ON THE NEED TO DIVIDE THE SIGNATURE CREATION ENVIRONMENT

Jorge L. Hernandez-Ardieta, Ana I. Gonzalez-Tablas, Benjamin Ramos, Arturo Ribagorda

Abstract

Electronic signatures have been legally recognized as the key element for boosting e-commerce under secure conditions. Several legislations throughout the world establish electronic signatures as legally equivalent to hand-written signatures, assigning them the property of evidence in legal proceedings. In addition, international standards define electronic signatures as non-repudiation evidence respecting the signed information. Bearing this in mind, it is obvious that the reliability of electronic signatures is paramount. However, the results show that several attacks on signature creation environments are feasible and easy to perform. As a result, the reliability of evidence is drastically undermined. We claim that the division of the environment becomes the most effective solution to counteract current threats. The formal proofs that support this statement are given along with an overview of the legal background and a summary of main potential threats on signature creation environments.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

L. Hernandez-Ardieta J., I. Gonzalez-Tablas A., Ramos B. and Ribagorda A. (2009). ON THE NEED TO DIVIDE THE SIGNATURE CREATION ENVIRONMENT . In Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2009) ISBN 978-989-674-005-4, pages 375-380. DOI: 10.5220/0002224103750380


in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt09,
author={Jorge L. Hernandez-Ardieta and Ana I. Gonzalez-Tablas and Benjamin Ramos and Arturo Ribagorda},
title={ON THE NEED TO DIVIDE THE SIGNATURE CREATION ENVIRONMENT},
booktitle={Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2009)},
year={2009},
pages={375-380},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0002224103750380},
isbn={978-989-674-005-4},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2009)
TI - ON THE NEED TO DIVIDE THE SIGNATURE CREATION ENVIRONMENT
SN - 978-989-674-005-4
AU - L. Hernandez-Ardieta J.
AU - I. Gonzalez-Tablas A.
AU - Ramos B.
AU - Ribagorda A.
PY - 2009
SP - 375
EP - 380
DO - 10.5220/0002224103750380