A Non-concept is Not a ¬Concept

Iaakov Exman

2012

Abstract

Often objects with removed parts or functionality also lose their identity. But, there are situations in which this is not the case: identity is preserved. We refer to such objects, by means of Non- concepts, non- implying partial negation and concept implying preserved identity. In this work Non- concepts are defined and pluggable ontologies are proposed for their representation. These ontologies are made pluggable by sockets, a novel kind of class. These are abstract place-holders for removed/added parts, functionalities or identities. The space of Non- concepts has been extensively explored. Pragmatic implications of Non- concepts include manageable design of products with a multitude of models. Non- concepts are also relevant to the formal controversy whether composition is/isn’t identity. The resolution is not sharp. Identity is entangled with composition, such that identity is preserved to a certain extent, until further removal causes identity break-down.

References

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Exman I. (2012). A Non-concept is Not a ¬Concept . In Proceedings of the International Conference on Knowledge Engineering and Ontology Development - Volume 1: KEOD, (IC3K 2012) ISBN 978-989-8565-30-3, pages 401-404. DOI: 10.5220/0004149704010404


in Bibtex Style

@conference{keod12,
author={Iaakov Exman},
title={A Non-concept is Not a ¬Concept},
booktitle={Proceedings of the International Conference on Knowledge Engineering and Ontology Development - Volume 1: KEOD, (IC3K 2012)},
year={2012},
pages={401-404},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0004149704010404},
isbn={978-989-8565-30-3},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the International Conference on Knowledge Engineering and Ontology Development - Volume 1: KEOD, (IC3K 2012)
TI - A Non-concept is Not a ¬Concept
SN - 978-989-8565-30-3
AU - Exman I.
PY - 2012
SP - 401
EP - 404
DO - 10.5220/0004149704010404