Towards a Sustainable Smart e-Marketplace - A Stable, Efficient and Responsive Smart Exchange with Strategic Conduct

Wafa Ghonaim, Hamada Ghenniwa, Weiming Shen

Abstract

The landscapes of e-marketplaces are changing profoundly, evident in the phenomenal growth and potential of online services, consumers, and enabling mobile technologies. However, it is unleashing grave concerns about sustainability due to the fierce competitions, fuzzy dynamics and rapidly shifting powers. While it is attributed to the game-theoretic economics and computation complexities of the decentralized combinatorial allocation problem, this work establishes, denying e-traders expressing fair strategic choice is unfounded of adverse strategic risk. In fact, free market dynamics realize impact of smart learning on strategic conduct. The fact strategic rules enable faster consumer-to-market bidding lifecycle is another compelling factor. Hence, the work introduces the novel rule-based bidding language and GSPM double auction for the smart exchange that facilitates expressions of strategic rules, while uniquely exploits forward and reverse GSP auctions for efficient, tractable, stable, and budget balanced e-marketplace. The e-marketplace deliberates on rules for effective preference elicitation, while bringing self-prosperity in socially efficient ecosystem.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Ghonaim W., Ghenniwa H. and Shen W. (2013). Towards a Sustainable Smart e-Marketplace - A Stable, Efficient and Responsive Smart Exchange with Strategic Conduct . In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-8565-39-6, pages 338-345. DOI: 10.5220/0004316503380345


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart13,
author={Wafa Ghonaim and Hamada Ghenniwa and Weiming Shen},
title={Towards a Sustainable Smart e-Marketplace - A Stable, Efficient and Responsive Smart Exchange with Strategic Conduct},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,},
year={2013},
pages={338-345},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0004316503380345},
isbn={978-989-8565-39-6},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,
TI - Towards a Sustainable Smart e-Marketplace - A Stable, Efficient and Responsive Smart Exchange with Strategic Conduct
SN - 978-989-8565-39-6
AU - Ghonaim W.
AU - Ghenniwa H.
AU - Shen W.
PY - 2013
SP - 338
EP - 345
DO - 10.5220/0004316503380345