Remote Security Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems: Adapting
Design Patterns for Enhanced Diagnosis
Kazutaka Matsuzaki
1a
, Kenji Sawada
2b
and Shinich Honiden
3c
1
Faculty of Global Informatics, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan
2
The Info-Powered Energy System Center, The University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, Japan
3
Faculty of Science and Engineering, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
Keywords: Cyber-Physical System, Cyber Security, Communication Robustness Test, Industrial Automation and Control
System.
Abstract: This paper presents a novel approach to remote security diagnosis for critical infrastructure systems, focusing
on integrating Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and cloud-based diagnosis. The proposed method adapts two
existing design patterns to address the challenges associated with remote security diagnosis: (1) adapting the
"Ambassador Pattern" of the cloud design pattern for virtual extension of the CPS input interface to the cloud
computing environment, and (2) adapting the "Data Aggregation Pattern" of the edge computing design
pattern for virtual extension of the CPS output to the cloud computing environment. We discuss implementing
and evaluating our proposed method in a simulated environment, demonstrating its potential for improving
the accuracy and efficiency of remote security assessment. This research contributes to developing secure and
reliable CPS by providing insights into effectively adapting existing design patterns for remote security
diagnosis.
1 INTRODUCTION
As the adoption of cyber-physical systems (CPS)
continues to grow, encompassing applications such as
distributed solar power plants, cloud-based building
management, and smart factory security, the risk of
cyberattacks on these systems also rises. Cyberattacks
on CPS can result in significant damage to both
digital and physical domains, with infrastructure
components like pipelines, water treatment facilities,
and power grids susceptible to shutdowns and
disruptions.
Given the ongoing discovery of new
vulnerabilities and the evolving sophistication of
cyber attackers, it is crucial to continuously assess the
efficacy of cybersecurity measures. Existing security
evaluation frameworks include certification tests for
control systems and embedded devices, assessing
known vulnerabilities and communication
robustness. However, conducting such tests on
a
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2337-2686
b
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8935-0434
c
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1385-3996
operational systems poses challenges in terms of
time, manpower, and cost constraints.
To reduce the burden of on-site testing, this paper
explores the potential of remote testing over a
network as an alternative approach to enhancing
cybersecurity in CPS. We investigate a cloud-based
diagnostic method aimed at minimizing on-site
testing while efficiently evaluating the security
posture of these systems. Our analysis begins with
identifying the challenges that can be addressed
through remote diagnostic innovations, followed by
highlighting the remaining issues that warrant further
investigation.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2
discusses the challenges of CPS security diagnostics;
Section 3 introduces a cloud-based security
diagnostic architecture; Section 4 evaluates the
addressed challenges; Section 5 examines the
remaining challenges; and Section 6 presents a
conclusion.
Matsuzaki, K., Sawada, K. and Honiden, S.
Remote Security Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems: Adapting Design Patterns for Enhanced Diagnosis.
DOI: 10.5220/0012132600003555
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2023), pages 805-812
ISBN: 978-989-758-666-8; ISSN: 2184-7711
Copyright
c
2023 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. Under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
805
2 CPS SECURITY ASSESSMENT
CHALLENGES
2.1 Assumed Situation
To clearly understand the assumed situation, Figure 1
illustrates a simplified model of CPS security
diagnostics and the associated challenges. In this
model, the diagnostic device (DD) transmits
anomalous data to the CPS's input interface (IN) for
diagnostic purposes. While the specific data
transmitted depends on the protocol supported by the
input interface, this paper assumes using TCP/IP.
The DD observes the output (OUT) of the CPS to
evaluate its security measures. Potential output
interfaces for monitoring include digital, analog,
serial (e.g., RS-485), TCP/IP, register (e.g., Modbus),
LED, and others.
Monitoring is necessary during two distinct
phases:
Assessing whether essential functions are
maintained while transmitting anomalous
data for diagnosis.
Verifying that the system returns to normal
operation after sending abnormal data.
The challenge lies in the possibility of obtaining
inaccurate diagnostic results due to various factors.
These inaccuracies can occur in four different ways:
(a) Anomalous data may not reach the CPS,
causing it to be disregarded as an invalid test case.
Consequently, potential issues with security measures
might be overlooked.
