THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK
Peirce and Stamper
A. J. J van Breemen
ICIS, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Keywords: Architectonic of sciences, Peirce, Semiotic framework, Semiotic ladder, Stamper, Firstness, radical
subjectivism, Secondness, Actualism, Thirdness.
Abstract: The strength of Stamper resides in his keen eye for the situatedness of knowledge, the strength of the
founder of semiotics, Ch. S. Peirce (1839-1914), resides in his architectonic approach to processes of
knowledge generation and in his subtle, albeit unfinished semiotics. In this paper I confront both
approaches. The aim is to find a meeting ground. To that end I compare Stamper’s semiotic ladder with
Peirce’s classification of the sciences. A first result is a distinction between two views on the semiotic
ladder: 1. an outside perspective on an information system, in which the levels can be studied as if they are
not interdependent and 2. an inside perspective, in which the path from input to response is followed. In the
latter case the levels must be regarded as interdependent.
1 INTRODUCTION
The impact of Peircean semiotics in the information
sciences is to a large extend mediated by Morris’
behaviourist interpretation of semiotics. In Sign
processes and the sheets of semeiosis (Breemen &
Sarbo 2007a) we argued against the restrictions
Morris placed on sign processes. For us, in
contradistinction to Morris, sign processes:
(1) include mental phenomena (stimulus,
response and conditioning through reinforcement
will not do);
(2) include processes in inorganic nature;
(3) do cover all forms of behaviour;
(4) do as a rule generate new signs.
i
The most important consequence of Morris’
denial of the above four statements for information
science, so we claimed, is the severing of
information systems from organizational systems of
whatever kind by regarding an information system
as a sub-system that delivers services to another type
of system (Cf. D. Falkenberg et al 1998, p.15.)
which governs the interplay of presumably
disconnected processes of semiosis. In this manner
the study of the representational side of information
processes tends to get severed from the interactional
or social side. The price to be paid is that the
oftentimes intricate relations between both
dimensions remain opaque and the question of
responsibility cannot be properly addressed.
A direct recourse to Peirce, however, will not
solve the problem. For, although his way of thinking
was subtle enough to enable him to repeatedly
address issues that follow from the basic social
character of information processes –as, for instance,
his dialogical approach to quantification, generalized
by Hintikka into a game theoretical semantics,
testifies- his strong focus on science, conceived as a
project that in the long run will yield an ultimate
opinion that conforms to reality, prevented him to
systematically integrate the import of the
interactional element in semiotics.
ii
I will use the work of Stamper as a catalyst in my
attempt to work towards a more integrated and a
more Peircean semiotic account of what is identified
as two separate systems in the FRISCO approach to
information systems. In particular the notions of
radical subjectivism and actualism will be utilized in
order to shift the focus from representations of
information systems (IS) towards representations of
i
For Peirce only death or total annihilation puts an end t
o
semeiosis, not so for Morris. For Morris statements see Morris
(1946, pp. 287-291).
ii
The relative neglect for the normative sciences of aesthetics an
d
ethics, as compared to the abundance of attention for normative logic
can be understood against this background.
87
van Breemen A.
THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK - Peirce and Stamper.
DOI: 10.5220/0003258700870094
In Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Informatics and Semiotics in Organisations (ICISO 2010), page
ISBN: 978-989-8425-26-3
Copyright
c
2010 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
the interpretation processes that the agents may go
through when they partake in the realisation of goals
the IS is meant to fulfil.
It is not my intention to suggest that such a shift
ought to lead to a replacement of conceptual tools,
like replacing the ontology charts of the Semantic
Analysis method (SAM) with the interpretational
model we presented at ICOS 2007 (Breemen, Sarbo
& Van der Weide, 2007b). On the contrary, it may
be far more profitable to insert the interpretational
model in an agent node, of whatever agent type, in
the ontology chart in order to be able to zoom in on
a particular actor. But then it becomes of interest to
find out whether it is possible to find connections
between the semiotic frameworks of both
approaches that enables translation from one into the
other. It is this latter topic that I explore in this
paper.
