REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING TO AUDIT PRIVACY ISSUES IN
MEDICAL AND HEALTH SOFTWARE
Miguel A. Martinez, Ambrosio Toval and Manuel Campos
Computer and Systems Departament, University of Murcia, Campus de Espinardo (Murcia), Spain
Keywords:
Personal Data Protection, Audit, Requirements Engineering, Privacy, Reuse.
Abstract:
In recent years, there has been a growing interest to guarantee that health organizations make a suitable treat-
ment and protection of the personal data with which they deal in their daily activity. The privacy of personal
data is regulated by law in many countries and is considered an important issue in a number of Quality Stan-
dards. This paper presents a systematic method to make an audit of the privacy in health sector software based
on Requirements Engineering (RE). The aplication and validation of the method is ilustrated in a operative
tool of report and clinical record management in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) in a hospital.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Information Systems (IS) Audit is a discipline
whose practice has increased considerably during the
last few years. IS Audit is defined as the system-
atic process of gathering, grouping and evaluating ev-
idences to determine whether an IS safeguards the as-
sets, whether it maintains the integrity of the data,
whether it effectively carries out the aims of the orga-
nization, and whether it uses the resources efficiently
(Weber, 1988). A special type of audit within this
discipline is the software audit. The purpose of au-
diting software is to verify that the software accom-
plishes the requirements (both functional and non-
functional). A security audit is defined as an in-
dependent revision and examination of the registries
and activities of a system in order to verify if the con-
trols of the system are adapted to guarantee the fulfil-
ment of the established policy and the operative pro-
cedures, to detect security problems, and to recom-
mend possible changes in the control policy and pro-
cedures (ISO/IEC-7498-2:1989, 1989). A security
audit can include many aspects, such as the protection
level of the facilities or people, but this paper we will
focus on the security related to data and information
(privacy) of personal nature, that is a crucial aspect in
the security of clinical IS and clinical software. More
concretely, in this work we define a method to audit
the aspects related to the privacy on clinical software,
and we illustrate its use by means of an application
to software for Electronic Clinical Record and report
management for an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) that is
being deployed in a hospital.
The method used to carry out the audit is based on
SIREN, a general method of Requirements Engineer-
ing (RE) based on standards of this discipline (IEEE-
Std.830-1998, 1998; IEEE-Std.1233-1998, 1998) and
that is focused on the reusability of requirements.
SIREN (SImple REuse of software requiremeNts) is
a practical proposal to select and to specify the re-
quirements of a software system. The key elements in
SIREN are a spiral process model, requirements doc-
ument templates and a reusable requirements reposi-
tory which is organized by catalogs. The SIREN cata-
log related to privacy aspects is called PDP (Personal
Data Protection) (Toval et al., 2002b).
At the moment, SIREN can be applied in four dif-
ferent ways:
1. As a method for RE (Toval et al., 2002a; Toval
et al., 2002b) so that the fulfilment of the applica-
ble norm (for example, on security and PDP) can
be guaranteed from the beginning of the develop-
ment of IS, by using suitable catalogs.
2. As guide and support to conduct an audit for de-
termining the existence of security controls and its
degree of fulfilment in an organization who deals
with sensible data (Martinez et al., 2006).
3. As a method for auditing software (either devel-
oped by the organization or acquired) in opera-
tion.
4. As a method of consulting in the acquisition of
74
A. Martinez M., Toval A. and Campos M. (2008).
REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING TO AUDIT PRIVACY ISSUES IN MEDICAL AND HEALTH SOFTWARE.
In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Health Informatics, pages 74-81
Copyright
c
SciTePress
new software, so that it can be guaranteed that this
software satisfies the expected level of security.
In this paper, we show a specialization of the
method presented in (Martinez et al., 2006) that can
be used in applications 3 and 4, that is, as a method
for auditing and consulting. In order to conduct the
audit in a simple and agile way, it is necessary to de-
fine a new method for auditing software that fulfils the
standards of different disciplines, such as IEEE830
(IEEE-Std.830-1998, 1998) and CobiT (Control for
Objectives Information Technologies) (CobiT, 2005),
as well as the different laws in security and protection
of personal data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 describes briefly the method used for auditing.
In Section 3, we describe the phase of practical appli-
cation in our case study. In Section 4, some related
works are presented and compared with our proposal.
Section 5 describes the lessons learned after the ap-
plication of the method proposed in the practical case.
Finally, we enumerate the conclusions and the future
work in this line.
