
 
 
untenable as the race to meet growing needs reliant 
on complexity and connectivity progresses. We 
submit there is a double-edged ‘Red Queen’s race’ 
in that near continual evolution of not only 
proprietary instrument capability, but also its 
integration with mainstream technology will be 
important to remain competitive. 
3.4  The Virtual Programmer Future 
Design of next generation instruments should follow 
a direction consistent with the industry trends 
described previously. Some distance down this road 
we submit there may be a `virtual programmer’ that, 
unlike IMD instruments today, relies almost entirely 
on shared, general-purpose, existing infrastructure 
such as clinician’s PCs and a more virtual, 
distributed network of functionality. The 
programmer, in the form of hardware, operating 
systems, and other components provided by IMD 
manufacturers disappears – to be replaced by a 
changing, mainstream, connected pool of resources 
largely owned and maintained by others.  
Commenting on this idea one of Medtronic’s 
regulatory experts noted that this would be a 
“revolutionary change rather than an evolutionary 
one” and could not be achieved overnight (Peterson, 
2007). To this end, a first step might be to transition 
to the mainstream, buy and operate on a commercial 
off the shelf (COTS) platform, and separate from 
that any domain specific components which must 
remain proprietary. The IMD manufacturer would 
still control (in a regulatory and legal sense) the 
programmer, as has traditionally been the case. The 
second step would then be to transition to the use of 
general purpose, clinician owned and maintained 
PCs, operating systems and technologies in place of 
all but the essential proprietary components. To our 
knowledge no such clinician PC based instrument 
system exists today despite the potential hardware 
and support cost savings. 
4 SHIFTING CONCERNS 
As a result of our work towards a virtual 
programmer, we have begun to see what we believe 
are key challenges in security, obsolescence, and 
development which are and will be echoed across 
the industry. With simple, isolated instruments there 
is a low attack surface or room for misuse to 
motivate complicated security concerns. As trends 
continue toward complex, connected, mainstream 
components outside the control of the instrument 
manufacturer, associated migration and development 
costs beget significant additional concern.  
4.1 Security 
With instruments, there is the potential for some 
severe types of harm including discomfort, death, 
and exposure of protected health information (PHI). 
Complex, mainstream, connected, general purpose 
computing is notorious for having a high rate of 
breach due to a number of different vectors which 
are not of significant concern for traditional 
instruments. Windows operating systems (e.g. in the 
PainDoc™ programmer) are infamous for having 
their “survival time” measured in minutes when 
exposed to the Internet (SANS™, 2007). This 
combination begets a potential for high severity and 
high frequency security challenges. Also, in a 
connected, virtual programming environment, one 
can imagine new and frightening scenarios. One 
might no longer have to get within a few feet of each 
implant to program it or interrupt service to it and 
anyone with internet access could potentially access 
or affect a tremendous volume of PHI, patients, 
IMDs and instruments in patients’ homes and 
clinics. Instruments could become a risk to their host 
clinical environments and they could be severed 
from their increasingly important information 
ecology or inadvertently open a backdoor for 
hospital infrastructure to be compromised.   
Though scenarios involving malicious attack 
against patients (e.g. Vice President Cheney via his 
ICD), addictive self medication, or even attempts to 
manipulate the stock of a public instrument 
manufacturer are regularly raised, perhaps the 
greatest risk lies in less specifically targeted security 
scenarios in which needed therapy is unavailable or 
delayed. In many cases instruments are essential to 
the therapy of patients to the extent that if 
programming is unavailable when changes are 
required or an IMD state is unknown there may be 
significant patient harm. The ability to program 
could be lost or interrupted by something as minor 
as the instrument software not having sufficient 
resources to operate (e.g. because malcode or user 
software has used up RAM). 
4.2  Obsolescence and Development 
Recently companies like St. Jude, and Medtronic 
(e.g. 2010 programmer) have begun basing their 
instruments on COTS platforms available from 
companies like Microsoft, Intel, HP and others from 
the broader computing market. With these 
mainstream components come mainstream 
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