Self-consciousness Cannot Be Programmed
Jinchang Wang
School of Business, Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, Galloway Township, NJ 08205, U.S.A.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Self-consciousness.
Abstract: We investigate the issue about whether a computer can be self-aware or self-conscious. We derive logically
that if a machine can be copied or duplicated then it cannot be self-aware. Programs of a digital computer
are copiable, therefore self-consciousness cannot be programmed. Self-awareness is an insurmountable
stumbling block for a digital computer to achieve full range of human consciousness. A robot cannot be
self-conscious unless it is not copiable.
1 KURZWEIL’S THOUGHT LAB
We investigate the issue of machine self-
consciousness and give a logical answer in this
article. We start with Ray Kurzweil’s thought lab.
When talking about a computer’s self-identity,
Kurzweil used a thought lab of copying himself with
reverse engineering. Reverse engineering refers to
replicating something by scanning its composition
and structure to the levels of neural cells, molecules
and atoms, and rebuilding a copy of it according to
the scanned information. “If we scan let’s say
myself and record the exact state, level, and
position of every neurotransmitter, synapse, neural
connection, and every other relevant detail, and then
reinstantiate this massive data base of information
(which I estimate at thousands of trillions of bytes)
into a neural computer of sufficient capacity, the
person that then emerges in the machine will think
that he is (and had been) me. He will say ‘I grew up
in Queens, New York, went to college at MIT,
stayed in the Boston area, sold a few artificial
intelligence companies, walked into a scanner there,
and woke up in the machine here.” (Kurzweil, 2002,
p.42)
“Is the person emerging in the machine Ray
Kurzweil? asked Ray Kurzweil.Objectively,
Kurzweil answered, “the newly built ‘Ray’ is exact
me in the eyes of everyone except for me.” “But
wait. Is this really me? For one thing, old biological
me still exists. I’ll still be here in my carbon-cell-
based brain. Alas, I will have to sit back and watch
the new Ray succeed in endeavors that I could only
dream of. (Kurzweil, 2002, p.42)If you then
come to me, and say,Good news, Ray, we have
successfully reinstantiated your mind file, so we
won’t be needing your old brain anymore,’ I may
suddenly realize the flaw in the ‘identity from
pattern’ argument. I may wish new Ray well, and
realize that he shares my ‘pattern,’ but I would
nonetheless conclude that he’s not me, because I’m
still here. How could he be me? After all, I would
not necessarily know that he even existed.”
(Kurzweil, 2002, p.43)
Kurzweil continued his thought lab in his 2005
book <Singularity is near>. “Although the copy
share my pattern, it would be hard to say that the
copy is me because I would - or could - still be
here. Although he would have all my memories
and recall having been me, from the point in time of
his creation Ray 2 would have his own unique
experience, and his reality would begin to diverge
from mine.” “If we copy me and then destroy the
original, that’s the end of me, because as we
concluded above the copy is not me.” (Kurzweil,
2005, p.384)
Kurzweil raised a dilemma: the copy ofme is
not “me”! It is an enlightening puzzle. It leads us to
think deeply into the issue of what on earth “self” is,
how “myself” after copying becomes another “self”,
and whether an artificial robot can be spiritual. But
Kurzweil did not go further and pursue to solve this
dilemma.
577
Wang J..
Self-Consciousness Cannot Be Programmed.
DOI: 10.5220/0005285905770581
In Proceedings of the International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence (ICAART-2015), pages 577-581
ISBN: 978-989-758-074-1
Copyright
c
2015 SCITEPRESS (Science and Technology Publications, Lda.)
2 IF A MACHINE IS COPIABLE
THEN IT CANNOT BE
SELF-CONSCIOUS
We argue in this section that a copiable artificial
machine cannot be of self-awareness or self-
consciousness, therefore it does not have self-
identity. The arguments are logically straightforward.
2.1 Self, Self-awareness, and Their
Features
According to Wikipedia, “the self is the subject of
one’s own experience of phenomena: perception,
emotions, thoughts. The self is seen as requiring a
reflexive perception of oneself, the individual person,
meaning the self is an object of consciousness.”
