can therefore expect some speed-up by this protocol and only in the worst case it will
deteriorate to the performance of the protocol without trusted computing.
6 Conclusion
The concept of language-based secure computation was introduced. The major chal-
lenge of securely translating the control-ﬂow was exempliﬁed with the secure if state-
ment protocol and the advantages of language-based secure computation have been
shown by an optimization on that protocol that requires the if statement to be trans-
lated directly. Many of the outlined challenges, e.g. comprehensive proofs and other
control-ﬂow problems, such as for loops with secret bounds, remain to be solved and
are subject of future research.
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