A TWO-PLAYER MODEL FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS LOCATION OF FRANCHISING SERVICES WITH PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS

Pedro Godinho, Joana Dias

Abstract

We consider the discrete location problems faced by two decision-makers, franchisees, that will have to simultaneously decide where to locate their own services (unsure about the decisions of one another). All services compete among themselves. At most one service can be located at each potential location. We consider that one of the decision-makers has preferential rights meaning that if both decision makers are interested in the same location, only to this decision-maker will be given the permission to open the service. We present a mathematical formulation and some conclusions based on computational results.

References

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Godinho P. and Dias J. (2012). A TWO-PLAYER MODEL FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS LOCATION OF FRANCHISING SERVICES WITH PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS . In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - Volume 1: ICORES, ISBN 978-989-8425-97-3, pages 120-125. DOI: 10.5220/0003717401200125


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icores12,
author={Pedro Godinho and Joana Dias},
title={A TWO-PLAYER MODEL FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS LOCATION OF FRANCHISING SERVICES WITH PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - Volume 1: ICORES,},
year={2012},
pages={120-125},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0003717401200125},
isbn={978-989-8425-97-3},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - Volume 1: ICORES,
TI - A TWO-PLAYER MODEL FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS LOCATION OF FRANCHISING SERVICES WITH PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS
SN - 978-989-8425-97-3
AU - Godinho P.
AU - Dias J.
PY - 2012
SP - 120
EP - 125
DO - 10.5220/0003717401200125