A STRATEGYPROOF AUCTION MECHANISM FOR GRID SCHEDULING WITH SELFISH ENTITIES

V. Hastagiri Prakash, Y. Narahari

Abstract

With major advances in computing technology and network performance, grid computing is strategically placed to become the future of enterprise and even personal computing. One of the most important issues concerned with grid computing is that of application scheduling. The type of scheduling algorithm used will depend on the type of the application. In a global grid setting, the individual users must be provided with an incentive to offer their resources. The situation becomes non-trivial because of the fact that these entities are intelligent, rational and selfish resource providers who, for strategic reasons, may not provide truthful information about their processing power and cost structure. In this scenario, apart from optimality of the algorithm used, strategy-proofness of the underlying mechanism becomes important. This paper presents a strategyproof mechanism based scheduling algorithm for parallel flow type applications in the form of a reverse auction.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Hastagiri Prakash V. and Narahari Y. (2006). A STRATEGYPROOF AUCTION MECHANISM FOR GRID SCHEDULING WITH SELFISH ENTITIES . In Proceedings of WEBIST 2006 - Second International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies - Volume 1: WEBIST, ISBN 978-972-8865-46-7, pages 178-183. DOI: 10.5220/0001255301780183


in Bibtex Style

@conference{webist06,
author={V. Hastagiri Prakash and Y. Narahari},
title={A STRATEGYPROOF AUCTION MECHANISM FOR GRID SCHEDULING WITH SELFISH ENTITIES},
booktitle={Proceedings of WEBIST 2006 - Second International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies - Volume 1: WEBIST,},
year={2006},
pages={178-183},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0001255301780183},
isbn={978-972-8865-46-7},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of WEBIST 2006 - Second International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies - Volume 1: WEBIST,
TI - A STRATEGYPROOF AUCTION MECHANISM FOR GRID SCHEDULING WITH SELFISH ENTITIES
SN - 978-972-8865-46-7
AU - Hastagiri Prakash V.
AU - Narahari Y.
PY - 2006
SP - 178
EP - 183
DO - 10.5220/0001255301780183