(b) Monitoring data may not be observable from
the CPS, leading to determining abnormalities or
dismissing an invalid test case.
(c) In cases where monitoring data is not
observable from the CPS, anomalies might be missed,
causing the test case to proceed undetected.
(d) When verifying whether the system returns to
normal operation after transmitting abnormal data,
the inability to observe monitoring data from the CPS
may result in misjudgements of abnormalities or false
negatives.
By addressing these potential inaccuracies, we
aim to enhance the effectiveness and reliability of
CPS security diagnostics.
2.2 Related Research
In recent years, research on network-based security
testing (e.g., fuzzing) for control systems has gained
prominence at international conferences.
These studies not only focus on improving test
performance but also organizing the requirements for
test environments specific to control systems. For
instance, it is emphasized that equipment under test
should be monitored as comprehensively as possible
(Pfrang, 2018). Monitoring targets encompass
network interfaces and digital inputs and outputs.
Unlike fuzzing tests for software, essential functions
are maintained by analyzing communication and
hardware signals. Since it is not feasible to access the
device's internals using a debugger, inferences about
the device must be drawn from externally observable
phenomena during testing.
Efforts to enhance the performance of control
system fuzzing tools are also underway. For example,
Polar (Luo, 2019) employs machine learning to
identify the functional code of the control system and
conducts fuzzing by progressively modifying
anomalous data. This study aims to explore whether
such tools can be applied to test targets located at
considerable distances from one another. Another
study of interest uses fuzzing to evaluate security
measures for entire control systems (Chen, 2019).
2.3 Security Testing Efforts in Past
Demonstrations
Security testing for IEC 61850-based systems has
demonstrated that communication robustness tests
could be performed using remote access VPNs
(L2TPv2) and VPNs between locations (L2TPv3)
(Matsuzaki, 2020, Wilkerson, 2022). When
employing a VPN between locations, networks can
communicate as if they were part of the same LAN.
In one instance, a communication robustness test
of the IEC 61580-MMS protocol was conducted via a
VPN using DTLS. In another case, a compact
portable terminal (e.g., Raspberry Pi) was brought
Figure 1: CPS security diagnostic model and current issues.
SECRYPT 2023 - 20th International Conference on Security and Cryptography
806
near the test target and operated as an LAC/LNS
4
for
L2TPv3, creating a virtual network to verify the
feasibility of communication robustness testing.
Figure 2 illustrates the response status to the issue
using naïve methods, including those demonstrated in
past years. The following three mechanisms were
added as naïve solutions:
Remote Access VPN: The diagnostic equipment and
CPS were connected through a remote access VPN.
Specifically, a VPN client device using DTLS was
placed on the CPS side, and a controller was installed
on the diagnostic equipment side.
DAQ (Data Acquisition): A digital signal was
branched from the terminal block contact in the CPS
and used as an input to DAQ.
DAQ Client: The DAQ client accesses DAQ via
TCP/IP, periodically obtains data values held by
DAQ, and presents them to the user via a GUI.
Although most items were partially addressed,
several challenges remained:
a) The team was able to run numerous test cases on
the TCP/IP protocol stack. Still, issues persisted with
Layer 2 (e.g., Ethernet) and the reachability of
anomalous data using broadcast.
b) The DAQ client was used via VPN to acquire
current values at high frequency continuously.
However, there remained the issue of being unable to
detect pulse data for short periods (about 0.1 second)
due to the access frequency of the DAQ client and
network latency.
c) Network latency occasionally made it challenging
to perform essential function monitoring. The
problem remained that essential function outages
could be overlooked, which were short but longer
than the test requirements.
d) The issue persisted that after sending abnormal
data, when monitoring whether the system had
returned to normal operation status, it might not be
able to detect the condition that allowed the user to
operate the touch panel.
3 ADAPTING DESIGN
PATTERNS FOR REMOTE
Figure 3 shows the proposed input/output extension
design pattern and the improvement status of the
4
L2TP Access Controller / L2TP Network Server
5
Microsoft, Ambassador pattern,
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/azure/architecture/patterns/ambassador
issue. The proposed method addresses the security
diagnosis issue by simultaneously adapting two
existing design patterns.
