Content Control Scheme to Realize Right Succession and
Edit Control
Katsuma Koga
1
, Masaki Inamura
2
, Kitahiro Kaneda
3
and Keiichi Iwamura
1
1
Tokyo University of Science, Niijuku 6-3-1, Katsusika-ku, Tokyo, Japan
2
Tokyo Denki University, Ishizaka, Hiki-gun, Hatoyama-machi, Saitama, Japan
3
Osaka Prefecture University, Sakai-shi, Osaka, Japan
Keywords: Copyright Protection, Right Succession, Edit Control, Electronic Signature, Aggregate Signature.
Abstract: We propose a copyright protection technology suitable for consumer generated media such as You Tube and
CLIP. This technology realizes right succession of and edit control by the previous work’s authors. In this
technology, we use a digital signature to confirm the relation between the primary and secondary authors
and to determine whether the contents may be edited. We propose to apply this technology to CLIP, which
is a software used to operate a pre-set character three-dimensional (3D) model of a three-dimensional
computer graphics (3DCG) for creating computer animation. In addition, we provide three security methods
for the proposed technologies.
1 INTRODUCTION
Because of the widespread use of the Internet,
circulation of content created by consumers has
increased. This consumer content is known as
consumer generated media (CGM) and all Internet
users can be content creators and distributors. You
Tube and CLIP are well-known and widely used
examples of CGM services.
However, in conventional content distribution by
high-quality TV and DVD, etc., viewing and copy
control are used as copyright-protection technology.
However, viewing control is unsuitable for CGM
services, because most authors who produce CGM
content want to have their content widely viewed
and without restrictions. Copy control is also useless
because most authors want their content to be used
in other content forms.
Therefore, new copyright-protection
technologies are required by CGM services. We
propose that right succession and edit control are
suitable as new copyright protection technologies for
CGM services.
Right succession is a technology that protects an
author's copyright when his or her work is used in a
secondary source (Tetsuya, 2007). This is realized
by introducing a signature, which shows the relation
between the primary- and secondary-content authors.
A verifier can verify the signature and relation
between the primary and secondary authors.
Edit control is a technology of permitting editing
primary content in secondary contents that permits a
partial content edited as secondary content to the
contents by the author. An author creates and reveals
a signature that gives permission for edits to any
partial primary content. An editor can then edit that
content. The verifier confirms that the editor is
editing only that content to which the author gave
permission. This technology has the advantage of
reducing time and effort for an editor in setting
permissions, because editing permissions established
by an author can be saved by an editor. The editable
content is shown in advance by the author.
These two independent technologies of right
succession and edit control have been proposed in
other studies (Tatsuhiko, 2011) and (Masaki, 2012).
However, because the two technologies use different
signatures, they may be incompatible. Therefore, in
this study, we propose a technology that realizes the
two simultaneously. Usage is I will be described
later. This technology can also be applied to cases in
which two or more authors collaborate on a single
work. In addition, we provide three security methods
concerning prevention of aggregate signature
forging, disguised participation, and collusion
attacks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. We describe applied services in Section 2
and related research in Section 3. We describe our
249
Koga K., Inamura M., Kaneda K. and Iwamura K..
Content Control Scheme to Realize Right Succession and Edit Control.
DOI: 10.5220/0005535602490256
In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on e-Business (ICE-B-2015), pages 249-256
ISBN: 978-989-758-113-7
Copyright
c
2015 SCITEPRESS (Science and Technology Publications, Lda.)
proposed scheme for realizing the two technologies
in Section 4 and the three security methods in
Section 5. The last section provides a conclusion.
2 SERVICES PROPOSED
Section 1 referred to specific CGM services such as
You Tube and CLIP. CLIP is a web site to support
creating animation by consumers, and to operate a
pre-set character 3D model of 3DCG. In CLIP,
consumers can reuse some exhibited works in their
own work. Our proposed scheme is suitable for the
service like CLIP which makes the work using the
prepared materials, because our scheme can specify
the right relation between authors and the portion
which permits edit in advance, when a work is
reused.
When using this scheme, the content and the
digital signature need to be connected using an
digital watermark. If the digital watermark is robust
against an attack to the history information on
signatures, the content creator rights including editor
are guaranteed. Although CLIP is managed by an
administrator, our scheme realizes continuous
copyright management in two or more sites. In
addition, if the player machine mentioned later is
standardized, our scheme realizes a new copyrights
protection which does not need an administrator.
3 RELATED RESEARCH
3.1 Edit Control
Sano et al. proposed an digital signature scheme that
can control the edits of content in advance. In this
paper, edit includes modify and delete a part of
contents (Kunihiko, 2008). In their proposed scheme,
the author divides his content into each area to be
edited, and gives the signature for controlling edit to
each area.
When permitting edit, the signature is opened to
the public. When not permitting edit, the signature
serves as nondisclosure. When editor edit the
permitted areas, he substitutes the signature for a
new signature for the edited contents. Editor cannot
edit it, when the signature is not exhibited, because
he cannot exchange the signature for a new signature.
This scheme not only allows the consumer to edit
permitted area of contents, it can also add new
contents in the perming area by adding new
signature.
