A Formal Proof of Security of Zhang and Kim’s ID-Based Ring Signature Scheme

Javier Herranz

2004

Abstract

In this work we provide a formal analysis of the security of an identity-based ring signature scheme proposed by Zhang and Kim in [10]. We first define the security requirements that this kind of schemes must satisfy; or in other words, the capabilities and goals of the most powerful attacks these schemes must remain secure against. Then we prove, in the random oracle model, that the above-mentioned scheme is secure against the defined attacks, assuming that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard to solve.

References

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Herranz J. (2004). A Formal Proof of Security of Zhang and Kim’s ID-Based Ring Signature Scheme . In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Security in Information Systems - Volume 1: WOSIS, (ICEIS 2004) ISBN 972-8865-07-4, pages 63-72. DOI: 10.5220/0002661000630072


in Bibtex Style

@conference{wosis04,
author={Javier Herranz},
title={A Formal Proof of Security of Zhang and Kim’s ID-Based Ring Signature Scheme},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Security in Information Systems - Volume 1: WOSIS, (ICEIS 2004)},
year={2004},
pages={63-72},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0002661000630072},
isbn={972-8865-07-4},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Security in Information Systems - Volume 1: WOSIS, (ICEIS 2004)
TI - A Formal Proof of Security of Zhang and Kim’s ID-Based Ring Signature Scheme
SN - 972-8865-07-4
AU - Herranz J.
PY - 2004
SP - 63
EP - 72
DO - 10.5220/0002661000630072