Adapting the Ambassador Pattern for Virtual
Extension of CPS Input Interface to the Cloud
This approach adapts the "Ambassador Pattern" from
the cloud design pattern
5
to the security diagnosis. It
uses a site-to-site VPN instead of the previous
section's remote access VPN. The OUT of the
diagnostic equipment is virtually on the same local
network segment as the IN of the CPS. Specifically,
LAC/LNS equipment is brought in, and an L2TPv3
VPN is temporarily established between the
diagnostic device (DD) and the CPS. In the
ambassador pattern, a proxy for remote access is
deployed for communication with external services.
Therefore, the proposed method can be described as
a "dispatched" ambassador pattern, which is realized
by bringing in equipment on the CPS side.
Adapting the Data Aggregation Pattern for
Virtual Extension of CPS Output to the Cloud
In this approach, the "Data Aggregation Pattern" of
the edge computing design pattern
6
is adapted for the
security diagnosis. Instead of checking the output of
the CPS using the pull-type method by the DAQ
client as described in the previous section, the data
6
Amazon Web Services, Industrial edge design
considerations,
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/industrial
-iot-architecture-patterns/industrial-edge-design-
considerations.html
Figure 2: Status of addressing challenges with naïve
Solutions.
Remote Security Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems: Adapting Design Patterns for Enhanced Diagnosis
807
aggregated on the DAQ is delivered to the DD side
using the push-type method. Using digital output as
an example, data is aggregated and conditioned on the
DAQ, relays are turned on and off, and the data is
transmitted to the DD side as digital output using the
remote I/O mechanism. This method makes it
possible to convey short pulse data that would
otherwise be overwritten on the DAQ side to the DD
side. In the data aggregation pattern, data is
temporarily aggregated by an edge computer in an
environment with unstable network communication
and periodically summarized and sent to the center.
In the proposed method, data is aggregated and stored
so that it is not overwritten and reliably transmitted to
the DD side through push-type distribution.
The proposed method can be used in a stable
network environment.
a) The reachability of Layer 2 (e.g., Ethernet) and
broadcast anomalous data is also addressed.
b) Depending on the performance of the DAQ,
changes as short as 0.1 seconds can be monitored and
communicated to the DD so that short pulse data
(about 0.1 seconds) can be detected.
c) As with the above, depending on the
performance of the DAQ, monitoring of essential
functions can be performed in milliseconds. It is also
possible to supplement the suspension of essential
functions for short periods, which cannot be
overlooked as a test.
d) When monitoring whether the system returns
to normal operation status after sending abnormal
data, we confirmed that the system can detect a 0.1-
second operation, even when the user's touch panel
operation is enabled.
Figure 3: Proposed Input/Output Extension Patterns and
Status of Issue Improvement.
4 IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVALUATION
To evaluate the ability of the proposed method to
meet the challenges under certain conditions in a
simulated environment, we conducted three different
tests:
1. Comparison of the number of automated tests by
testing on the local network and testing with the
proposed method.
For comparison, we ran a test suite on TCP/IP on
the test equipment. The number of test cases
within the test suite automatically executed by
local testing environment was compared with the
number of test cases when performed in a cloud-
based environment.
2. Comparison of the number of automated tests in
industrial protocols.
From the tests in the first point, a similar
comparison was made only for the test suite for
IEC 61850 (MMS), which is increasingly being
introduced in the power sector. The IEC 61850
software was changed to another software, and the
digital output of the equipment under test was also
subject to monitoring.
3. Pulse Signal Monitoring Test.
We conducted a monitoring test of the proposed
method in a cloud-based environment. The test
was performed by changing the analog output for
the test in a steady time series and sending a pulse
output to the diagnostic device for 100
milliseconds when the condition was met. When
this pulse is detected, the diagnostic device
records it as "abnormal" in the test case.
The diagnostic device used was the Achilles Test
Platform (ATP), a commercial product with a test
suite for each protocol. The ATP does this by
terminating the test case in progress and moving on
to the next test case.
4.1 Evaluation Experiment 1: Number
of Test Cases (General)
A comparison of the number of cloud-based
automated tests was conducted by testing on the local
network and by using the proposed method.
SECRYPT 2023 - 20th International Conference on Security and Cryptography
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Figure 4: Test environment for the experiment 1.
