# MAJORITY VOTING IN STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM WITH COUPLES - Using a monotone systems based tournament approach

### Tarmo Veskioja, Leo Võhandu

#### Abstract

Providing centralised matching services can be viewed as a group decision support system (GDSS) for the participants to reach a stable matching solution. In the original stable marriage problem all the participants have to rank all members of the opposite party. Two variations for this problem allow for incomplete preference lists and ties in preferences. If members from one side are allowed to form couples and submit combined preferences, then the set of stable matchings may be empty (Roth et al., 1990). In that case it is necessary to use majority voting between matchings in a tournament. We propose a majority voting tournament method based on monotone systems and a value function for it. The proposed algorithm should minimize transitivity faults in tournament ranking.

#### References

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#### Paper Citation

#### in Harvard Style

Veskioja T. and Võhandu L. (2004). **MAJORITY VOTING IN STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM WITH COUPLES - Using a monotone systems based tournament approach** . In *Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 2: ICEIS,* ISBN 972-8865-00-7, pages 442-447. DOI: 10.5220/0002655904420447

#### in Bibtex Style

@conference{iceis04,

author={Tarmo Veskioja and Leo Võhandu},

title={MAJORITY VOTING IN STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM WITH COUPLES - Using a monotone systems based tournament approach},

booktitle={Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 2: ICEIS,},

year={2004},

pages={442-447},

publisher={SciTePress},

organization={INSTICC},

doi={10.5220/0002655904420447},

isbn={972-8865-00-7},

}

#### in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 2: ICEIS,

TI - MAJORITY VOTING IN STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM WITH COUPLES - Using a monotone systems based tournament approach

SN - 972-8865-00-7

AU - Veskioja T.

AU - Võhandu L.

PY - 2004

SP - 442

EP - 447

DO - 10.5220/0002655904420447