A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR JUSTIFIED INFORMATION
SECURITY DECISION-MAKING
Daria Stepanova, Simon E. Parkin and Aad van Moorsel
School of Computing Science, Newcastle University, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, U.K.
Keywords:
Information security, Ontology, Knowledge base, Human-behavioural factors.
Abstract:
The majority of modern-day companies store commercially sensitive and valuable information assets in digital
form. It is essential for the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) within an organisation to ensure that
such information is adequately protected. External standards exist to advise CISOs on how to secure infor-
mation, but these are essentially “one-size-fits-all”. Furthermore they do not consider the human-behavioural
aspects that determine the impact of security controls upon employees, or how security controls can be best
deployed to manage insecure employee behaviour. CISOs require more information than they are currently
provided with to justify their information security management decisions.
Here we present a knowledge base and accompanying user interface. The knowledge base represents key struc-
tural components of the ISO27002 security standard, formally relating them to one another. This empowers
CISOs to understand how different security measures impact upon each other. It also considers how human-
behavioural factors can be associated with these concepts. The accompanying user interface provides a means
to present formalised information security concepts to CISOs. This paper describes the development of the
knowledge base and user interface, highlighting and discussing key challenges and how they were resolved.
1 INTRODUCTION
Large organisations increasingly follow information
security standards when managing their assets (e.g.
the ISO27K series, such as ISO 27002 (BS, 2005)).
Such standards offer only management-level recom-
mendations, which must be adjusted to the specific re-
quirements of individual companies. However, Chief
Information Security Officers (CISOs) are often not
provided with a complete picture of the organisation’s
operational requirements and how IT impacts upon
them (C. Alberts, 2004).
Within this paper we relate knowledge from stan-
dards to the consideration of employee behaviour
within information security management. CISOs can-
not afford to ignore the human element within the or-
ganisation (KTN, 2007). Organisations must cultivate
an awareness of the human-behavioural implications
of their information security decisions, and the CISO
is best positioned to achieve this. An example would
be acknowledging both a need for employees to use
removable storage devices and the potential for em-
ployees to lose these devices, and mandating that all
storage devices be encrypted to protect valuable data
in such an event. Understanding the usability needs of
employees should be a priority for CISOs (Skidmore,
2003), as it can help in identifying and managing per-
sistent clashes between security mechanisms and end-
users (ISACA, 2009).
This paper is focused on structuring knowledge
from information security standards so as to provide
additional benefits. For this we develop a knowledge
base application to encapsulate facts and processes
relating to information security. We build upon the
static content of an information security standard by
identifying relationships between the different infor-
mation security concepts within. We then associate
these concepts with additional information relating to
the work behaviours of staff.
The knowledge base is built on an information
model (or ontology), populated with management
recommendations from multiple information security
standards. We also developed a user interface appli-
cation driven by the knowledge base content.
Discussion of the ontology and user interface fol-
lows in Sections 2 and 3 respectively. Related work
is described in Section 4, with concluding remarks in
Section 5.
326
Stepanova D., Parkin S. and Moorsel A. (2009).
A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR JUSTIFIED INFORMATION SECURITY DECISION-MAKING.
In Proceedings of the 4th Inter national Conference on Software and Data Technologies, pages 326-331
DOI: 10.5220/0002256703260331
Copyright
c
SciTePress
2 KNOWLEDGE BASE DESIGN
CISOs require more information to inform their in-
formation security management decisions. We re-
fer specifically to information relating to human-
behavioural factors within the workplace, and how
human behaviour can influence or be influenced by
information security measures. There is then a re-
quirement to associate information relating to human-
behavioural factors with existing decision-making
criteria. In this case the existing criteria may be in-
formation security standards, as these are often im-
plemented to provide a measure of an organisation’s
security competence.
A second requirement is to present existing and
additional (i.e. human-behavioural and usability)
management criteria to a CISO effectively. This is ad-
dressed in the user interface (Section 3). Any further
knowledge derived from or associated with informa-
tion security management content must be presented
logically if it is to assist the decision-making process.