The test suite used includes the following:
• Major grammar exams for Ethernet, IP, TCP
• Ethernet Load Testing
• IEC 61850 (MMS) testing
The test subject was Omicron IEDScout
7
as an
Intelligent Electronic Device (hereinafter IED)
simulator. The test input was limited to port TCP 102,
and the monitoring covered network communication
and the availability of port TCP 102.
As a condition for determining an abnormality,
we set a loose condition that the monitored object
should recover within 30 seconds after it is no longer
captured so that the test case can be implemented as
much as possible.
Under these conditions, the study was conducted
three times with direct connection in a local network
environment and via the cellular network (LTE) for
comparison.
The results were almost identical in all cases, with
the last test case conducted. There is no statistically
significant difference in the number of test cases
performed (Figure 5, Figure 6).
Figure 6 shows the number of test cases with
anomalies. On average, more anomalies are detected
when the TCP port is added to the monitoring
conditions. This can be seen because of the difficulty
in determining test results using the same port to
which data is sent.
Figure 5:Number of sub-testcases executed.
7
OMICRON, IEDScout,
https://www.omicronenergy.com/en/products/iedscou/
Figure 6: Number of test cases with anomalies.
4.2 Evaluation Experiment 2: Number
of Test Cases (IEC 61850)
A comparison of the number of automated tests in
industrial protocols was performed. As a change
from Experiment 1, the software implementing IEC
61850 was changed to a different type, and the output
interface of the device under test was included in the
monitoring conditions (Figure 8).
The test set of ATP used includes the following:
• IEC 61850 (MMS) testing
The libiec61850
8
sample program was used as
the test subject. The test input was limited to port
TCP 102, and the monitoring was network sparsity,
availability of port TCP 102, and digital output of
IEDs (should always hold High). Other conditions
were the same as in Evaluation Experiment 1.
Figure 8 shows the number of tests and the
percentage containing anomalies. All of the tests
eventually resulted in an abnormality. In fact, the
software also ended abnormally. Although the
number of tests conducted was the same each time,
the number of anomalies found differed slightly (35,
30, 33 times). Still, as in Experiment 1, it is thought
to contain some judgment errors.
Figure 7: Test environment for the experiment 3.
8
https://github.com/mz-automation/libiec61850
Rem ot e
I/O
LAC/
LNS
LAC/
LNS
WAN/ LTE
L2TPv3
DD
LAN1
LAN2
Rem ot e
I/O
DAQ
DI/ DO
Relay
DI/ DO
TCP/ IP
TCP/ I PDI/ DO
Remote Security Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems: Adapting Design Patterns for Enhanced Diagnosis
809
Figure 8: Test environment for the experiment 2.
Figure 9: Latency in the environment 3.
The leftmost bar graph shows that there were about 340
ICMP exchanges between 0.05-0.06 seconds (about 45% of
the total).
Figure 10: Number of tests resulted in anomalies.
4.3 Evaluation Experiment 3: Pulse
Signal Monitoring
In evaluation experiment 3, a pulse signal monitoring
test was carried out with the aim of verifying the
system's capability to accurately capture short-
duration communications and signals, such as touch
panel operations. Figure 7 shows the test environment
which is specialized for monitoring for evaluation of
a pattern of virtual extension of CPS output to the
cloud. A direct path from the DAQ to the diagnostic
device is also set up for the comparison experiment.
The diagnostic device was operated in manual test
mode to assess the functionality of the monitoring
system during the test. The output was transmitted to
the diagnostic device through the cellular operator’s
network, and it was confirmed that the diagnostic
device accurately detected the abnormality.
The average latency observed was 0.07 seconds,
with the maximum latency reaching 0.18 seconds
(occurring only once in a 10-hour period). The
distribution of latencies is depicted in Figure 10.
There were no instances where the pulse outputs were
incompatible, and 100% of the pulses were
successfully reported.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 Relationship Between Evaluation
Experiments and Challenges
Table 1 presents the results of the evaluation
experiments conducted in Section 4 and summarizes
the relationship between the experiments carried out
in Section 4 and the challenges identified in Section
2.
(a) Based on experiments 1 and 2, it can be
concluded that the aborted transmission of abnormal
data due to undelivered transmitted data has been
addressed. However, the network load test was not
included in this evaluation, so additional evaluation
on load reproducibility is necessary.
