Achieving Energy Efficiency and Security in Mobile Cloud
Computing
Sourya Joyee De, Sourav Saha and Asim K. Pal
Management Information Systems Group, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Joka, D. H. Road, Kolkata, India
Keywords: Mobile Cloud Computing, Security, Privacy.
Abstract: Computation offloading to the Cloud for energy efficiency in portable devices is an emerging area of
research triggered by the widespread use and acceptance of smart phones. A number of architectures have
already been proposed in this context. However, security issues in the cloud still remain a concern that can
play an important role in deciding whether offloading really helps to achieve energy efficiency in mobile
phones. Our framework is based on a layered data approach together with user selected security policies.
This motivated us to develop a mathematical model to depict the energy consumption when performing a
security-enhanced computation in the cloud. The model demonstrates the potential energy saving in the
event of user or organization specified policy for secure computing and data storage in the Cloud.
1 INTRODUCTION
Today mobile phones have a wide range of
functionalities and are fast becoming the primary
computing devices for many people (Kumar and Lu,
2010). However battery life still remains a constraint
and demands improvement. Even for high-end
phones like the iPhone, the consumer’s top priority
is battery life (Paczkowski, 2009). Long battery life
implies that a user can remain connected to the
world for longer time.
Of late, mobile phones are being used as an
interface for cloud computing (Luo, 2009). Earlier,
the use of Mobile Cloud had several challenges like
setup time and cost. However with newer
technologies like virtualization, cloud instances can
be invoked for even a short time (Barham et al.,
2003). Thus recent research focuses on how heavier
applications can be offloaded to the cloud to save
battery life. The decision that which tasks should be
offloaded depends on the amount of computation
(task complexity) and data to be transmitted
(bandwidth and power consumption), etc.
Even with ever-increasing concerns about
information security and the trustworthiness of cloud
service providers (CSPs), the sensitiveness of
information to undesirable exposure has not yet been
considered an integral part of the energy saving
problem. Use of security techniques can adversely
affect energy efficiency. Data is an integral part of
mobile devices and users are sensitive about its
privacy and security. However, not all information
has identical requirements. For example, a user will
be happy to share pictures of his last holiday trip. He
will be a little cautious when sharing information
like contact details stored in his phone. The same
user will be extremely wary if information like
credit card numbers or bank account numbers is
compromised. Existing works mainly focus on the
benefit achieved in terms of energy saved for a
computation done in the cloud vis-à-vis a mobile
phone. This trade-off does not take into account the
decision on which data should reside in the cloud
and the policy that governs the usage of such data.
There are certain applications that are highly
computation intensive and are better processed in the
cloud. However if these applications use sensitive
data, then the existing models for mobile cloud
either fail to address the issue or applies a generic
policy for all the data. Such generic policy may not
be suitable for everyone. For example, if a policy
requires data erasure every time a computation is
performed then the user may incur heavy charges for
bandwidth consumption during frequent data
uploads to the cloud. Similarly, if policies are not
rigid, the provider might end up pooling all
information in the cloud, thereby risking security in
case of an attack. This paper therefore considers
aspects like amount of data that needs uploading
469
De S., Saha S. and K. Pal A..
Achieving Energy Efficiency and Security in Mobile Cloud Computing.
DOI: 10.5220/0004374204690474
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Science (CLOSER-2013), pages 469-474
ISBN: 978-989-8565-52-5
Copyright
c
2013 SCITEPRESS (Science and Technology Publications, Lda.)
during a computation along with energy
consumptions for providing necessary security to the
data. Unlike existing works, the model looks at
various facets like security, costs and efficiency to
arrive at the final decision.
Very few works on energy efficient mobile cloud
computing consider security of offloaded code and
data as a concern. The MAUI architecture of Cuervo
et al (2010) works in the client-server mode where
decisions are taken during runtime on which
methods should be remotely executed. The