2.1 The Need for an Ontology
To create an information security knowledge base it is
essential to define the concepts to be represented, and
the relationships that exist between them. For this we
chose to develop an ontology, which would be appro-
priate for a number of reasons (as stated elsewhere in
(S. E. Parkin, 2009):
By providing a taxonomy of information security
terminology, there is scope for security engineers
to broaden their knowledge of related concepts.
An ontology facilitates interoperability, not least
between different assessment methodologies or
software tools. This can potentially generate new
knowledge.
To represent terminology in an ontology it is nec-
essary to reduce a diverse array of terms, concepts
and relations into a refined, structured information
model. This makes precise any knowledge and
process information.
2.2 Scope of the Knowledge Base
Our work uses the ISO27002 standard as a context,
as an example of a framework that CISOs often work
within, and with which we could associate human-
behavioural factors. The University Colleges and
Information Systems Association (UCISA) Informa-
tion Security Toolkit (developed by the University of
Reading) (UCISA, 2005) was chosen as an additional
source of information. The UCISA toolkit differs in
that it is targeted towards educational institutions. As
the UCISA standard references and expands upon the
BS7799 standard (a predecessor to ISO27002), using
these two standards together allows us to investigate
ways of representing knowledge from similar sources.
The content of the knowledge base was restricted
to guidelines relating to employees’ use of remov-
able data storage devices (e.g., to transfer work to
client premises for presentation). This allowed us to
build on previous findings that have shown a need
to consider human-behavioural factors when secur-
ing information on removable USB storage devices
(A. Beautement, 2008),(R. Coles, 2008).
2.3 Approach to Ontology Development
We followed recommendations for ontology design as
found in (N. F. Noy, 2000). The structure of the on-
tology was also inspired in part by the work of Fenz
et al (S. Fenz, 2007), who developed an ontology in-
corporating ISO27001/2 content (discussed further in
Section 4).
The ontology was developed using the Ontology
Web Language (OWL) (W3C, 2004). We chose OWL
as it is extensible and well-supported. By following
ontology design recommendations and encoding our
ontology in an ontology language we provide well-
structured, meaningful information security knowl-
edge. We used the Prot
´
eg
´
e Ontology Editor applica-
tion (Stanford, 2009) to construct the ontology and
enter data.
2.4 Overview of Knowledge Base
Components
The content of the ontology is introduced in Figure 1.
For brevity the Asset definitions are restricted to those
relating to removable media. The components of the
ontology are described in the following sections.
2.4.1 Asset
An Asset represents something of value to an organ-
isation which may require protection. We focus on
‘Removable Device’ Assets. This includes remov-
able USB storage devices (USB sticks, external hard
drives etc.), as well as write-once and rewritable CDs
and DVDs.
2.4.2 Source
A Source represents the standard from which guide-
lines are taken. We represent two Sources, ISO27002
and the UCISA Toolkit. Each standard has corre-
sponding subclasses that describe its structure. The
A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR JUSTIFIED INFORMATION SECURITY DECISION-MAKING
327
Asset
In ta n g ib le
T a n g ib le
R em ovable D evice
Data
Business
Administrative
Security
In fo rm a tio n
Source
ISO 27002
Category
Objective
Control
UCISA
Section
Subsection
Chapter
G u id e lin e
Step
Vulnerability
Hum an-Behavioural
Technical
hasStepAsset
is S o u rc e R e la te d
hasSubsectionSection
hasStepSource
hasG uidelineC hapter
hasStepG uideline
hasStepVulnerability
is S te p R e la te d
Figure 1: Overview of the ontology.
Source class allows representation of different infor-
mation sources, so it is possible to add additional stan-
dards in the future (owing to the extensibility of an
ontology).
To facilitate integration of different Sources, a
unifying knowledge hierarchy was created. This
structure consists of the Chapter, Guideline and
Step classes (where a Step is a refinement of part
of a Guideline). Content relating to use of remov-
able storage devices was extracted from the stan-
dards and arranged according to this hierarchy via the
hasStepSource relation. The isStepRelated
relation identifies links between (potentially previ-
ously non-associated) Steps.