2 A METHOD FOR AUDITING
SOFTWARE BASED ON SIREN
The method proposed belongs to the scope of the
Spanish legislation (LOPD, 1999; SMR, 1999),
which is an adaptation of the European Union legisla-
tion (Directive-1995/46/CE, 1995). Nevertheless, the
proposal is easily generalizable since this legislation
has been adapted in a similar way by other European
countries. For example, in Italy, the law that regulates
the personal data protection is the Italian Law 196, of
30 of June of 2003, in Germany the counterpart is the
Federal Law of Data Protection (BDSG), and in the
United Kingdom, it is the Data Protection Act of 24
from October of 1998. In the United States, there is
a sectorial conception of the law and has as source a
mixture of legislation, regulation and self-regulation.
Rights of information privacy in a variety of sectorial
laws have been granted, like for example the law The
Privacy Act of 1974, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of
1970, or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986.
In addition, our method has a direct correspon-
dence with the referential frame of CobiT in its more
recent version (CobiT, 2005), which is widely ac-
cepted by the international community of IS auditors.
With this proposal, we intend to help to fulfil the Co-
biT Control Objectives that deal with privacy aspects,
since the identification and verification of the fulfil-
ment of the requirements related to these aspects is fa-
cilitated by the use of the requirements of the SIREN
PDP catalog.
The method for auditing software based on
SIREN contemplates the following phases (see Fig-
ure 1):
Figure 1: Phases of the method for auditing data protection
in software.
Phase 1. - Analysis of the situation of the software.
This phase consists of a first interview for establish-
ing the scope of the audit so that an initial budget can
be elaborated. The objective is to gather all kind of in-
formation about the treatment of the data used by the
software. The information comes from two sources:
on the one hand, the information facilitated by the de-
velopment team of the software (manual of use, UML
diagrams, etc.), and, on the other hand, from the ex-
perience acquired by the auditor after testing the soft-
ware.
Phase 2. - Requirements verification with the
SRS (Software Requirements Specifications) of the
SIREN PDP catalog. The auditor verifies the fulfil-
ment or breach of the requirements contained in the
SRS of the catalog. Personnel responsible in the or-
ganization should support and facilitate, as much as
possible, this verification. The verification consists of
choosing those requirements of the SIREN PDP cata-
log that can be applied to the organization and of veri-
fying whether they are fulfilled or not in the software.
For example, if the software is going to be used in an
organization to whom a high level of data protection
is going to be demanded, according to the SMR (Se-
curity Measures Regulation), the auditor will extract
from the SRS those requirements necessary to reach
this protection level and will verify if these require-
ments are present in the tool. This extraction or filter
of requirements of the catalog is possible thanks to
the use of the meta-information associated to each re-
quirement (in this case, through the attribute ”security
level”).
Phase 3. - Execution tests. In this phase, the auditor
must check the proper operation of the software once
REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING TO AUDIT PRIVACY ISSUES IN MEDICAL AND HEALTH SOFTWARE
75
it has been integrated in the system. In case that some
of the evaluated measures are not fulfilled in the tool,
the auditor must describe the risks that exist in the
IS of the organization where the software is going to
be used. In order to perform the tests, the Software
Test Specification (STS) of the SIREN PDP catalog
will be used. In this way, any person (even with little
experience) could make the tests systematically.
Phase 4. - Preparation and writing of the final re-
port. The product of the audit is a final report where
all aspects from the evaluation are written. At least
the report will have the following information:
Situation: which describes briefly the resultant
weakness after the analysis carried out in the soft-
ware tool.
Threats: where the possible risks which the soft-
ware tool are exposed to, are enumerated.
Recommendations and action plans proposed to
the development team.
The aim of the SRS used for the audit is to gather
the requirements about the functionality of the sys-
tem, external interfaces, performance, design restric-
tions and attributes of software (portability, main-
tenance, security, availability and reliability). This
specification of requirements has been made in agree-
ment with the IEEE 830-98 Standard that is respon-
sible for defining the characteristics and contents of a
good software requirements specification.
A particular characteristic of the SIREN method
is that in the requirements specification there exist
what we call parameterized requirements. A parame-
terized requirement contains some parts that must be
adapted to each application or system when they are
reused in a concrete project. For example, the fol-
lowing requirement extracted from the SIREN PDP
catalog the system will not conserve the data, once
cancelled, so that the identification of the subject in-
terested is not allowed during a period no inferior to
[time in months] on the basis of which they had been
successfully obtained or registered”, gives the analyst
the possibility of choosing a period of suitable time to
the necessities of the concrete project.