2 PEIRCE, STAMPER AND THE
SOCIAL ELEMENT
An important difference between Peirce’s and
Stamper’s conception of information processes
follows from their respective overall goals. Whereas
Peirce’s main interest is to deliver a contribution to
the project of science in a way that is reminiscent to
the work of Comte (save the latter’s positivistic
philosophy), Stamper is less restrictive, since he
wants to understand information processes in all
kinds of organizations, not only in the project of
science. Here I will only hint at one consequence of
this difference in orientation. I do this with the help
of an idea of the Chinese philosopher Master Meng
(372-289 BC).
Master Meng, living in troubled times, suggested
a remedy to the hardship farmers suffered as a result
of the greed of the ruling classes. The well-field
system, he conceived, foresaw in the subsistence of
farmers by subdividing the land in pieces of nine
fields. Each of the eight fields surrounding the
central field would be worked by a family and the
fruit of that labour would be theirs. On top of that all
eight families would have to work on the central
field in order to provide the ruler with the means to
organize labour on behalf of the common good. See
figure 1.
Figure 1: Xu Guangqi’s representation of master Mengs
nine field system
iii
or the position of Peirce.
Now, substitute interpreting systems for the
families of farmers, substitute science for the central
field, and add to that a goal that instigates the
individuals to value individual information processes
incompatible with the (methodical) demands of the
central field as bad because they lead to false
statements (beliefs) and processes that do contribute
true statements (beliefs) according to the rules as
good.
iv
Thus, the field-well system can be read as a
simile for Peirce’s intellectual orientation.
Figure 2: The effect of multiple goals or the position of
Stamper.
Against this background: Stamper asks how we
can understand what happens if different nine field
units intersect, for instance because differentiating
economic activity leads to conflicts of norms and
interest, see figure 2. Part of the answer, of course,
are the concepts of NORMA (Liu 2000) and the idea
of agents rooted in and influenced by information
fields. These have to bring out the (semantic)
differences between the different units and sub-units.
The question here is not who values the social
element higher, for both are truly convinced of the
social character of thought. The question is in what
way respect is being effectuated. Gazendam and Liu
(2005) point the way to an answer when they remark
that in ontology charts for Stamper society is the
root agent. Peirce would specify for his research
program the root agent as the society of investigators
that strives to unravel the secrets of reality. Reality
iii
The drawing and the explanation are to be found in C. Lindqvis
t
(2007).
iv
It is of interest to note that Peirce includes emotions in the class o
f
appearances that is continually contradicted by testimony and typifies
them as the source of error (Cf. CP 5.234).
ICISO 2010 - International Conference on Informatics and Semiotics in Organisations
88
being defined as ‘that upon which agreement will be
reached in the indefinite future, if only research is
pushed far enough’.
v
A clear indication that this is
the stance taken is to be found in the distinction
Peirce made between man as an individual and man
as a personality. As an individual man is regarded as
the source of error (Cf. CP 8.12). As a personality
man is looked at as the unit of consistency. Closely
connected to this is Peirce’s opinion that man is
immortal only to the extent that he as a true symbol
has a lasting effect on future thought (Cf. CP 7.593,
7.594).
vi
It is tempting at this point to take recourse to
Peirce’s architectonic classification of the sciences
and to remark that the difference between Peirce and
Stamper must be understood as a difference in
generality: Peirce is working on the philosophical
foundations of the (special) sciences and Stamper
works within one of the special sciences or even
within the applied sciences. In the next paragraph I
will treat this subject in more detail, here I only
point to some obstacles for such an interpretation:
1. Although informatics or information science
may have started as computer science or just as
an information technology, nowadays, as de
Tienne puts it, it has become ‘a confluence of
studies in artificial intelligence, cybernetics,
cognitive science, formal logics and other
related activities that study how natural or
artificial systems represent, transform, and
communicate information […].’ (De Tienne
2006) As a consequence information scientists
nowadays raise questions that for Peirce
belonged to the sub-branches of philosophy.
vii
2. Although Peirce was a strong advocate of the
scientific enterprise, his conviction that science
evolved out of ordinary thinking guaranteed
semiotics to encompass all information
processes.