Once concrete Guideline and Step definitions
have been created, it is possible to identify the
Assets that specific recommendations refer to (via
the ‘hasStepAsset’ relation).
2.4.3 Vulnerability
Each Asset can have additional knowledge attached
to it, as per the established information security
paradigm that “an Asset may expose a weakness or
Vulnerability which can potentially be exploited”, via
the hasStepVulnerability relation. We can then
relate human-behavioural vulnerabilities to the con-
tent of a standard in a structured manner.
In our ontology a Vulnerability may be ei-
ther Technical (i.e. relating to the informa-
tion security hardware/software infrastructure) or
Human-Behavioural (i.e. part of an activity or pro-
cess that requires the interaction of a person). The
separation of technical and human factors within
a standards framework provides CISOs with a for-
malised perspective on behavioural issues and their
relevance to existing IS management concerns.
As an example, a Step “Security Media
Storage” hasStepAsset {“USB”, “CD”}, and
hasStepVulnerability “NoProtectionOfUnautho-
risedAccess”.
We developed Vulnerability definitions asso-
ciated with each guideline and links between guide-
lines by decomposing the ISO27002 and UCISA stan-
dards. We also consulted experts within a large IT
consultancy and reviewed related research documen-
ICSOFT 2009 - 4th International Conference on Software and Data Technologies
328
tation. Ideally development of further ontology con-
tent would be achieved through consultation with ex-
perienced IS professionals and existing research in
this way. This approach also proved effective in the
work in (S. E. Parkin, 2009), wherein an information
security ontology incorporating human-behavioural
factors was developed and content produced to repre-
sent management considerations in an organisation’s
password authentication policy.
3 KNOWLEDGE BASE
INTERFACE APPLICATION
A user interface was developed for CISOs to access
the knowledge base. We considered the usability re-
quirements of CISOs by building a system that aligns
the knowledge base and the representation of that
knowledge to the user. Through consultation with a
CISO within a large financial organisation we were
able to structure and illustrate the relationships be-
tween ontology classes in a more logical manner. The
main interface window is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Overview of Knowledge Base user interface ap-
plication.
In Figure 2 a number of features can be seen:
Search Window (Top-Left): users can search for
content featuring specific keywords, instead of
traversing the guidelines in search of it.
Questionnaire (Middle): a CISO can answer spe-
cialised management questions. The answers are
used to refine the guidelines that apply to the or-
ganisation.
Guideline Hierarchy (Bottom): content from stan-
dards is arranged in a hierarchy to enable sim-
ple navigation. Our example content follows
the structure of the ISO27002 standard. Con-
tent should have a logical structure and indicate
its source to aid in auditing and compliance pro-
cesses.
Guideline Information (Right): provides specific
guideline content, as well as associated Asset
and Vulnerability information. This is where
human-behavioural factors are linked to individ-
ual guidelines.
We developed the user interface using HTML,
JavaScript and jOWL (Decraene, 2009). This pro-
vided a lightweight, browser-based application that
could be accessed across various systems and with
limited resource requirements.
3.1 Accessing Knowledge Base Content
The simplest way to view content is to follow the
guideline hierarchy to an individual guideline. Each
guideline link provides a tool-tip text box indicating
the source.
Use of the hierarchy is appropriate for users who
know which guidelines they wish to view, however
other approaches to finding knowledge base content
are also useful. Users may be assisted through use
of the search engine (as shown in Figure 2), which
finds mention of entered Asset names within guide-
line Steps. We assume that a user would use sim-
ilar terminology to the Source standards. However
the knowledge base application can use synonyms to
associate keywords with specific guidelines (e.g., if
“portable storage device” and “removable media” re-
fer to the same Asset).
Ontology content can be tailored to a particular or-
ganisation by use of the questionnaire shown in Fig-
ure 2 (which here focuses on removable storage de-
vice policy). An example would be to ask a CISO if
they store data on removable devices for more than a
year at a time (in which case a particular ISO27002
guideline applies). The questionnaire identifies both
guidelines that are applicable to the organisation and
those that can be ignored.
3.2 Presentation of Guideline Content
When a user has chosen a specific guideline to view,
content is presented as in Figure 3.