The SRS of the PDP catalog used for the audit
presented in this work is currently composed by 48 re-
quirements. In addition to the statement, each require-
ment of the catalog contains meta-information (at-
tributes with information about each requirement) that
enriches the requirement. Among the 18 attributes
that have been defined up to now, we can point out
the following ones: source, exceptions, security level,
motivation and fulfilment.
3 CASE STUDY
In this work, we present a concrete application of the
method to a software tool for clinical record man-
agement that deal with personal data and, therefore,
needs a high protection level in its data. The tool
used is called CH4 and has been developed by the
Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Engineering re-
search group of the University of Murcia and is being
deployed at the moment in the ICU of the Hospital
Universitary of Getafe (Madrid).
With the objective of taking advantage of the
case study as an experience to validate the proposed
method, we have decided to use a method of quali-
tative investigation in software engineering, denomi-
nated Action-Research (Baskerville, 1999) (the use of
this method will be explained in Section 4.1).
CH4 has the aim of managing the clinical record
as much as facilitating the daily work and communi-
cation between medical staff in an ICU. CH4 is cen-
tered in the process of patient management along their
stay in the ICU by registering personal and clinical
data, and allowing the staff to automatically gener-
ate reports. In this way, a documentary database with
admittance, evolution and discharge report is created
and available for its later access.
In the development of this report oriented tool,
three scenarios have been considered: the admittance,
the daily evolution and the discharge. In each one of
them, data relative to tests (physical, complementary
examinations, analytical explorations, classifications,
. . . ) treatments and diagnoses can be introduced. The
tool includes facilities, as the treatment profiles, to
easy the management of the most habitual cases. Each
diagnosis or problem can be related to the concrete re-
sults of tests, to the treatments or even to other prob-
lems, allowing in this way a traceability of all the as-
pects defined for a patient.
3.1 Design of the Experiment
The application of Action-Research gives rise to a
cyclical process in which the different implied parts
participate, examining the existing situation (which
they consider of some problematic way) with the ob-
jective to change it and to improve it (Wadsworth,
1998). Action-Research is one of the few approaches
valid to study the effects of specific alterations in
development methodologies and maintenance of sys-
tems in human organizations (Baskerville and Wood-
Harper, 1996). Following the terminology of Action-
Research, in this case study the following participants
are considered:
The “researcher” is the research group in Software
HEALTHINF 2008 - International Conference on Health Informatics
76
Engineering of the University of Murcia.
The “researched” object is the application of the
PDP catalog in a method for auditing a software
tool for clinical record management that needs a
high protection level in the files of personal data
that handles.
The “critical reference group” (CRG), in other
words, the one for which the research is carried
out, is formed by the members of the development
team of the tool, is the research group of Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Knowledge Engineering of
the University of Murcia. According to Action-
Research, the CRG must also participate in the
research process, although less actively than the
researcher.
The “stakeholders” will be all those organizations
who can benefit from the results of the research,
in particular, the members themselves of the CRG
and, in general, other groups whose development
activities are similar to those of the tool audited.
In this research, a participative application of
Action-Research has been made, in which the CRG
puts into practice the recommendations made by the
researcher, and shares its effects and results.
3.2 Audit of Software for Clinical
Record Management in an ICU
Within IS Audit, we distinguished two basic types of
audit: system audits and software audits. The first one
corresponds to verifications on the own IS (an exam-
ple of real application using method SIREN can be
seen in (Martinez et al., 2006)). The second type is
centered in verifying that the software tools accom-
plish to the requirements, both functional and non-
functional (norms, laws, etc.). This work belongs to
the second type, where the tool audited is a practical
case of a software tool related to the clinical sector.
We have used the SRS of the SIREN PDP catalog as
guide to make the audit process shown in Figure 1.
After analyzing the information obtained in the
different interviews with the development team of the
tool made in Phase 1 of the audit, and after the test
of the tool made by the auditor, we pass to Phase 2.
Since we have at our disposal the SRS of SIREN PDP
catalog, only two meetings were necessary to com-
plete this phase. In these meetings, the fulfilment or
breach of the requirements of SIREN PDP catalog has
been checked one by one in the tool.
Once the two first phases of the audit method have
been completed, the pertinent tests were made to ver-
ify the operation of the tool once it has been integrated
in the IS.