CloneCloud architecture (Chun et al., 2011)
partitions applications into portions executing in the
mobile phone and threads that migrate and execute
in the cloud benefitting from cloud resources. The
basic assumption is that it may be beneficial to
upload data and code to the cloud as long as
execution in the cloud is faster, more reliable and
more secure. In this paper, we assume that execution
and storage in cloud is not necessarily more secure
unless proper security techniques are deployed. Most
importantly, we point out that we can achieve both
security and energy efficiency in most cases simply
by categorizing data based on their sensitivity and
user security policies along with user perception
about the security offered by the cloud. ThinkAir
architecture (Kosta et al., 2011) develops on MAUI
and CloneCloud by exploiting parallelizability of
method execution using multiple VM images. It also
addresses on-demand resource allocation in the
cloud for smart phone users. Zhang et al (2009) take
into account security of elastic applications but they
do not consider the effects of the security techniques
on the energy efficiency achieved by the migrating
weblets. Kumar and Lu (2010) provide a
comprehensive mathematical model of energy
savings in a mobile phone showing that
computations that require high amount of data
transfer while the number of instructions is relatively
low should not be offloaded as they do not provide
much energy savings or may lead to more energy
consumption. They also conclude that if additional
energy required to protect privacy and security is
large then offloading to the cloud may not save
energy. We propose an improved version of their
model based on our framework and show that even
after due considerations of security and privacy
issues, offloading tasks to the cloud can save energy.
2 ENERGY EFFICIENT
SECURITY FRAMEWORK
Our energy efficient security framework consists of
the following building blocks: Data Layers, User
Security Policy, Adversarial Model and Data Upload
and Computation. We describe these below.
Henceforth, we use the words user and organization
interchangeably.
1) Data Layers: We classify user data into three
categories namely sensitive (eg., credit card
numbers), private (eg., appointments, calendar
etc) and public (eg., scores in a game) which are
in decreasing order of value to the user. This
categorization helps in identifying and
performing computation-intensive and energy
consuming security algorithms (like encryption,
decryption etc) in mobile phones only for those
data and computations that bear a significant
risk. It also decides where the data can be stored
and in effect helps in limiting bandwidth usage
for data transfers during computations on the
data. Copies of each type of data are maintained
in the mobile phone memory so that in case the
phone is offline, it can still perform
computations.
2) User Security Policy: User policies regarding
data storage and computations are presented in
Table 1. Policies may result due to regulatory
restrictions, compliance requirements or resource
availability.
3) Adversarial Model: We consider three levels of
trust assigned to the cloud: honest, semi-honest
and malicious (Goldreich, 2004). A virtual
machine (VM) is honest if it computes correctly
all functions and does not keep copies of data
used in computations etc whereas semi-honest
VMs may keep records of the unencrypted data
on which the computation took place and hence
perform additional, unauthorized computations
on them. A malicious VM can compute incorrect
function values and keep records of unencrypted
data to perform additional, unauthorized
computations on them, abort a protocol or
collude with other malicious parties. A storage
provider is honest if it does not reveal user data.
Semi-honest storage providers try to glean as
much information as possible from stored user
data. A malicious storage provider can collude
with other malicious providers and outside
attackers to extract information from stored data.
All data and computations in user mobile phone
are secure.
4) Data Upload and Computation: DP 1 allows
no data to be stored in the cloud. Under DP 2,
sensitive data is uploaded to the cloud only when
computations are to be performed on them. Other
data can be uploaded beforehand. DP 3 allows
CLOSER2013-3rdInternationalConferenceonCloudComputingandServicesScience
470
prior uploading of all data. Public data is
uploaded to the cloud and stored there
unencrypted. Under policy combinations (2,1),
(2,2), (3,1) and (3,2) private data is encrypted
before it is transferred to the cloud. However, to
reduce the burden of encryption operations on
the user we use Zhou & Huang’s (2011) privacy
preserving cipher policy attribute based
encryption (PP-CP-ABE) and attribute based