Content for each guideline is divided into:
Content: original text from a Guideline or Step.
Vulnerability: the Vulnerability types associ-
ated with the guideline.
Links: cross-references to other stored guidelines.
Info: additional related knowledge from the
Source or other sources such as modelling tools
(see Section 3.3).
A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR JUSTIFIED INFORMATION SECURITY DECISION-MAKING
329
Figure 3: Example of guideline advice.
Notes: notes can be attached to a specific guide-
line e.g., to record progress with compliance.
Links between guidelines hinge on the identi-
fied Asset and Vulnerability types. For in-
stance, removable storage devices may be secured by
password-authenticated encryption, so the user could
then consult advice on password quality and usability.
Use of an ontology formalises the relations between
guidelines from within and across different standards.
We focus on guideline relations that identify human-
behavioural considerations (e.g. usability of pass-
words when encrypting removable storage devices).
3.3 Integration of Modelling Tools
CISOs should assess the impact that management de-
cisions will have upon members of an organisation.
Modelling tools that assess the usability of security
controls can potentially provide further insight into
these impacts. This would support decision-making
while enabling analysis of various policy scenarios.
Our knowledge base user interface integrates a
demonstrative modelling tool that measures password
strength and memorability. Much existing research
(e.g. (A. Adams, 1997)) has highlighted that pass-
word security and memorability are often conflicting
goals, so a balance must be found. Here a CISO can
enter sample passwords as per their own prospective
policies, and be informed of both how secure the pass-
word would be and how easy or hard it might be to
remember (as determined by a simple demonstrative
algorithm). Presenting the tool in this way provides
a perspective similar to that of an individual in the
organisation. The tool output could be used as evi-
dence for management decisions e.g., whether a spe-
cific password format would meet an organisation’s
usability and security requirements.
The simple password strength/memorability tool
demonstrates the potential for using modelling tools
to consider human-behavioural factors in security
management decision-making. More complex mod-
elling tools with appropriately formalised human-
behavioural metrics could be added over time.
4 RELATED WORK
Fenz et al (S. Fenz, 2007) created a security ontol-
ogy incorporating content from the ISO27001/2 stan-
dards. Guidelines are related to organisational secu-
rity controls, allowing assessment of security policies
within the ISO27001/2 framework. Our ontology also
incorporates structural components and content from
ISO27002, for the purposes of knowledge derivation
and expansion.
Lee et al (S. Lee, 2006) describe a process for
identifying interdependencies across different stan-
dards and deriving security requirements from these
standards. Questionnaires are used to align stan-
dards and internal security configurations. This work
demonstrates adaptation of natural-language stan-
dards to internal security infrastructures, by way of in-
formation models that identify and relate assets, vul-
nerabilities etc. We formalise the relationships be-
tween guidelines and subject matter within and across
information security standards to deepen knowledge
and facilitate integration of additional knowledge.
The ENISA Knowledgebase tool (ENISA, 2008)
is a directory for managing content from different IT
standards. It can be used to decompose standards con-
tent and store it in a consistent, systematised format.
We break standards down into their structural compo-
nents, but to the level of objects and procedures that a
CISO can consider within their policies.
Commercial tools exist to assist organisations pur-
suing compliance with external standards (e.g. Cura
Compliance (Cura, 2009), Modulo Risk Manager
(Modulo, 2009)). These products integrate knowl-
edge of e.g. ISO27002 controls into a compliance
process, providing guideline content and additional
functionality to relate guidelines with an organisa-
tion’s information security position (by way of spe-
cific organisational assets and processes). Our knowl-
edge base associates external standards with security
infrastructure components, allowing further knowl-
edge to be developed and in part tailored to specific
organisations.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a knowledge base structure and
associated user interface that expand the informa-
ICSOFT 2009 - 4th International Conference on Software and Data Technologies
330
tion security management knowledge available to
CISOs, and improve awareness of the relationships
between various information security concepts. The
work also serves to illustrate how consideration of
human-behavioural factors can be incorporated into
this knowledge structure. Investigation of the require-
ments of the interface further informed development
of inter-concept connections, and how they are pre-
sented to target users.