Table 1: Results of the audit of the software.
Software requirement
Fulfilled 22
Not fulfilled 10
Undetermined 16
Finally, all the results of the evaluation were writ-
ten in a final report. This final report was given to the
development team and they included in the tool the
improvements and safety measures proposed in the
audit. It is important to emphasize that implantation
of such measures is not part of the audit, since a ba-
sic principle of the audits is that these finalize with
conclusions and possible solutions, but never get to
implement solutions as part of the audit.
In this way, after maintaining several interviews
with the development team of the tool and the person
in charge of security of the system, we have collected
the data shown in Table 1.
According to the results of the Table 1, we see that
the tool fulfils 45.8% of the referring requirements to
the SRS of the SIREN PDP catalog. If we do not take
into account the requirements that can not be applied
to this tool (those marking like undetermined), a ful-
filment of 68.7% with respect to the SRS of SIREN
PDP catalog is obtained.
Some examples of requirements of the SIREN
PDP catalog that were not fulfilled in the audited tool
are the following ones:
SRSL2. The application will warn the user that a
password needs to be changed.
SRSL6. The [identification procedure] and [au-
thentication procedure] will limit the possibility of
repeatedly trying a non-authorized access to the
application.
SRSL9. The subsystem implementing the [iden-
tification procedure] and [authentication proce-
dure], or other system related to this one, will log
all accesses to the application. The log will con-
sist of: user identification, timestamp of the ac-
cess, file accessed, access type, and the result of
the access.
SRSL14. The application will allow the cancel-
lation of the registered personal data (within the
ten following days to its request by the interested
part). The data will be accessible only by Public
Administration and Courts for the investigation of
possible responsibilities due to the treatment dur-
ing the term of prescription of these responsibili-
ties.
The breach of these requirements is caused by di-
verse reasons. For example, requirement SRSL2 is
REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING TO AUDIT PRIVACY ISSUES IN MEDICAL AND HEALTH SOFTWARE
77
not fulfilled since the application did not provide a
control to automatically warn the users about the ne-
cessity of changing the passwords. The breach of re-
quirement SRSL6 put in serious danger the security
of the application, because a user without permissions
granted in the application could try to access many
times; instead of only closing the session if an at-
tempt of no authorized access takes place, the user
login must be blocked and the attempts of no autho-
rized access must be registered. Requirement SRSL9
is breached since the application did not consider reg-
istering the access information; as a solution, we pro-
posed to use the database and application logging fa-
cilities to store the user accesses. Finally, requirement
SRSL14 is not fulfilled since the application elimi-
nates the data completely when a cancellation is re-
quired; instead of that, the data should be marked as
unavailable or stored in a temporary database so that
could be accessed in case they are required by the
Public Administration.
4 RELATED WORK
In this section, we make a review of the most out-
standing papers related to our proposal. In order to
facilitate its reading, we have organized these works
by topics, according to the essential related aspect
treated. These topics are: 1) Personal data protec-
tion audits applied to the health sector; 2) Software
tools audits; 3) Principles of the data protection in the
European Union; 4) RE applied to the security field.
4.1 Personal Data Protection Audits
Applied to the Health Sector
In (Sandhu and Samarati, 1996), an introduction to
the personal data audit is provided, emphasizing its
importance in the organizations that deal with them.
Here, audit is understood like the process that gath-
ers data on the system activities to analyze them in
search of security violations. In (Hughes, 2005), the
authors make a study about the relations between au-
dits and research methods applied to the health sector
of the United Kingdom. More concretely they apply
Action-Research, which is a method with a special
relevance in the health sector, where there is an im-
portant social factor. Nevertheless, in these papers,
the approach is different from ours, since they do not
audit a specific tool but the stored personal data in
a system, and because neither application to a study
case appears, nor the specific phases of an audit pro-
cess are distinguished.
4.2 Software Tools Audits
Some of the software audit tools (in general, not only
of the health sector) more used are GASP and Web-
Census, both available in trial version in the BSA
(Business Software Alliance) website
1
, that is the
main organization dedicated to the development of
legal and safe computer science. These tools allow
the auditors to identify and to track licensed and un-
licensed software installed in a computer. Both tools
are easy to use (WebCensus can be run through Web,
without requiring installation by the user) and their
high degree of accuracy has converted them in audit
tools standard in numerous companies and govern-
mental bureau worldwide. These tools have a differ-
ent approach from the methodology that we propose,
since they exclusively are limited to make a testing of
the software installed in a system, contributing data
related to the licenses and manufacturers, but they do
not cover in any way the audit of software specific
concerns (functional or non-functional requirements).