Peirce’s preference for scientific reasoning shows
itself nevertheless. For example in the disbalance in
attention paid to the sciences of aesthetics and ethics
as compared with his attention for the other branches
of philosophy.
3 STAMPERS LADDER AND
PEIRCE’S ARECHITECTONIC
OF THE SCIENCES
Stamper’s semiotic ladder (see figure 3) grew out of
the distinction Morris made between three angles
from which signs can be studied: the syntactic, the
semantic and the pragmatic. Although Morris
division was inspired by the work of Peirce and
widely accepted by the semiotic community, it is
hard to see how it could fit in Peirce’s research
program (Cf. Cordeiro & Filipe 2004). And indeed,
it is hard to find a satisfying counterpart for Morris’
distinctions in Peirce. The most obvious candidates
are the subdivisions of normative logic in the
architectonic of sciences drawn up by Peirce (see
figure 4), i.e. speculative grammar, critical logic and
speculative rhetoric. But if we realize ourselves that
the other, more common name for speculative
grammar is semiotics, then the correspondence with
syntactics becomes problematic. As a consequence
of the extensions made by Stamper, however, a
comparison still may be useful.
Figure 3: Stamper’s semiotic ladder. Note that although
there are differences between information processing man
and computers from an engineering point of view, from a
semiotic point of view the similarities prevail. So, it ought
to be stated as The Human/IT-platform.
The first thing to note is that Peirce classifies
sciences, while Stamper classifies dimensions or
levels that can be distinguished in the study of
information systems. Along one line of reasoning it
can be argued that the levels must be applicable to
any interpreting system, e.g. also to a brain devoted
to the scientific enterprise. For, whatever the
systems goal, the dimensions must be present. Along
another line of reasoning it can be argued that the
extremes of the ladder –the social and physical
worlds- are the object of the sub-branches of the
special sciences –the psychical and physical- in the
architectonic presentation of the sciences by Peirce
(Cf. Figure 4).
v
Peirce’s concept of reality is dynamical and entails the passage
from the irregular to the regular (Cf. CP 1.175).
vi
Note that agents in ontology charts are taken in their personalit
y
character only.
v
ii
To determine the place of information science in Peirce’s
classification of the sciences is not easy. Information science
spreads out over the applied sciences, the special theoretica
l
sciences and philosophy and contributes to them by demandin
g
more rigor.
THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK - Peirce and Stamper
89
Figure 4: Peirce’s mature classification of sciences.
viii
The
numbers indicate categorical values. Notice that if we
discard esthetics and ethics, the sub-branches of logic fill
the 2.2.x range.
Both lines of thought would be more clearly
distinguished if besides figure 3, a figure would be
made in which the six level-names are modified by
the suffix ‘aspect’, e.g. physical aspect instead of
physical world. The steps of the ladder would thus
specify the different aspects that can be
distinguished in each information process. Each next
step up could be imagined to rely on the steps below,
i.e. without existence (physical aspect), no pattern
(empirical aspect), etc. If the relation between the
aspects is conceived in this way, then at least in this
respect a similarity with Peirce’s classification of
sciences exists.
With Peirce, the ‘lower’ sciences are involved in
the higher: mathematics is involved in philosophy
and the special sciences, phenomenology is involved
in the normative sciences, aesthetics in ethics, etc.
Since this idea of involvement is a consequence of
Peirce’s categorical scheme and since that scheme
also steered the arrangement of sign aspects and
interpretant aspects (Breemen & Sarbo 2009), in
principle the categorical scheme of Peirce might
prove very helpful for the development of
architectonic approaches, like Stamper’s, to
information systems.