The decomposition of external standards into indi-
vidual concepts and relationships, integrated with ad-
ditional knowledge, provides potential for CISOs to
better understand IS management knowledge and so
inform their security management decisions further.
There is potential to build upon the work de-
scribed in this paper, by for instance integrating more
complex, specialised modelling tools, and by expand-
ing the range of guidelines in the knowledge base.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are supported in part by EPSRC grant
EP/F066937/1 (“Economics-inspired Instant Trust
Mechanisms for the Service Industry”) and UK Tech-
nology Strategy Board (TSB), grant nr. P0007E
(“Trust Economics”).
We are grateful for the feedback we received from
Robert Coles (Merrill Lynch) and members of the
Trust Economics project (Newcastle, 2009). Daria
Stepanova was a Visiting Researcher at Newcastle
University, visiting from Saint-Petersburg State Uni-
versity, Russia.
REFERENCES
A. Adams, M. A. Sasse, P. L. (1997). Making passwords
secure and usable. In HCI 97: Proceedings of HCI
on People and Computers XII, pages 1–19. Springer-
Verlag.
A. Beautement, R. Coles, e. a. (2008). Modelling the human
and technological costs and benefits of usb memory
stick security. In Workshop on Economics in Informa-
tion Security (WEIS).
BS (2005). BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 - Information Tech-
nology - Security Techniques - Code of Practice for
Information Security Management. British Standards
Institution.
C. Alberts, A. D. (2004). An intro-
duction to the octave method. http://
www.cert.org/octave/methodintro.html. Software
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University,
last viewed 12/03/09.
Cura (2009). Cura compliance. Cura Software Solutions,
http://www.curarisk.com/pages/content.asp?SectionID
=7&SubSectionID=50. last viewed 12/03/09.
Decraene, D. (2009). jowl - semantic javascript library.
http://jowl.ontologyonline.org/. last viewed 12/03/09.
ENISA (2008). Knowledgebase: Tool-based security pol-
icy composition. European Network and Information
Security Agency (ENISA). Version 1.0.
ISACA (2009). An Introduction to the Business Model for
Information Security. ISACA.
KTN (2007). Human Vulnerabilities in Security Systems:
White Paper. KTN Human Factors Working Group.
Modulo (2009). Modulo risk manager. http://
www.modulo.com/products/modulo-risk-manager-
overview.jsp. last viewed 12/03/09.
N. F. Noy, D. L. M. (2000). Ontology development 101:
A guide to creating your first ontology. Stanford KSL
Technical Report KSL-01-05.
Newcastle (2009). Trust economics website. Newcastle
University, UK, http://www.trust-economics.org/. last
viewed 24/02/09.
R. Coles, J. Griffin, e. a. (2008). Trust economics feasibility
study. In 38th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Con-
ference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN
2008), pages A45–A50. IEEE Computer Society.
S. E. Parkin, A. v. M. (2009). An information security on-
tology incorporating human-behavioral implications.
School of Computing Science, Newcastle University
CS-TR No 1139.
S. Fenz, G. Goluch, e. a. (2007). Information security forti-
fication by ontological mapping of the iso/iec 27001
standard. In PRDC ’07: Proceedings of the 13th
Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable
Computing, pages 381–388. IEEE Computer Society.
S. Lee, R. Gandhi, e. a. (2006). Building problem do-
main ontology from security requirements in regula-
tory documents. In SESS ’06: Proceedings of the 2006
international workshop on Software engineering for
secure systems, pages 43–50. ACM.
Skidmore, P. (2003). Beyond Measure. Demos.
Stanford (2009). The prot
´
eg
´
e ontology editor
and knowledge acquisition system. Stanford
Center for Biomedical Informatics Research,
http://protege.stanford.edu/. last viewed 24/02/09.
UCISA (2005). UCISA Information Security Toolkit. Uni-
versities and Colleges Information Security Associa-
tion (UCISA), 3rd edition.
W3C (2004). Owl web ontology language overview. http://
www.w3.org/TR/owl-features/. last viewed 24/02/09.
A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR JUSTIFIED INFORMATION SECURITY DECISION-MAKING
331