ATTACK INTERFERENCE IN NON-COLLABORATIVE SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS

M.-Camilla Fiazza, Michele Peroli, Luca Viganò

Abstract

In security protocol analysis, the traditional choice to consider a single Dolev-Yao attacker is supported by the fact that models with multiple collaborating Dolev-Yao attackers have been shown to be reducible to models with one Dolev-Yao attacker. In this paper, we take a fundamentally different approach and investigate the case of multiple non-collaborating attackers. After formalizing the framework for multi-attacker scenarios, we show with a case study that concurrent competitive attacks can interfere with each other. We then present a new strategy to defend security protocols, based on active exploitation of attack interference. The paper can be seen as providing two proof-of-concept results: (i) it is possible to exploit interference to mitigate protocol vulnerabilities, thus providing a form of protection to protocols; (ii) the search for defense strategies requires scenarios with at least two attackers.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Fiazza M., Peroli M. and Viganò L. (2011). ATTACK INTERFERENCE IN NON-COLLABORATIVE SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS . In Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2011) ISBN 978-989-8425-71-3, pages 144-156. DOI: 10.5220/0003516801440156


in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt11,
author={M.-Camilla Fiazza and Michele Peroli and Luca Viganò},
title={ATTACK INTERFERENCE IN NON-COLLABORATIVE SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS},
booktitle={Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2011)},
year={2011},
pages={144-156},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0003516801440156},
isbn={978-989-8425-71-3},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2011)
TI - ATTACK INTERFERENCE IN NON-COLLABORATIVE SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
SN - 978-989-8425-71-3
AU - Fiazza M.
AU - Peroli M.
AU - Viganò L.
PY - 2011
SP - 144
EP - 156
DO - 10.5220/0003516801440156