The three most general categories are irreducible to
each other, interdependent and present in every
experience. The categories are: 1. Firstness or
qualitative possibility, 2. Secondness or actuality,
and 3. Thirdness or mediating law. It is important to
note already here that the categories can be applied
to themselves in order to yield ever more detailed
sub-branches. And indeed, as a matter of fact, in the
classification of sciences each of the sciences,
regarded on itself, is of the third category -as is all
cognition- but in relation to each other they can be
provided with categorical values that state their
relative positions and they can again be sub-divided
according to the categorical scheme as the division
of philosophy shows.
ix
Mathematics, in relation to philosophy and the
special sciences, is a First because ‘[…] it meddles
with every other science without exception.’ (CP
1.245) and
[…] does not undertake to ascertain any matter of fact
whatever, but merely posits hypotheses, and traces out
their consequences. It is observational, in so far as it
makes constructions in the imagination according to
abstract precepts, and then observes these imaginary
objects, finding in them relations of parts not specified
in the precept of construction. CP 1.240
Philosophy is, according to Peirce, a Second because
it is involved in the special sciences, but not in
mathematics. This follows from its task, which is
[…] to find out all that can be found out from those
universal experiences which confront every man in
every waking hour of his life, (philosophy: the author)
must necessarily have its application in every other
science. For be this science of philosophy that is
founded on those universal phenomena as small as you
please, as long as it amounts to anything at all, it is
evident that every special science ought to take that
little into account before it begins work with its
microscope, or telescope, or whatever special means
of ascertaining truth it may be provided with. CP
1.246
Another way to put this is to say that philosophy is
of the second category because the actuality of
experience comes into play.
Before I proceed with a treatment of
phenomenology and the normative sciences, the key
parts of this paper, a closer look at a difference
between Peirce and Stamper is useful.
3.1 The Detached Eye of the Logician
and Actualism
The development of Peirce’s semiotics did get off
the ground with his On a New List of Categories
(1867) and went on until his dead in 1914. The
central question in On a New List of Categories
viii
Constructed from CP 1.180-1.283, 1902/03.
ix
It can be argued that metaphysics is misplaced in th
classification. If it is regarded as the First of the special sciences,
then the scheme of sciences (1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) is identica
l
with Peirce’s scheme of interpretant aspects. Besides that,
b
uilding domain specific ontology’s is by now daily business i
n
information science.
ICISO 2010 - International Conference on Informatics and Semiotics in Organisations
90
already is: How do we bring the manifold of sense to
unity? (Cf. CP 1.546) This question clearly deals
with our faculty of understanding. Peirce’s
development of technical terms in semiotics
however starts with the distinctions to be made with
respect to (outward) signs. It is only after the turn of
the century that a theory of interpretants
(interpretants to be distinguished from interpreters
that process or develop the interpretants suggested
by the sign) comes in sight. A consequence thereof
is that although the work on the categories is
profitable for the sign theory, it is only with the
emergence of the theory of interpretants that a more
material, semiotic approach towards the process of
conception, that brings the manifold of the senses to
unity, becomes feasible.
On the assumption that it makes no sense to
make distinctions with regard to the sign if they
don’t play a role in the process of their
interpretation, we did show in (Breemen & Sarbo
2007a) that it is possible to assign for each sign
aspect an interpretants aspect. Although all
ingredients were present, Peirce did not come that
far. The interesting question is: “why not?” The
short answer is that he looked at the matter with the
rather detached eye of the logician, as is exemplified
in the following quote.
It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a
quasi-mind; for if we regard it as an outward object,
and as addressing itself to a human mind, that mind
must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only
after that consider it in its significance; and the like
must happen if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-
mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that
quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding that
determination as the sign. EP 2 p.391 1906
Here it is admitted that in order to interpret
signs, it is needed to first apprehend the sign as an
object, but Peirce immediately makes clear that
nothing is lost if we skip this step by supposing the
sign as an object already to be grasped by a quasi-
mind. And indeed, in his personal Logic Notebook,
October 8
th
1905,
x
we find a categorical ordered
listing of sign aspects that flows over in a listing of
interpretant aspects. In this list, however, the first
triad of interpretant aspects is missing. These are
precisely the interpretant aspects that cover the
apprehension of the sign as an object.
xi
We will see
in paragraph 4 that taking an actualist
xii
stand
(Gazendam & Liu 2005), forces one also to take into
account that first stage of the interpretational
process.
