A COALITION BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR P2P CONTENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

M. V. Belmonte, M. Díaz, A. Reyna

Abstract

P2P systems suffer from free-loaders, peers that consume many more resources or contents (bandwidth) than they contribute. One of the reasons for this is that the mechanisms used for downloading and sharing in the P2P systems, do no take selfish behavior of the peers into account at the design stage. Therefore, it is important to find mechanisms that provide incentives and encourage cooperative behavior among the peers. One possible solution could be to use an economic framework that provides them with incentives. We propose the application of a coalition formation scheme based on game theory to P2P file sharing systems. The main idea for the coalition formation scheme is based on the fact that peers that contribute more get a better quality of service. A peer that participates in a coalition lends ”bandwidth” to other peers of the coalition, in exchange for utility and consequently far greater download bandwidth. Simulation results have shown the effectiveness of the mechanism in stopping the free-riding peers and encouraging cooperation, increasing the performance of a P2P network and obtaining an improvement in time download performance.

References

  1. Androutsellis-Theotokis, S. Spinellis, D. (2004). A survey of peer-to-peer content distributing technologies. ACM Computing Surveys, 36-4:335-371.
  2. Belmonte, M. V., Conejo, R., Díaz, M., and Pérez-de-la Cruz, J. L. (2006a). Coalition formation in p2p file sharing systems. In Curret Topics in Artificial Intelligence, LNAI 4177.
  3. Belmonte, M. V., Conejo, R., Pérez-de-la Cruz, J. L., and Triguero, F. (2006b). Coalitions among intelligent agents: A tractable case. Computational Intelligence. An International Journal, 22-1:52-68.
  4. Belmonte, M. V., Díaz, M., Pérez-de-la Cruz, J. L., and Reyna, A. (2007). File sharing service over a generic p2p simulator. In In Proceedings of Semantic, Knowledge and Grid, SKG-07.
  5. Bertsekas, D. Gallager, R. (1992). Data Networks. PrenticeHall.
  6. Cohen, B. (2003). Incentives build robutness in bit torrent. In Proceedings of the First Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems.
  7. eMule (2010). The e-mule web site. http://www.emule.net.
  8. Garbacki, P., Iosuo, A., Epema, D., and Van Steen, M. (2006). 2fast:collaboartive downloads in p2p networks. In Sixth International Conference on peer-topeer computing, P2P'06.
  9. Golle, P., Leyton-Brown, K., Mironov, I., and Lillibridge, M. (2001). Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACMPress.
  10. Handurukande, S. B., Kermarrec, A., Le Fessant, F., Massouli, L., and Patarin, S. (2006). Peer sharing behaviour in the edonkey network, and implications for the design of server-less file sharing systems. In 1st ACM Sigops/Eurosys European Conference on Computer Systems. EuroSys 7806.
  11. Kahan, J. Rapaport, A. (1984). Theories of Coalition Formation. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
  12. Karakaya, M., Korpooglu, I., and Ulusoy, O. (2008). Countrecting free riding in peer-to-peer networks. Computer Networks, 52:675-694.
  13. Karakaya, M., Korpooglu, I., and Ulusoy, O. (2009). Free riding in peer-to-peer networks. In IEEE Internet Computing, pages 92-98.
  14. Ma, R. T. B., Lee, S. C. M., S., L. J. C., and Yau, D. K. Y. (2006). Incentive and service differentiation in p2p networks: A game theoretic approach. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 14-5:978-991.
  15. Mekouar, L., Iraqi, Y., and Boutaba, R. (2006). Handling free riders in peer-to-peer systems. In Proceedings of AP2PC 2005. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 4118.
  16. Ramaswamy, L. Liu, L. (2003). A new challenge to peer-topeer file sharing systems. In 6th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.
  17. Sariou, S., Gummadi, P. K., and Gribble, S. D. (2002). A measurement study of peer-to-peer file sharing systems. In Proceedings of Multimedia Computing and Networking.
  18. Shneidman, J. Parkes, D. (2003). Rationality and selfinterest in peer to peer networks. In Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems IPTPS'03.
Download


Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

V. Belmonte M., Díaz M. and Reyna A. (2011). A COALITION BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR P2P CONTENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS . In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-8425-41-6, pages 15-24. DOI: 10.5220/0003140200150024


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart11,
author={M. V. Belmonte and M. Díaz and A. Reyna},
title={A COALITION BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR P2P CONTENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,},
year={2011},
pages={15-24},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0003140200150024},
isbn={978-989-8425-41-6},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,
TI - A COALITION BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR P2P CONTENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
SN - 978-989-8425-41-6
AU - V. Belmonte M.
AU - Díaz M.
AU - Reyna A.
PY - 2011
SP - 15
EP - 24
DO - 10.5220/0003140200150024