management, utilizing computer science, marketing,
psychology and other field knowledge, analyzed
how to promote the construction of credibility
evaluation system, and discussed the reliability of
the evaluation mechanism from the number of
Buyers and sellers, the property of the participants,
Market microstructure, anonymous and certification
system evaluation, the future development of online
reputation evaluation depends on the reliability of
evaluation results.
In fact, the accused has not stopped on the
OREM, mutual abusive messages can be seen
anywhere on the web, mapping out there are flaws in
the reputation of the mechanism in some extent.
Chris et al. (2004) obtained a negative evaluation
will lead undesirable consequences for their
development through the empirical analysis and
pointed out the contradiction between the reputation
with the dissatisfaction about the transaction and
explain the causes of conflict, but not deeply
analyzed the inadequate of OREM. Christina et al
(2008) analyzed the seller change their strategy
through the generation of expected return and the
results of dishonest conduct under an effective
reputation mechanism, and the effectiveness of the
percentage of 12-month evaluation results in eBay,
the final design of the mechanism should start from
raising the level of parameters, but lack of analysis
of the behaviour of traders.
Any design and optimization of mechanism are
complex systematic thinking process, not only
analysis from the objective, but also sort out the
characteristics of the participants. Some traders In
the virtual web where more complex than the
actuality due to difficult to "face to face"
communicate may make non-rational behaviour (Yi
Yang, 2009), therefore, the OREM design is to
bound the irrational behaviour of traders and allow
them make rationally decisions. However, in reality
many people are not entirely rational "economic
man" (Qing Wang, 2009), after Simon (1955)
developed the concept of bounded rationality and
made a satisfactory criteria, the bounded rational
"social man" are gradually replaced fully rational
"economic man" either in theory or in practical
applications, for it is more close to reality. On et al.
(2002) found in the virtual network environment,
because they do not by any constraints, human
reason is very limited. The secret identity of online
transactions, a single expression characteristic
determines the behaviour of its unique
characteristics. Ariely et al (2003) pointed out that
based on the decision-making motivation of
different, "desperate" emotion in the online auction
process will distort value judgments of the auction
and then exert an influence on strategic options. Yi
Yang et al. ( 2007 ) took www.kongfz.com as an
example, analyzed the process of online bidder’s
mental accounts changing and found the default
rates were different: the small starting price and fare
increase higher than the large one’s, Participants’
were randomly greater than the experts’.
All above
results directly or indirectly confirmed the bounded
rational character of online traders.
Therefore, this article assumes that traders are
bounded rationality: a. Although the trader pursuit
their own credit score to maximize in the reputation
evaluation process, but if the other party meet own
expectations will be meet in the deal and the
evaluation; b. Traders will be impacted by the
evaluating competitors, that is forgive a little faults
in the process of exchange with each other because
of compassion.
2 NEW DESIGN PROCEDURES
OF OREM
2.1 Design of the Evaluation Process
False reputation and retaliation are two outstanding
issues of OREM. False reputation is collusive
behaviour that traders who are familiar with each
other through false transactions, thus achieving a
false evaluation of the reputation. In reality, for
avoiding this problem, both parties are required to
submit their performance.
Retaliation was mainly
due to the uncertainty caused by information
asymmetry the order of evaluation.
Currently the
seller and the buyer evaluated each other, after the
transaction is completed (Figure 1).
In fact, after each deal, buyers will generate their
own expect reputation E
B
in the payment level, then,
give opposite side a credit rating R
B
as his
compliance; And sellers results a credit rating R
S
of
buyer from the receipt of payment, then begins
shipments and generates its own credit expectations
E
S
. When the transaction is completed, if the seller
was the first evaluator, and R
S
< E
B
, the buyer will be
discontented, and retaliate evaluation R
B
< R
S
against
the seller; Likewise, if the buyer was the first
evaluator and R
B
< E
S
, seller will revenge and give
the evaluation R
S
< R
B
.
Therefore, first valuator will
always give the opposite side a good reputation for
other party can give his/her a good reputation, the
result makes the OREM forfeit the role of boosting
trust.
ICEIS 2011 - 13th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems
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