(Wikipedia, 2014 (1))
Philosophers and psychologists view the self
differently. “The philosophy of self seeks to
describe essential qualities that constitute a person’s
uniqueness of essential being.”(Wikipedia, 2014 (1))
“The psychology refers to the cognitive and
affective representation of one’s identity or
subjective experience.” (Wikipedia, 2014 (1))
Self-awareness is the capacity for introspection
and the reflective ability to recognize oneself as an
individual separate from the environment and other
individuals.” “Self-awareness or self-consciousness
is a form of intelligence which is an understanding
of one’s own existence.” Similarly, self-identity is
an awareness of the identification with oneself as a
separate individual, or the conscious recognition of
the self as having a unique identity.” (Wikipedia,
2014 (2))
Self and self-awareness are related. The self is a
being of an entity’s (or agent’s) subjective
phenomenon which includes one’s emotions,
perception, thoughts, and the self exists for the entity
only if the entity is self-aware, which is a reflexive
and retrospective capability to recognize the
subjective phenomenon.
There are numerous definitions and discussions
on what self, self-awareness, and self-identity are.
We do not intend to pursue the exact definitions of
them in this article. What we need here for the
purpose of showing the possibility of artificial self-
awareness are just some commonly accepted
features of self and self-awareness.
One basic feature of self is subjectivity. The self
refers to the first person “I”. As put by Kurzweil,
“When people speak of consciousness they often slip
into considerations of behavioral and neurological
correlates of consciousness (for example, whether or
not an entity can be self-reflective). But these are
third-person (objective) issues and do not represent
what David Chalmers calls the ‘hard question’ of
consciousness: how can matter (the brain) lead to
something as apparently immaterial as
consciousness?” (Kurzweil, 2005, p.385) “The
essence of consciousness is subjective experience,
not objective correlates of that experience.”
(Kurzweil, 2002, p.44) He further pointed out the
un-measurableness of subjective experience,
“Science is about objective measurement and logical
implications therefrom, but the very nature of
objectivity is that you cannot measure subjective
experience you can only measure correlates of it,
such as behavior (and by behavior, I include the
actions of components of an entity, such as neurons).
This limitation has to do with the very mature of the
concepts ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’.
Fundamentally, we cannot penetrate the subjective
experience of another entity with direct objective
measurement.” (Kurzweil, 2002, p.45) For a
particular person, there are many “himself’s” and
“yourself’s”, but there is only one “myself” which is
the subjective self.
Let us use Self to denote the subjective self,
emphasizing that it is from the reflexive
consciousness. Self is myself from the standpoint of
the first person “I”.
Another feature of Self in addition to subjectivity
is its uniqueness: - Self is distinct from anything else
existent in the world. Every person has his/her Self
and feels the existence of the world through the Self.
Among many consciousnesses related to subjective
Self-awareness, there is a key recognition: “I’m
alone in this world, - yesterday, today and tomorrow.
No one is same as me. If I died, the world around
myself would be gone for me forever.” Self-
awareness enables a person to recognize that nothing
or no person is same as his/her subjective Self. S/he
is distinct from any other person and anything else in
this world.
The distinction between subjective Self and any
other objective things can be seen in this way.
Think of the answers to the following two questions.
Let P
1
, P
2
, P
3
, …denote anything other than
subjective Self, where P
i
can be of life or of no life.
Question 1: To me, the subjective Self, what would
this world be like if any P
i
is destroyed or dies?
Question 2: To me, the subjective Self, what would
this world be like if “I” is destroyed or dies? Self’s
answer to Question 1: The world aroundme
would be same as before except that P
i
disappears
forever, but P
1
, P
2
, P
3
, …, P
i-1
, P
i+1
, …are still in the
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world around me. Self’s answer to Question 2: The
whole world around me would disappear, including
P
1
, P
2
, P
3
, …, and Self, forever. The two answers
show the essential difference between Self and non-
Self, and the uniqueness of Self.
Although there are multifarious definitions of
Self, the above two features, subjectivity and
uniqueness, are being accepted in all literatures and
among all scholars. Self is in the singular of the first
person. No one has ever argued that Self can be in
the plural. Objective self’s can be plural, such as
“themselves” and “yourselves”. But subjective self,
Self, is always in the singular. It is not possible to
have two or more Selfs existing at the same time.
The essential part of self-awareness or self-
consciousness is recognizing the unique specialty of
Self: - If Self dies, then the world currently around
the subjective “I” will disappear forever.