3.2 Stamper’s Ladder Revisited
In figure 5 I present the aspectual view on the
semiotic ladder. The difference between both ladders
is twofold. First, while in the received view
perspective there may or may not be
interdependencies between the levels, in the
aspectual perspective I assume there are
interdependencies. Note that the steps of the
aspectual ladder relate with the sub-branches of
philosophy in Peirce’s classification as an aspect
approach relates to a received view approach or, as
Peirce would have it, as the utens of a certain kind of
habits relates to the docens of the same kind of
habits. The different moments that can be discerned
in the utens of a process of interpretation are reified
into relatively independent levels. Here resides the
ground for hope to be eventually able to trace back
the different steps of the semiotic framework to a
general description of interpretation.
Second, the aspectual ladder describes what must
be assumed present in any information process, the
sciences ladder divides and distinguishes sub-
domains of all possible information processes. This
difference is akin to the difference between a
universal (or cenoscopic) ontology and domain
specific (or idioscopic) ontology’s (Breemen &
Sarbo 2009).
Stamper’s ladder of views starts with the
physical world. That may be a good choice for the
received view approach, for an aspectual approach, I
think, it is better to follow Stamper’s principle of
radical subjectivism. But if we do so value the
perceiving mind, we are better off with
phenomenology at the first steps of the aspectual
view ladder.
x
Manuscript 339 according to the Robin catalogue
xi
For Peirce scholars: this probably is the reason why Peirce neve
r
tried to categorically relate the emotional, energetic and logica
l
interpretant, with the immediate, dynamical and normal interpretant.
xii
This does not imply throwing away the first and third category, i
t
only admits that to start with some actual arousal of the mind may be
a
good strategy.
THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK - Peirce and Stamper
91
Figure 5: Stamper’s ladder adapted to an aspect view and
their roughly corresponding terms in Peirce’s semiotics.
Note that both Peirce -in his work on interpretants- and
Stamper work with two trichotomy’s while three
trichotomy’s are needed to describe a sign in its most
general characteristics. A description of processes of
interpretation by an agent ought to take account of all
three trichotomy’s.
Space forbids tracing out the relation between
Stamper’s ladder, the aspectual ladder and the
interpretational model we derived from Peirce’s
work on signs and interpretants (Breemen & Sarbo,
2009). Since, however, any attempt in that direction
must invoke the phenomenology and the semiotics
of Peirce, in the remainder of this presentation, I will
start that enterprise with the first steps, the steps that
cover the apprehension of the sign as an object (The
steps distinguished under the heading IT-platform).
The first thing to do is to zoom in from the
arrangement of sciences to the object covered by the
sub-branches of philosophy or, better still, we must
zoom in on the most general characteristics of any
interpretation process that relates to the sub-
branches of philosophy as the praxis (utens) relates
to the teaching (docens) of the praxis.
3.3 The Docens and the Utens of the
Sciences
Peirce makes a clear distinction between everyday
reasoning and controlled or scientific reasoning. It is
captured with a distinction between the docens and
utens of logic:
[…] In everyday business, reasoning is tolerably
successful; but I am inclined to think that it is done as
well without the aid of theory as with it. A logica
utens, like the analytical mechanics resident in the
billiard player's nerves, best fulfills familiar uses. CP
1.623
This distinction is consonant with the general
character of philosophy and with specialized
science, so the utens – docens distinction covers not
only what offers itself to the mind (the subject of
philosophy), it also includes the trajectory from the
receptors to the brain, the brain and the motor
system. For, a description of the analytical
mechanics of motor movement clearly seems a
subject for one of the special sciences. A more
radical subjectivist interpretation and description of
the utens of mathematical logic is provided by
Farkas and Sarbo, see the appendix of Breemen &
Sarbo (2009) for a succinct description. They called
it naïve logic because all Boolean operators are
uncritically applied and quantification and modality
are not covered.
xiii
It involves an ordering of the
Boolean operators, but the truth conditions do not
apply, it can be looked at as translations without any
check, besides a check on the completeness of
operators used.
xiv
It covers all we must assume the
mind is capable to at the moment it gets confronted
with “those universal experiences which confront
every man in every waking hour of his life” (CP
1.246).
