Formal Analysis of E-Cash Protocols

Jannik Dreier, Ali Kassem, Pascal Lafourcade

Abstract

Electronic cash (e-cash) aims at achieving client privacy at payment, similar to real cash. Several security protocols have been proposed to ensure privacy in e-cash, as well as the necessary unforgery properties. In this paper, we propose a formal framework to define, analyze, and verify security properties of e-cash systems. To this end, we model e-cash systems in the applied p-calculus, and we define two client privacy properties and three properties to prevent forgery. Finally, we apply our definitions to an e-cash protocol from the literature proposed by Chaum et al., which has two variants and a real implementation based on it. Using ProVerif, we demonstrate that our framework is suitable for an automated analysis of this protocol.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Dreier J., Kassem A. and Lafourcade P. (2015). Formal Analysis of E-Cash Protocols . In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2015) ISBN 978-989-758-117-5, pages 65-75. DOI: 10.5220/0005544500650075


in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt15,
author={Jannik Dreier and Ali Kassem and Pascal Lafourcade},
title={Formal Analysis of E-Cash Protocols},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2015)},
year={2015},
pages={65-75},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0005544500650075},
isbn={978-989-758-117-5},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2015)
TI - Formal Analysis of E-Cash Protocols
SN - 978-989-758-117-5
AU - Dreier J.
AU - Kassem A.
AU - Lafourcade P.
PY - 2015
SP - 65
EP - 75
DO - 10.5220/0005544500650075