2.2 An Electronic Robot Can Never Be
Self-conscious
Is it possible to have an artificial machine which is
self-aware?
At any time point, Self is unique and singular.
That means at any time point, it is not possible to
have two or more Self’s. That is, for an existing Self,
it is not possible to have another entity, no matter
whether it is nature-made or man-made, which is
identical to the Self. The direct logical corollary is:
Self cannot be duplicated and copied.
What does “copy” or “duplication” mean? Let
us define these common words in more accurately.
Object H is a copy or duplication of object G in
terms of J, if they are identical in aspect of J. That is,
no one can tell the difference between G and H in
aspect of J. Thus, we say G is copiable or
duplicatable in terms of J. For example, a document
on paper is “copied” on a copy machine. The
original and the copy are identical in the aspect of
the contents and format, even though they might be
different in the other aspects, quality of the paper for
example. A computer program for word processing
is copiable from a computer to another, because after
copying, the codes and functions of the copy are
identical with the original, and no one can tell which
one is the original and which one is the copy.
Imitating a painting is not duplicating, because at
least some top artists can tell the difference between
the imitation and the original, even they look same
for most of people.
Self cannot be copied in terms of consciousness.
Suppose Self S
1
is copied to another entity as S
2
.
Even though most people cannot tell the difference
between S
1
and S
2
, at least the original Self S
1
can
tell the difference between S
1
and S
2
. S
1
would say,
“I am still here. S
2
is not myself!” Therefore, S
2
is
not a copy of S
1
.
Programs of an electronic computer are copiable.
A program in a digital computer is a step-by-step
procedure or algorithm which can be executed in the
computer to accomplish certain function. By the
Church-Turing Thesis (Russell and Norvig, 2010)
(Turing, 1950), an executable algorithm on a
computer can be converted to a set of equivalent 0-1
codes executable on the Turing Machine. Obviously,
the 0-1 codes on the tape of the Turing Machine are
duplicable or copiable.
Therefore, it is not possible to have an electronic
robot to be programmed to have self-consciousness
anytime in the future. That is because if there were
a robot to be programmed to have subjective Self,
then those programs could be duplicated to other
robots with the same Self, - which would contradict
to the feature of uniqueness of Self.
It is not impossible to have artificial self-
consciousness on a man-made machine, but that
machine must not be copiable. All the man-made
machines currently we have are copiable in terms of
the functions. We have not yet had a machine that is
not copiable. What an uncopiable machine is like is
unknown yet.
3 IMPLICATION AND
DISCUSSION
We have logically argued that an electronic robot
can never be programmed to be self-aware, therefore
they will always lack the so called “self-conscious
emotions” (Tracy and Robins, 2004), which are the
consciousnesses associated with self-awareness such
as shame, pride, self-respect, and self-motivation.
An electronic robot therefore will never possess the
full range of human consciousness, and will never be
a “human”. The work on developing self-awareness
in electronic computers will end in vain. The
researches on the social and legal issues in the future
society when robots of full range of human
consciousnesses walk all around are based on an
unfounded and delusive assumption.
Let us revisit Kursweil’s thought lab cited in
Section 1. Kurzweil recognized the absurdity
occurred between himself and his copy, and should
have come to the theory as we derived in Section 2.
But he was just stunned by the absurdity, “the copy
of me is not me!”, with no further probe into “why”.
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Our reasoning in Section 2 tells the answer to the
puzzle in Kurzweil’s thought lab: “The so-call
‘copy’ of Kurzweil is not a copy of Kurzweil in the
first place!” Kurzweil’s subjective Self cannot be
copied.
Now another question comes up: If the “copy”
by scanning Kurzweil’s brain with reverse
engineering is not the copy of his Self, then what is
missing in reverse engineering? We do not know.
What we know is: the information from scanning the
neurotransmitter, synapses, neural connection and
every other details of the brain of Self is not
sufficient to form Self.
John Searle sensed something wrong with
Kurzweil’s hypothesis of coping himself by reverse
engineering (Searle, 2002), but did not reach the
essential of the dilemma either: the Self of Ray
Kurzweil cannot be copied.