4.3 Principles of the Data Protection in
the European Union
In (Van der Haak et al., 2003) and (Massacci et al.,
2005), two practical applications about the use of per-
sonal data protection law in different European coun-
tries (concretely, Germany and Italy) are described.
The first paper focuses on the identification of spe-
cific legal requirements related to data security and
data protection of patients included in electronic clin-
ical records. It is based on the set of German laws on
data protection. The second paper presents a practical
case of the application of a RE methodology for the
fulfilment of the Italian legislation in privacy and data
protection.
In these papers, authors do not provide the re-
quirements engineers with a PDP requirements cat-
alog (or similar) related to data privacy in a easily
understandable language. So, the application of the
data protection law in IS becomes a more tedious and
difficult task for the requirements engineer.
The PDP requirements catalog that we have used
(and improved) in this paper, is valid, with slight
modifications, in any country of the European Union,
since it is based on, among others, (Directive-
1995/46/CE, 1995) and on (Directive-2002/58/CE,
2002). As (Lusignan et al., 2006) exposes, these di-
rectives are the base of the privacy laws of any Euro-
pean Union country. The authors show a table with
the chronological order of the different treaties the
1
www.bsa.org
HEALTHINF 2008 - International Conference on Health Informatics
78
fundamental principles of personal data protection of
the European Union, and another table with a compar-
ison of these principles (including general principles
of the ethics in health computer systems).
4.4 Requirements Engineering applied
to the Security Field
In the line of RE, we draw attention to the work
by Firesmith (Firesmith, 2003), which provides ex-
amples and directives for requirements engineers to
specify suitably security requirements. The different
types of security requirements are identified and de-
fined, among which privacy, security audit and phys-
ical protection requirements are highlighted. (Olv-
ingson et al., 2002) presents a minimal data set for
requirements elicitation in the area of public health.
This minimal data set is a data collection that supports
the elicitation of users’ voices that later will constitute
the foundation on which to identify the true require-
ments and describes the problems found by health
professionals in their daily activities in countries like
Sweden and the United States. Thus, it is possible
to prioritize the requirements in an early phase of the
construction of the system, e.g. the RE phase, and
thus capture the most important characteristics to be
implemented in IS. In these two papers, proposals are
made considering thinking only RE and without fol-
lowing any RE methodology. On the contrary, we
have followed the SIREN methodology and made a
proposal for conduct audits.
In contrast to with the works described previously,
our paper offers an integrated and repeatable system-
atic method to make an audit of software tools based
on international standards of audit (CobiT) and good
practices of Software Engineering (SIREN and inter-
national standards of RE). This method has been val-
idated in a real study case where personal data are
treated. In this way, our work complements other cur-
rent proposals in the audit area but is new because
allows the auditor to verify the fulfilment of privacy
laws in software tools which deal with personal data.
5 LESSONS LEARNED
After carrying out this work we can identify three
main lessons learned of our experience as software
tools auditors.
On the one hand, this type of audits supposes a
decisive aid to improve the used tools so that they ad-
just to the norms used as base; for example, in this
case, the norms are the personal data protection laws.
On the other hand, we have realized that thanks to
the existence of a previous requirements catalog, we
have been able to reduce the time dedicated to meet-
ings and other activities of the audit. The interviews
with the development team and board of directors of
the organization (usually with very just a short time
available) can be focused and guided directly to the
crucial points that concern the audit.
Finally, we have detected weak points in the re-
quirements catalog used in the audit. The inconsis-
tencies consist fundamentally of the existence of am-
biguities in the writing of certain requirements, which
impede to the auditor team to make a firm decision on
his fulfilment or breach in the software tool.
In relation to this last point, in addition to be-
ing able to detect what requirements were fulfilled or
not in the current version of the developed tool, and
thanks to the feedback obtained from the development
team of the audit tool, ambiguous requirements and
bad-written requirements in the SRS of the SIREN
PDP catalog have been identified during the audit.
Of the 48 requirements that composed the SRS of
the SIREN PDP catalog, 7 of them were identified
by the development team of the audit tool, like can-
didates to a possible modification since they were not
clear and precise enough. Some examples of these
requirements, along with its corresponding improve-
ment, are showed next:
SRSL2-Old. The software will have to warn that
a password needs to be changed.
