Bilinear Pairing-based Hybrid Mixnet with Anonymity Revocation

Andrea Huszti, Zita Kovacs

Abstract

A hybrid mix is presented providing anonymity and eligibility verification of senders, the possibility of anonymous reply and anonymity revocation, that are usually required in practice. Furthermore the proposed mix is capable of processing messages with arbitrarily length. In the process of design we applied bilinear pairings due to their good properties. We compared the time and space complexity of Zhong’s mix (Zhong, 2009) to our one, we achieved better efficiency. In the security evaluation we prove, that our mix is correct, provides anonymity and eligibility verification for senders.

References

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Huszti A. and Kovacs Z. (2015). Bilinear Pairing-based Hybrid Mixnet with Anonymity Revocation . In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP, ISBN 978-989-758-081-9, pages 238-245. DOI: 10.5220/0005273002380245


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icissp15,
author={Andrea Huszti and Zita Kovacs},
title={Bilinear Pairing-based Hybrid Mixnet with Anonymity Revocation},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP,},
year={2015},
pages={238-245},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0005273002380245},
isbn={978-989-758-081-9},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP,
TI - Bilinear Pairing-based Hybrid Mixnet with Anonymity Revocation
SN - 978-989-758-081-9
AU - Huszti A.
AU - Kovacs Z.
PY - 2015
SP - 238
EP - 245
DO - 10.5220/0005273002380245