes). Hier-
archical relationships in OWL ontology are the re-
quired components that reveal different security di-
mensions. In fact, RDF and RDFS support the under-
standing of the extracted information on the web. In
our obtained OWL ontology, RDF operates the graph-
ical representation of web resources using URI, while
RDFS provides vocabulary specifying classes (i.e.,
rdf: class) on the hierarchical relationship between
classes(i.e., rdfs: subclassof ) (Bikakis et al., 2013),
(Nguyen, 2011).
Figure 2 shows the corresponding OWL encoding of
the class computer and the subclass computer abuse.
The OWL format of the complete IS ontology gener-
ated is available in (Meriah et al., 2023a).
3.4 Multi-Dimensional View Extraction
A view is a fragment of a target ontology, which is
captured by ontology users (Lozano et al., 2014). A
An OWL Multi-Dimensional Information Security Ontology
375
Figure 2: Fragment of the OWL file generated showing
the security dimension of computer with its attribute com-
puter abuse.
dimensional view is considered as a portion of an
existing domain ontology, which presents details re-
lated to a root ontology concept. The purpose of this
stage consists of offering a well defined terminology
regarding user security needs. As mentioned previ-
ously, the ontological representation helps ontology
users easily querying and searching for particular con-
cepts and details. Therefore, to extract dimensional
view, three main tasks are performed:
1. Search the root concept by browsing OWL ontol-
ogy.
2. Select the root concept, if it exists in the OWL on-
tology.
3. Visualize the dimensional view in which, all con-
cepts that are reachable from the selected concept are
involved.
In this final stage of our ontology generation process,
we use the ontology implementation tool of prot
´
eg
´
e
editor (Prot
´
eg
´
e, 2020). This tool provides an interac-
tive graphical representation for a given OWL ontol-
ogy and offers an API access to user knowledge bases.
The automatic generation of a sub-ontology based
on words occurring after each other make security
concepts related to each dimension readable, clear
and precise. The proposed OWL multi-dimensional
ontology is a means that help security stackholders
efficiently interpret security concepts. It is useful to
define security dimensions and precise the relations
among them.
4 A USAGE SCENARIO OF THE
OWL ONTOLOGY
GENERATION PROCESS
The following example illustrates the generation pro-
cess of OWL multi-dimensional IS ontology and illus-
trates how users can exploit the obtained ontology to
precisely decompose the three IS concepts threat, at-
tack, and risk. Decision makers are often using these
three terms for identifying, analysing, and evaluating
their IS situation within the organization. The chal-
lenge for them is to remove ambiguities among these
terms in order to efficiently conduct risk assessment
and make suitable IS decisions.
Attackers exploit system vulnerabilities to launch
attack programs or multihost attacks that target com-
puter resources in a progressive way (Meriah and
Rabai, 2018). In organizations, the popular forms
of attacks like phishing, malware and DoS/DDoS at-
tacks make unauthorized access of information assets
in order to use, steal or destroy sensitive data (Sing-
hal and Ou, 2017; ISO Central Secretary, 2018). For
example, DoS attack deactivates servers by gaining
access to particular services from internet and mak-
ing computer resources like disk space, processor and
bandwidth unavailable. In addition, malicious attack-
ers pose potential threats in information systems. In
(Stoneburner et al., 2002), a threat refers to ”a cir-
cumstance that cause damage to information system’s
assets”. It can be an undertaken action performed by
attacker or adversary to makes business losses. Sig-
nificant threats that are commonly known include de-
struction, fraud, penetration, theft, disclosure, extor-
tion, vandalism, and espionage.
In general, IS attacks and potential threats affect
security objectives and make business prone to risk.
According to (Jones and Ashenden, 2005), risk is an
unexpected event that makes us at least losing one of
the security requirements. As an initiative to address
such risk, it is relevant to outline security threats in
business environment and identify attacker’s traces in
a security context. In ISMS, a risk is defined as the
effect of uncertainty on IS objectives (Alanen et al.,
2022). It is considered as the potential of security
threats to cause security breakdowns in an enterprise.