data storage (ABDS) scheme where users need to
only partially encrypt the data before sending it
to the encryption service provider (ESP) which
completes the task of encryption. The data can be
updated and the cloud can use the data for
computations depending on the attribute related
keys that it receives from the user.
Table 1: User Security Policies from user Perception.
Data Polic
y
(DP) Interpretation
DP 1: No data leaves the
user permanently.
Cloud is malicious for
storage.
DP 2: Data partly
managed by third party
service providers
depending on sensitivity
of data.
Semi-honest cloud for
private data; malicious for
sensitive data.
DP 3: Data managed fully
by third party service
providers irrespective of
sensitivity.
Semi-honest cloud for
private and sensitive data
storage.
Computation Polic
y
(CP)
Interpretation
CP 1: Computations are
trusted.
Honest cloud for all
computations.
CP 2: Computations are
semi-trusted.
Honest cloud for
computations on public/
private data; semi-honest/
malicious for sensitive
data.
CP 3: Computations are
untrusted.
Honest cloud for
computations on public
data; semi-honest/
malicious in case of
private and sensitive data.
For (1,1) and (1,2) private data can be uploaded
using any secure public-key encryption scheme. For
(1,1) and (2,1), even sensitive data can be encrypted
using any secure public-key encryption scheme
while for (3,1) we can use the PP-CP-ABE and
ABDS schemes. For on-the-fly data upload (for
private data in (1,3) and sensitive data in (1,3) and
(2,3)) the user uploads shares of the relevant portion
of the data to different VMs in the same cloud. If at
least one VM is honest, then the cloud is unable to
Figure 1: User with Policy Combination (2,2) Uploads
Private Data.
recover the data. When prior data upload is allowed
(for private data in (2,3) and (3,3) and sensitive data
in (3,3)), it is stored encrypted using the PP-CP-
ABE and ABDS schemes but access rights are
distributed in shares to multiple VMs.
In this scenario, computation of any function can
be performed by using the concept of Kamara &
Raykova (2011) where VMs participate in a multi-
party computation of the given function on shared
input and produce shares of the output.
Figure 2: User with Policy Combination (2,2) Uploads
Sensitive Data During Computation.
3 EXECUTION
The cloud replicates an image, maintained in at least
three VMs, of the user mobile. In general, all
computations take place in a single VM but
computations on sensitive data use the images
available in all the VMs. Mobile phone applications
are exactly replicated in the cloud image (referred to
as Im APP).
The user interface (UI) (refer to Figure 3)
interacts with the user to support his requirements of
data storage, update and running any application and
the Cloud Interface (CI) interacts with the cloud for
data upload, update or for running any application.
The Data Manager (DM) is responsible for
classifying data as suggested by the user, storing and
retrieving data and generating relevant information
AchievingEnergyEfficiencyandSecurityinMobileCloudComputing
471
for identifying the data later. The Crypto Service
(CS) performs all encryption/ decryption related
tasks such as key generation, output reconstruction
etc. The CS in CI also performs the initial
encryption operation before delegating the rest of the
task to the ESP for private data and generates shares
of sensitive data before distributing them to its
counterpart in different VMs. On receiving the
encrypted data or a share and in some cases a
function representation the CS counter-part sends
them to the DM in Operations Module (OM).
Figure 3: Implementing the conceptual framework through
interactions between user mobile and cloud images in
VMs.
On receiving user request for an application, the
APP Manager (AM) finds out the type of
computations and the data necessary for running it
by referring to the particular application. Depending
on the user policy, the AM either just sends the APP
request to the Initiator sub-module in CI or sends the
necessary representation of the functions to be
computed for the application to the CS sub-module
for encryption. The AM checks with the DM for the
data and function and if function representation has
not been received, it contacts the Im APP to know
functions to be computed. The Initiator triggers a
request for an application in its counter-part in MI.
The Initiator counterpart also transmits the request
application to the AM in OM. The Compute sub-
module receives the shares or the data and the
function and performs the computations.
4 ENERGY ANALYSIS
We propose the following generic energy
consumption model (meaning of symbols appear in
Table 2) where energy saved










