(b) Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that the system
can handle events interrupting the transmission of
abnormal data due to monitoring malfunctions of the
output being diagnosed. Nonetheless, further
evaluation is needed when dealing with more
complex conditions, such as increasing the number of
contacts to be monitored or monitoring the TCP port
on the transmitting side.
(c) The issue where the transmission of abnormal
data is interrupted due to a malfunction in monitoring
the output to be diagnosed is also handled similarly to
(b).
(d) The misjudgment of diagnostic results due to
a monitoring malfunction of the output to be
diagnosed does not fall under the risk category of
misjudgement when the operator's operation is
normal. Other confirmation methods are also
considered applicable if they are fundamentally the
same as (b) and (c), i.e., normal operation
confirmation on transmitting and monitoring.
SECRYPT 2023 - 20th International Conference on Security and Cryptography
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5.2 Applicability of This Method
The requirement for monitoring in fuzzing studies
and certification schemes is "to cover all outputs."
The scope is limited even for monitoring tests in local
networks that are not cloud-based. When applying the
virtual extension pattern to the cloud in the proposed
method, it is possible to reproduce the same
monitoring as for testing in a local area network by
increasing the number of devices with remote I/O and
DAQ. However, even test devices that are certified
tools in the certification system have GUI and
physical limitations on the number of monitored
points. For example, a digital output is physically
limited to four contacts. If many contacts are to be
monitored to improve diagnostic accuracy, some kind
of encoding and expansion of the monitoring GUI
may be necessary.
In this test environment, latency was relatively
small, and jitter issues did not affect the results.
Further empirical research is needed to test the
response to jitter errors in areas with weak radio
waves and poor network conditions.
When considering actual use cases of diagnostics,
it is also necessary to consider the increased burden
on testers who temporarily set up DAQ and other
equipment in the local system. As for the testers, they
will have to carry in the monitoring equipment, install
it, set it up, and witness the implementation of the test,
which will be costly in proportion to the scale of the
target to be monitored. When determining the
parameters that define the monitoring conditions, if
the parameters are optimized for the local
environment, the burden on local workers will
increase, which will not lead to a reduction in the cost
of the test. Establishing a methodology to reduce the
total cost, including the burden on workers, is also
considered necessary.
Developing strategies to minimize the workload
on local testers and optimize the overall testing
process will be crucial in ensuring the success of the
proposed method. This could involve creating
comprehensive guidelines and automating certain
aspects of the installation and monitoring processes to
streamline the workflow. Additionally, exploring
innovative ways to expand the monitoring GUI and
improve diagnostic accuracy without overwhelming
the system or personnel will be essential.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel method for remote
security assessment of critical infrastructure systems
using virtual extension design patterns. The proposed
method addresses the challenges and limitations
faced by traditional remote security assessment
approaches, including network stability, reachability
of Layer 2 data, and the monitoring of essential
functions in real time.
Through the implementation and evaluation of the
proposed method, we demonstrated its ability to
effectively address these challenges in a simulated
environment. The evaluation experiments showed
promising results, with the proposed method
successfully handling aborted transmission of
abnormal data, ensuring proper output monitoring to
be diagnosed, and maintaining consistent
performance in various testing scenarios.
However, further research and development are
needed to optimize the proposed method for real-
world applications. This includes expanding the
scope of monitoring, addressing latency and jitter
issues, and minimizing the burden on local workers
during the testing process. Developing
comprehensive guidelines and automating certain
aspects of the installation and monitoring processes
will be essential in streamlining the workflow and
reducing overall costs.
In conclusion, the proposed method offers a
promising solution for the remote security assessment
of critical infrastructure systems. By addressing the
existing challenges and limitations, this method can
significantly enhance cybersecurity and protect
critical infrastructures in the face of ever-evolving
threats.
Table 1: Relationship between evaluation experiments and tasks.
Ex 3 Ex 2 Ex 1
(a-1) The same tests were conducted as those in the local area.
(a-2) The same number of tests were conducted in the local area.
**(a)Interruption
(b-2) Equipment output was properly monitored.
(b-3) Anomalies as small as 0.1 second were also supplemented.
**
(b)Interruption
(c-2) Equipment output was properly monitored.
(c-3) Anomalies as small as 0.1 second were also captured.
**
(c)Continuation
(d-3) Operations of about 0.1 second were also captured.
*
(d)Confirmation
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