SRSL2-New. In case that the authentication
mechanism is based on the existence of passwords,
the software will warn that a password needs to be
changed, once finished the validity period set to [time
in days].
SRSL5-Old. The software will allow that the In-
formation Systems and data processing facilities can
be subjected to an internal or external audit, at least
every two years.
SRSL5-New. As much as every two years, the
software will warn of the need to make an audit (inter-
nal or external) of the Information Systems and data
processing facilities to verify the fulfilment of the Se-
curity Measures Regulations.
SRSL26-Old. The software will allow the people
in charge of treatments of public and private owner-
ship, as well as the organizations in which they group
themselves, to formulate codes of ethics.
SRSL26-New. In this case the requirement re-
mains equal, it is necessary to add the following addi-
tional information in the attribute Rationale of the
requirement: The aim of codes of ethics is to estab-
lish the conditions of organization, operating condi-
tions, applicable procedures, norms of security of the
surroundings, use and obligations of the software and
REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING TO AUDIT PRIVACY ISSUES IN MEDICAL AND HEALTH SOFTWARE
79
hardware implied in the treatment and use of the per-
sonal information, as well as the guarantees, in its
scope, for the exercise of the people rights and its de-
velopment norms.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER
WORK
Finally, we show the most important conclusions, ob-
tained after carrying out this research:
A systematic method has been extended to make
a data protection audit to a software tool which
deals with specially protected data. More specif-
ically, we have applied the method to audit a tool
for clinical record management in an ICU at a hos-
pital that deals with sensible data.
With the application of the proposed method, we
helped to adapt the tool audited to the security
measures and to the regulations demanded by law.
An improvement of the PDP requirements catalog
has been obtained (Toval et al., 2002b), which cor-
responds with one of the SIREN method phases.
In this sense, the quality of the existing require-
ments has been improved: some requirements,
identified as necessary or advisable, have been in-
serted in the PDP SIREN catalog.
The use of “good practices” in Software Engineer-
ing considerably facilitates the subsequent audit
work.
As a result of the audit, we can provide a precise
degree (in %) of fulfilment of a software tool with
respect to the requirements document.
With the application of the method, the treatment
of legal requirements and the audit process im-
plied is contemplated in the organization that uses
the software tool. This process is considered im-
portant in Quality Standards like ISO 9001 or ISO
9004.
The result of the audit provide the development
team with a very useful and direct set of sugges-
tions to be included in the software tool in order
to accomplish the norms.
As limitation of our proposal, we can say that al-
though our method is generalizable to other functional
and non-functional software concerns, it is necessary
to have a requirements catalog similar to the one used
in this paper. At the moment, we have developed the
following reusable requirements catalog:
Personal Data Protection (PDP) (Toval et al.,
2002b).
Security in Information System (Toval et al.,
2002a).
Teleoperated Systems (Nicolas et al., 2006).
In lack of a predefined specific requirements cata-
log on the concern or concerns that we want to audit,
some other alternative sources of broad acceptance
could be used. For example, standard ISO/IEC 9126
(ISO/IEC-9126-1, 2001) could be used as guide for
an audit of software quality.
As future work, we are already working on the
development of a more specific requirements cata-
log of Electronic Clinical Record (ECR). This cata-
log will not only cover the legal aspects in the LOPD
and the SMR but will also bring together the obli-
gations imposed in the General Health Law (Law
14/1986) and the Law on the Autonomy of the Patient
(Law 41/2002). Finally, we have developed a website
where it is possible to consult the results obtained af-
ter audit, to download the SIREN PDP catalog and to
request a change of the current catalog requirements.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work has been partially financed by the Span-
ish Ministry of Science and Technology, project
DEDALO (Desarrollo de sistEmas De calidad
bAsado en modeLos y requisitOs), TIN2006-15175-
C05-03, by the project FoMDAs (Formalizacion de
(Meta-) Modelos y transformaciones en un marco
MDA para el Desarrollo Automatico de SIW), URJC-
CM-2006-CET-0387, by the project IDEATIO (Her-
ramientas inteligentes para el control de la calidad
asistencial en procesos de seguimiento integrado in-
tra/extrahospitalario de pacientes: Una aproxima-
cion basada en guias de practica clinicas), TIN2006-
15460-C04-01, and by the Junta de Castilla-La Man-
cha (Spain), project DESERT (DEveloping Secure
systEms through Requirements and Tools), PBC-05-
012-3.
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