STRATEGIES FOR CHALLENGING TWO-PLAYER GAMES - Some Lessons from Iterated Traveler’s Dilemma

Predrag T. Tošić, Philip C. Dasler

Abstract

We study the iterated version of the Traveler’s Dilemma (TD). TD is a two-player, non-zero sum game that offers plenty of incentives for cooperation. Our goal is to gain deeper understanding of iterated two-player games whose structures are far from zero-sum. Our experimental study and analysis of Iterated TD is based on a round-robin tournament we have recently designed, implemented and analyzed. This tournament involves 38 distinct participating strategies, and is motivated by the seminal work by Axelrod et al. on Iterated Prisoners Dilemma. We first motivate and define the strategies competing in our tournament, followed by a summary of the tournament results with respect to individual strategies. We then extend the performance comparisonand- contrast of individual strategies in the tournament, and carefully analyze how groups of closely related strategies perform when each such group is viewed as a “team”. We draw some interesting lessons from the analyzes of individual and team performances, and outline some promising directions for future work.

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  25. Random [99, 100]
  26. Always 100
  27. Always 99
  28. Mixed - L(y-g) E(x-g) H(x-g), 80%); (100, 20%)
  29. Simple Trend - K = 3, Eps = 0.5
  30. Mixed - TFT (y-g), 80%); (R[99, 100], 20%)
  31. Simple Trend - K = 10, Eps = 0.5
  32. Simple Trend - K = 25, Eps = 0.5
  33. Mixed - L(x) E(x) H(y-g), 80%); (100, 20%)
  34. Mixed - L(y-g) E(x-g) H(x-g), 80%); (100, 10%); (2, 10%)
  35. Q Learn - alpha= 0.2, discount= 0.0
  36. Q Learn - alpha= 0.5, discount= 0.0
  37. Q Learn - alpha= 0.5, discount= 0.9
  38. Q Learn - alpha= 0.2, discount= 0.9
  39. Q Learn - alpha= 0.8, discount= 0.0
  40. Q Learn - alpha= 0.8, discount= 0.9
  41. Buckets - PD, Retention = 0.5
  42. Always 51
  43. Buckets - PD, Retention = 0.2
  44. Buckets - PD, Retention = 0.8
  45. TFT - Simple (y-2g)
  46. Random [2, 100]
  47. Mixed - L(y-g) E(x-g) H(x-g), 80%); (2, 20%)
  48. Mixed - L(x) E(x) H(y-g), 80%); (100, 10%); (2, 10%)
  49. TFT - Low(x) Equal(x-2g) High(y-g)
  50. TFT - Low(x-2g) Equal(x) High(y-g)
  51. TFT - Low(x-2g) Equal(x-2g) High(y-g)
  52. Mixed - L(x) E(x) H(y-g), 80%); (2, 20%)
  53. Always 2
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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

T. Tošić P. and C. Dasler P. (2012). STRATEGIES FOR CHALLENGING TWO-PLAYER GAMES - Some Lessons from Iterated Traveler’s Dilemma . In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-8425-96-6, pages 72-82. DOI: 10.5220/0003753900720082


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart12,
author={Predrag T. Tošić and Philip C. Dasler},
title={STRATEGIES FOR CHALLENGING TWO-PLAYER GAMES - Some Lessons from Iterated Traveler’s Dilemma},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,},
year={2012},
pages={72-82},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0003753900720082},
isbn={978-989-8425-96-6},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,
TI - STRATEGIES FOR CHALLENGING TWO-PLAYER GAMES - Some Lessons from Iterated Traveler’s Dilemma
SN - 978-989-8425-96-6
AU - T. Tošić P.
AU - C. Dasler P.
PY - 2012
SP - 72
EP - 82
DO - 10.5220/0003753900720082