The risk is measured by the likelihood and impact
caused by attackers and IS threats. Therefore, model-
ing threat, attack and risk concepts as IS dimensions
helps to improve their perceptions in IS domain and
organizations.
We apply the OWL ontology generation process to
INFOSEC dictionary (Center, 2022). This dictionary
includes terminology changing in a continuous way
and varying based on the IS sub-fields being consid-
ered. Related terms and definitions are mainly cap-
tured from IS security standards and guidelines like
NIST Special Publications (SPs) and Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standards (FIPS). We have con-
sidered IS concepts under the above dictionary (i.e.,
dictionary of (Center, 2022)) as it respects most of the
requirements and hypothesis regarding the proposed
ontology generation process.
In the first stage, we extract IS concepts regarding
several tasks of pre-processing. In the second stage,
we have offered a hierarchical representation between
these IS concepts using XML document. The XML
identifies the security dimensions as a root concepts
ENASE 2023 - 18th International Conference on Evaluation of Novel Approaches to Software Engineering
376
Figure 3: Screenshot of attack, threat and risk dimensions
in XML file.
Figure 4: OWL IS Ontology generated.
organized with their features called attributes. In Fig-
ure 3, we present screenshots from XML document
generated. The screenshots show the risk dimension
with 17 attributes, the threat dimension with 7 at-
tributes and the attack dimension with 3 attributes. To
visualize the ontology, the XML structure of IS con-
cepts is mapped to OWL ontology. As shown in Fig-
ure 4, ontology dimensions are fuzzy, ambiguous and
unreadable due to the huge amounts of the stored con-
cepts. Therefore, IS dimensions still difficult to read
and interpret. To solve this problem, it is required to
present attack, threat, and risk concepts as a dimen-
sional views in order to perceive them correctly within
information systems.
At the end of the ontology generation process, we
have specified and visualized security concepts view
by view. First, we have searched the required dimen-
sion by browsing the ontology itself. Second, we have
selected the dimension in OWL ontology and finally
we have displayed the view using OntoGraph plugin
from prot
´
eg
´
e editor. Figure 5 shows attack, threat,
and risk dimensional views. Attack view is repre-
sented with red box. Threat view is represented with
blue box and risk view is represented by orange box.
The low number of attributes of attack dimension is
an indication about its limited perception in the IS
domain. In other hand, the high number of attributes
of threat and risk dimensions is an indication of their
wide scope in the domain. We note that all the con-
cepts that are reachable from threat dimension are in-
volved in threat dimensional view.
5 EVALUATION OF THE
PROPOSED ONTOLOGY
In this section, we evaluate the proposed multi-
dimensional ontology by comparing it with the most
known and available OWL IS ontologies for the re-
lated community. We have focused on the impor-
tance of the multi-dimensional ontology obtained in
terms of concepts, attributes and dimensions using a
qualitative analysis. In fact, three OWL IS ontologies
were selected for the ontological analysis: Herzog et
al. ontology (Herzog et al., 2007), Fenz et al. on-
tology (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) and De Franco et
al. ontology (de Franco Rosa et al., 2018). In Her-
zog et al. ontology (Herzog et al., 2007), concepts
are derived from security databases and cryptographic
models related to IS risk analysis and access control
sub-domains. In other hand, the structure of Fenz
et al ontology (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) highlights
the relationships among top-level security concepts to
ensure security compliance and IS risk management
in organization. Most relevant concepts in Fenz et
al. ontology are obtained from IT Grundschutz Man-
ual, the french EBIOS and ISO/IEC 27001 standards.