The first science that investigates the universal
experiences is phenomenology, but it only covers
the subject as appearance. This study yields the
universal categories as a principle to be used in the
construction of a model of our interpretational
process. In Speculative grammar or semiotics the
same appearances are re-investigated. This time
from the perspective of their character as a sign, that
must be grasped before it can evolve its meaning and
realize its effect. Together with the logica utens and
the matter and principles derived from
phenomenology, the technical terms of semiotics
must deliver the first building blocks for our process
model of interpretation. If we leave out the process
character, we have all that is needed to make a
ladder of the dimensions that must be distinguished
in any information system whatever. It does not
discriminate between organic and inorganic systems,
because aesthetics and ethics are not yet included.
4 THE SEMIOTIC SHEET AND
ACTUALISM
If “to all intents and purposes, without an actor no
reality exists” (Gazendam and Liu 2005), we do best
to start with the assumption of a receptive actor. Let
us call the mind of that actor the Semiotic Sheet (S
S
).
Since the S
S
itself is a sign, it has three modalities. In
its modality as a First (possibility, S
S
-P), at the
moment, it only contains the possibility to evoke the
xiii
Truth, modality and quantification come in after experience, so t
o
say.
xiv
Check failure leads to a feeling of uneasiness, to doubt that must b
e
settled in belief.
ICISO 2010 - International Conference on Informatics and Semiotics in Organisations
92
logica utens, that enables the ordered translation of
feelings through time along the steps of the semiotic
ladder by the sheet in its modality as a Third
(mediation, lawfulness, S
S
-L) on the occasion of a
feeling that occurs on the sheet, here and now, in its
modality as a second (actuality, S
S
-A).
What happens if a feeling (qualisign) presents
itself? That feeling must have a quality distinct from
what else is contained by the sheet: it is inescapably
there, here and now inscribing itself as an actual
feeling (sinsign) in a S
S
-A. Besides that it has a
definite quality that makes it the quality it is and that
has the potential to enter the stream of thought. But
only if there is a law or habit that takes this instance
of the quality as an instance of a type (mediation,
legisign). This is a very short summary of what we
find in Peirce’s phenomenological analyses.
In semiotic terms the phenomenological findings
can be presented in two ways. In terms of sign
aspects the feeling regarded as an existent feeling is
a sinsign, regarded as this quality it is a qualisign
and regarded as an instance of a type, it is a legisign.
If we shift focus to the process of interpretation we
find the emotional interpretant (qualisign) and the
physical energetic interpretant (sinsign). The
legisign counterpart is missing, as we showed that of
the nine sign aspects six are present in the
interpretant section (Breemen & Sarbo 2007a), see
figure 6.
Figure 6: The match of sign aspects (left) with interpretant
aspects (right). The match is ours. The interpretant aspects
that are missing in Peirce are in boldface.
The reason why Peirce did not identify the
missing interpretants himself may very well be that
he adhered to the scientific enterprise in which the
interpretant sign via the original sign better be
determined by the object only and not also by
peculiarities only pertinent to a given sheet.
xv
But he
seems to have acknowledged this limitation for he
once complained that:
I have thought of the Object of a Sign as that which
determines the sign; and this is well thought. I have
thought of the interpretant as that which the sign
determines or might determine or should determine;
but this is not so well. For my idea of determination is
dyadic while the idea of the relation of the interpretant
to the sign is triadic. Peirce, MS 339 276r. April 2,
1906
Actualism brings out what is missing, since it
forces one not to abstract from the interpreting
agent. In figure 7 the evolution of the import of a
sign is given. The diamond left represent the S
S
-A
when it is confronted with a new feeling as an effect
upon a state. The question is how a sign is
apprehended as an object with the ability to address
the human information functions.