Can a digital robot be someday as intelligent as,
or as spiritual as, a human? This is a long-lasting
contentious issue. Wang reasoned that a copiable
computer cannot have the consciousness of “fear of
death” (Wang, 2013). Our arguments in Section 2
have showed another example of human
consciousness, self-consciousness, which cannot be
realized in a digital computer. Therefore, a digital
computer can never have the full range of human
consciousnesses, and will not have souls that are
based on self-awareness. Digital robots can never be
one of us.
We do not rule out the possibility of having a
man-made machine with self-consciousness
sometime in the future. But a machine with self-
consciousness must be uncopiable in the first place.
Conceptually, all the machines that humans have
developed are copiable because the hardware of a
machine can be copied by reverse engineering, and
the software (programs) can be copied per the
Church-Turing Thesis. We have not developed a
machine which is conceptually uncopiable like Self.
We even do not have an idea on what an uncopiable
machine is like. The “dream” of having a self-aware
humanoid will not come to true soon, even if it will.
Bill Joy once seriously worried about the fate of
human beings when computers surpass humans on
intelligence. “How soon could such an intelligent
robot be built? The coming advances in computing
power seem to make it possible by 2030. And once
an intelligent robot exists, it is only a small step to a
robot species - to an intelligent robot that can make
evolved copies of itself.” He viewed the research on
computer intelligence similar to the research work of
atom bombs in 1940’s, and called for that
“researches leading to the danger should be
relinquished.” (Joy, 2000). His worry can now be
relieved due to the resolution we have derived in
Section 2.
Our arguments in Section 2 give a logical answer
to the issue everyone many have thought of. The
arguments are simple and can be understood by
everyone, which are just based on common sense
and the fundamentals of logic rules. But why has no
one ever logically derived them? People tended to
put their opinions based on beliefs, faiths, and
subjective judgments, and stay there without going
one step further. Some, like John Searle, even
asserted that whether a computer may have human
consciousness is a problem unable to prove or
disprove.
The reasoning addressed in this article is
composed of straightforward deductions that
everyone is able to do but no one did them. Such a
phenomenon is not alone in the history of science.
When Stephen Hawking mentioned the big-bang
theory of universe, he said, “The discovery that the
universe is expanding was one of the great
intellectual revolutions of the twentieth century.
With hindsight, it is easy to wonder why no one had
thought of it before. Newton, and others, should
have realized that a static universe would soon start
to contract under the influence of gravity. This
behavior of the universe could have been predicted
from Newton’s theory of gravity at any time in the
nineteenth, the eighteenth, or even the late
seventeenth centuries. Yet so strong was the belief in
a static universe that it persisted into the early
twentieth century. Even Einstein, when he
formulated the general theory of relativity in 1915,
was so sure that the universe had to be static that he
modified his theory to make this possible,
introducing a so-called cosmological constant into
his equations.” (Hawking, 1996)
Kurzweil and Minsky recognized that the ‘copy’
of ‘myself’ by reverse engineering was not myself.
But they did not go one step further for some reason
to recognize that the so-called ‘copy’ is not a copy in
the first place. They presumed that all human
consciousnesses, including self-awareness, come
from conceptually copiable neurons, synapses,
molecules and atoms so surely that they would not
cast a doubt on that belief even they had come
across a logical contradiction. They simply bypassed
the logical dilemma.
4 FURTHER RESEARCH
Even though electronic computers will never
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achieve self-awareness, computers’ capabilities of
logical deduction and data processing will keep
progressing, and computers will achieve some
human consciousnesses. Future robots could be
very intelligent, very human-like in terms of
appearance and action; but they are not self-aware
and do not have the consciousnesses related to self-
awareness such as shame, pride, self-respect, and
self-restraining. What will the world be like by that
time? Are we going to treat those humanoids, who
are highly intelligent but not self-aware, as machines
or as humans?
We need to continue the research on “self-
conscious emotions” to identify all self-conscious
emotions which can never be achieved on digital
robots, so that we can figure out what the future
robots are like and better prepare for our future
society.
We now have a necessary condition for a
machine to be self-aware: the computer must not be
copiable. What is an “uncopiable” computer like?
How to make such an “uncopiable” computer?
These issues are particularly essential for those who
are obsessed in developing robots with self-
consciousness.
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Kurzweil, Ray, 2005. “The Singularity Is Near When
humans transcend biology,” Penguin Books, New
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Russell, Stuart and Norvig, Peter, 2010. Artificial
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Searle, John, 2002. “I Married a Computer”, In J. Richards
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