(1)
Table 2: Symbols and values for energy analysis.
Symbol Meaning
Values for
example
/
/
number of instructions for
sensitive/private/ public
data per unit of data

10
per bit
speed (in instructions
/second) of the mobile
system
400
speed (in
instructions/second) of the
cloud server

160
network bandwidth
56
/
/
/

power consumed by mobile
phone for computing/when
transmitting data/when idle
0.9
0.3

1.3
(in watts)
/

/

number of instructions for a
security algorithm
protecting sensitive/ private/
public data per unit data
/

/

amount of sensitive/
private/ public data required
by the computation




5
total number of instructions
in a computation to be
performed =



400
instruction
s
/

/

(

,

)




1
In the above model (see Table 3 for details) we
ignore the bandwidth cost of initially uploading data
(if any) to the cloud (as data upload needs to be done
only once in a while), the requirement of policy
combinations are given in Table 3 and Table 4.
CLOSER2013-3rdInternationalConferenceonCloudComputingandServicesScience
472
computations for encryption before uploading such
data etc. Also, we ignore fine-grain separation of
privacy/security costs for different types of
encryption schemes and other techniques used
in different scenarios and the variations in the
computations required by security algorithms used
for different computation policies under a particular
data policy. For e.g., under DP 2,
may vary for
CP 1, CP 2 and CP 3. However the equations
can be easily modified to take these into account.
Table 3: Energy analysis for different policy combinations.
Scenario
Data type
needed
for
Computa
tion
Data
Requirements
Security/
Privacy
related
computation
requirement
s
Energy Savings
Energy
consumptions
in example
(units)
Scenario
1:
Policy
combinati
ons (1,1),
(1,2) and
(1,3)
Sensitive

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0




1.830446
Private

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0








1.830446
Public

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0





0.9304464
Mixed
(mixture
of public,
private,
sensitive)

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0


















1.530446
Scenario
2:
Policy
combinati
ons (2,1),
(2,2) and
(2,3)
Sensitive

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0




1.830446
Private

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0


0.001875
Public

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0


0.001875
Mixed

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0








0.611399
Scenario
3:
Policy
Combinat
ions (3,1),
(3,2) and
(3,3)
Sensitive

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0

0.001875
Private

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0


0.001875
Public

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0


0.001875
Mixed

0;

0;
0

0;

0;
0





0.001875
AchievingEnergyEfficiencyandSecurityinMobileCloudComputing
473
We take the example of performing content-
based image retrieval (CBIR) on a collection of
images captured by a mobile phone. Here we
consider that the total amount of data is 15 MB. We
set the energy consumption (0.9
) when
computed entirely in mobile phones as benchmark 1
and that (2.578571) using Kumar and Lu’s
model as benchmark 2 (for numerical assumptions
see Table 2). With respect to benchmark 1, our
framework leads to decreased energy consumption
for computations using only public (percentage
improvement 99.79%) or only private (99.79%) or
mixed (32.07%) for Scenario 2 and for all types of
data (single or mixed) in Scenario 3 (99.79% both).
With respect to benchmark 2, there has been
decrease in energy consumption in all scenarios. The
least energy consumption occurs in scenario 3 where
no data is ever uploaded/downloaded during
computation and the mobile phone need not perform
any security related computation for computations in
the cloud. The energy consumption for scenario 1 is
relatively more (as compared to that for scenario 3)
because all types of data must be uploaded/
downloaded and proper security computations
relevant to the data have to be performed by the
mobile phone whenever the computation uses such
data.
The meanings of symbols used are presented in
Table 2 and details of the model under different
5 FUTURE SCOPE
People and processes are an integral part of every
organization. Without the cooperation from people,
processes can hardly be a success. In the era of
BYOD (bring your own device), there is a thin line
between enterprise provided infrastructure and
personal devices. This immediately leads to some
very interesting extension of our work for the
enterprise scenario. 1) Automatic identification and
classification of organization specified sensitive data
as outlined in policy 2) Identifying additional
sensitive data and auto-protection overriding any
user-imposed possible information leakage channels;
To better address energy efficiency vs. security
issue we wish to look at cost and energy efficiency
of offloading 1) when computing with real-time
data; 2) assured deletion of data and preventing
threats on control data (account-related data, battery
consumption data etc). The framework has been
proposed for mobile devices for energy efficiency.
Security considerations and setup will be equally
applicable for any computing device for end-users
that needs protection from data leakage.
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