For modeling IS assessment sub-domain, SecAOnto
ontology in (de Franco Rosa et al., 2018) presents
terms from existing security taxonomies, ontologies
and guidelines.Although the presented ontologies de-
fine an extensive list of security concepts, they still
fragile as they highly dependent on specific IS sub-
fields like access control, risk assessment and risk
management. None of them covers a large number
of IS sub-domains. It can be noticed that the ontol-
ogy generated provides a major coverage of IS area
because it incorporates concepts extracted from se-
curity dictionary (CSRC dictionary). Following the
proposed process of ontology generation, the multi-
dimensional ontology can update and interrelate their
security terms in a continuous way. Thus, it enables
ontology users to generate specific ontologies relevant
to IS sub-fields. For instance, we can derive the secu-
rity dimensions of threat, asset, vulnerability and con-
trol and then represent relevant details to IS risk man-
agement sub-domain. The main ontology elements
considered for comparing ontologies are: the num-
ber of concepts, the number of attributes and the total
number of security dimensions providing hierarchical
An OWL Multi-Dimensional Information Security Ontology
377
Figure 5: The dimensional views of attack, threat, and risk.
relationships. prot
´
eg
´
e editor metrics have been used
to obtain quantitative data of these ontology elements.
Table 2: Data of comparison results of OWL IS ontologies.
OWL IS ontology elements
References Concepts Attributes Dimensions
(Herzog et al., 2007) 460 752 -
(Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) 641 1051 3
(de Franco Rosa et al., 2018) 157 167 3
Proposed ontology 2660 1613 331
Table 2 compares the number of concepts, at-
tributes and dimensions for each cited ontology and
the proposed one. As results, De Franco et al. on-
tology has the least number of concepts, while the
proposed multi-dimensional ontology has the largest
number of security concepts and attributes. Regard-
ing the dimensional aspect in these ontologies, the se-
curity dimensions are very low in Fenz et al. and De
Franco et al. ontologies, while the proposed OWL
ontology provides 331 security dimensions as sub-
ontologies. Each security dimension precises generic
security concept with its attributes. In fact, the di-
mensional aspect in ontology helps interpreting ter-
minologies and domain concepts. In general, security
dimensions make readable, shared and reusable the
generic concepts like threat, risk and control.
Furthermore, dimensions in the proposed OWL IS
ontology are used to remove ambiguities of security
concepts. Their main purpose is to specify security
concepts in an organized and detailed way.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORKS
This paper proposes an OWL multi-dimensional IS
ontology. The proposed ontology is comprehensive
and extendable as it can be further enriched with con-
cepts from IS corpuses. The overall ontology shows
the ontological links between the dimensions of IS,
which gives IS stakeholders an idea about the depen-
dencies among the dimensions and their criticality on
the security.
Following a rigorous and repeatable process that
is discussed in Section 3, we developed an ontology
covering the IS domain. This ontology is easily de-
composable into modules each presenting a security
dimension and providing a security perspective. The
ontology is available at (Meriah et al., 2023b) under
an XML format and at (Meriah et al., 2023a) under
an OWL format. The process used in obtaining the
proposed ontology can be applied to get ontologies in
other natural languages. For instance, for an ontol-
ogy in French one starts from a French dictionary for
security and uses similar Python scripts as the ones
we used (after adapting them to the specifics of the
language) to extract the concepts and their relation-
ships. Using the notion of ontology dimensions, we
can decompose the proposed IS ontology into sev-
eral modules. This modularization is essential when
we want to focus on specific security concerns such
ENASE 2023 - 18th International Conference on Evaluation of Novel Approaches to Software Engineering
378
as management, risk, or threats. In (LeClair et al.,
2019; LeClair et al., 2020), we find several ontology
modularization techniques. The dimensionalities in-
troduced in this paper could play a significant role in
support of methods such as the view traversal modu-
larization technique. ontology metrics of prot
´
eg
´
e edi-
tor are considered. Our future work aims at exploring
further enrichment of the current ontologies with con-
cepts and relationship extracted from other sources
such as ISO standards, wiki-data, and several other
corpuses. Our objective is to have the most current
and complete IS ontology.
We plan to use other ontology evaluation metrics
like precision, recall and f-measure to more evalu-
ate the performance of our ontology generation ap-
proach. Furthermore, we aim to use the proposed
ontology combined with DIS formalism (Marinache
et al., 2021) in analysing security-log data to learn
about the security situation surrounding the system
under consideration.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This study was funded by Natural Sciences and Engi-
neering Research Council of Canada –NSERC– (CA)
(RGPIN-2020-06859).
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