Figure 7: The semiotic sheet inscribed by a feeling. The
left diagram describes the interpretation moments in terms
of Peirce’s sign theory, the middle in terms of Stamper’s
Ladder and the right in terms of Peirce’s interpretants. The
left diagram provides the actualist perspective by
emphasizing the intrusion of a feeling in an agent state, the
right diagram provides the radical subjectivist perspective
by emphasizing the feeling that develops its effect, the
middle diagram presents a detached view by leaving the
occasion and the experience on that occasion unidentified.
The first significate effect an agent experiences
is a feeling that intrudes. At this moment it is only
the experience of a quality without any
understanding, just an urge to resettle balance on the
sheet. It is associated with doubt, in Peirce’s doubt –
belief sequence, as belief is associated with the
normal interpretant. This moment is indicated with
emotional interpretant in the right diagram. They are
there for an instant and once gone, they are gone
forever, much to elusive to be distinguished in the
detached view (middle).
However short lived emotional interpretants are,
in their effect they are sorted out in a twofold way.
As a feeling of resistance (physical interpretant,
sinsign, existence) and as the one time quality or as
the configuration of qualities they are (mental
interpretant, icon, form). If we follow the sequences
of inscriptions and their forms separately we enter
either the physical or the empirical level in the
detached view.
In the next phase, coined abstraction by Farkas
and Sarbo, the iconic sinsign connects (index) with
what is contained in the sheet. On the one hand it
offers all its interpretational possibilities (immediate
interpretant, rheme), on the other, in order to be
effective, it must be recognized and treated as an
XV
With Peirce ‘objective’ is not associated with the distinctio
n
b
etween external and internal to the mind, but with ‘dependent o
n
mind in general’ and ‘dependent only on a specific mind ’.
THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK - Peirce and Stamper
93
instance of a type by the sheet (legisign). A simple
example must suffice. The lady that can be seen
either as young or as old offers at least these
interpretational possibilities (immediate interpretant,
rheme). In what way it is seen at a particular
moment depends on the legisign invoked: the lady
either seen as young or old, not both. Note that it is
not yet seen as a young woman or as an old woman.
It still is just the image experienced as familiar.
In the detached view (middle diagram) the index
position is identified as the syntactical level, for, if
we take lots of occurring iconic sinsigns according
to the combinations they indexically lead to on
subsequent interpretation moments, we are looking
for the combinatory properties and we may start to
distinguish different types of combinations. Since in
the Rheme position all possible meaningful
combinations are offered, this must be the semantic
level. Interestingly, the legisign position does not
have a counterpart in the detached view. In part this
can be explained by pointing to the fact that it is
implied in the semantic level. But that is not the
whole story. In order to be able to dwell upon this
subject a bit more, I will skip the further assignment
of moments in the process model to ladder positions
and just give the correspondences in figure 7 without
any argument,
Another reason why the legisign position is not
recognized in the received view of the semiotic
ladder may be connected with a feat of the ontology
charts of SAM. The nodes represent affordances and
agents as a rule in general and not as particulars. The
exception is the root, that is taken to represent
society. By doing so entities like person tend to be
looked at from the point of view of the world
modeled in the charts. Characters of instances of
type person that fall outside the depicted world have
the same value as the individual has in Peirce’s
worldview, they are the source of error at the most.
This does not prevent those characters to be useful in
worlds depicted by other charts, but that falls out of
sight. Choosing unit of consistency instead of society
as epithet would enhance consciousness of the
potential and a source for agents to act adverse to the
goal of the world depicted. At the same time it
would invite to look at the agent as itself a unit that
strives to increase its consistency and that, taking
part in different information systems (Cf. Master
Meng), may be forced to take responsibility for its
acts in any one of them as a consequence of its role
in another. I suggest that zooming in on the
complexities that result is greatly enhanced by
projecting the process model of interpretation on the
agent nodes of the ontology charts. It would be of
assistance for any approach that tries to personalize
the response of information systems or of ambient
spaces to individual needs.
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