As mentioned above, the scheme by Sano et al.
can carry out prior control of the edit of contents.
However, since this scheme treated signatures of an
author and an editor equally, ordering of the author
and the editor had not been completed. Therefore, a
problem arises in which the relationship between the
author and editor is unclear. In addition, this
technique assumes the case where there is an author.
Thus, it does not consider cases in which multiple
authors produce content.
3.2 Right Succession
Inamura et al., proposed an expression of a quotation
process in contents with a new
tree-structure-specified aggregate signature scheme.
This proposed scheme solves right succession. This
uses a new tree-structure representation-type
aggregate signature based on a GDH group. The
tree-structure-specified aggregate signature scheme
can describe not only who signs but also which
division each of signers belongs to. The new
tree-structure represents a process until finally can
content. The method of right succession is
multiplied by the electronic information (Katsuhiko,
2006). It is that secondary producer is the signature
for the previous content. In other words, keys of the
previous human and the content of the later human is
guaranteed rights information multiplied.
Accordingly, this signature indicates that the ordered
aggregate signature (Boneh, 2003). can be realized
by being synthesized many times. Because this
approach extends the steps in one-to-many, stacking
the relationship can be extended to the aggregate
signature of the tree-representation type (Masaki,
2009). However, this approach does not consider the
configuration of the editing of content. Therefore,
constitute the aggregate signature for each of the
content editing, it is necessary to fix the beginning.
4 THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed scheme realizes right succession and
edit control simultaneously (Yamamoto, 2006).
Multiple of the author is potluck their own content, I
can perform a pre-edit control. Editors to propose a
scheme that can create a secondary content based on
it.
In this scheme, we assume two entities having
the following roles.
Author: creates content and sets to edit control.
If multiple authors want to produce a single
content, the hierarchy is that of primary author
ICE-B2015-InternationalConferenceone-Business
250
(Masaki, 2010). followed by the secondary author,
and then the division of editors. The i following
author by i + 1 primary author is an author for
creating content as a content editing of the original.
The primary author creates original content which is
first content.
Verifier: verifies whether the content contains a
legitimate signature.
Each author has his own secret key as well as a
public key, must sign the content they created, and
edit any data as his preference that has been divided.
In addition, they must retain the copyright (to
change, delete, add content), which may be one of
the controls set in advance. The editor has a public
key and his or her own secret key pertaining to
editing privileges (for editing data in the parts that
are allowed). Verifying public keys of editors and
authors require signature verification. The verifier
provides a content playback device that may include
content without a valid signature and was thus
produced from a scheme that the content cannot be
played.
4.1 State Transition
State transition is to edit control at divided data. This
section describes a state transition for setting the
conditions to realize editing control of the author’s
content data. However, the data are considered to be
of two types: existing and empty. Existing data
which has a real data represents a portion of the
content configuration data and have the following
conditions (a)–(f). In contrast, empty data has no
real data. Empty data are considered control data for
controlling the additional aspects (g) and (h) of state
transition which is making the edit control on the
content. Empty data which doesn`t has a real data is
changed to existing data, which the i following
author (i hierarchy on the author) produces. The
state transitions are shown below.
(a) can be changed, can be deleted
(b) can be changed, cannot be deleted
(c) cannot be changed, can be deleted
(d) cannot be changed, cannot be deleted
(e) can be changed or deleted
(f) cannot be changed or deleted
(g) can be added
(h) cannot be added
Figure 1: The state transition.
4.2 Control State
A pre-control example of each Data is shown in Fig.
2.
Figure 2: Pre-control example.
Control state in three partial data, two types with
existing data, using one type of signature empty data.
In addition, a control state can change, delete, and
add data to realize the control state. Authors of
existing data are modified for individual change
signing
and individual delete signing
by the
private key of the author. The secondary authorship
constitutes an ordered aggregate signature (Boneh,
2003). To indicate the order of the primary and
secondary authors, we use a hash value for the
deletion and for changing the intermediate signature
created. In addition, this operation is a form of
tree-structure representation because it performs in a
multistage manner. The empty data creates an
additional signature
using the private key of the
author. In addition, each set of data has a unique
signature to prove that actual creator created the
content. Moreover, authors are allowed to edit or
publish the signature as public information in the
signature collection. Each changed, deleted, and
added signature collection to prepare
,
,
corresponding to the additional. These are input as
individual signatures at portions in which state
ContentControlSchemetoRealizeRightSuccessionandEditControl
251
transition is allowed. In contrast, if it does not allow
editing, not signed output of the content in each set.
4.3 Algorithm
Fig. 2 shows an example algorithm for the control
state of the scheme. This scheme has the following
prerequisites to meet the security model (Komano,
2005) and (Komano, 2008).
Algorithm:
1. A public key infrastructure (PKI) (Helena, 2007).
has been developed. In addition, all of the signers
of the signing and verification key pair have been
duly issued by a certificate authority (CA).
2. In addition to having a key pair that is issued to
the signer, the scheme does not issue a new key
pair.
3. In aggregate during signature generation,
communication between the signers is
impossible for the purpose of obtaining
third-party intermediate information being
created conducted safely.
4. The relationship of the content and digital
signature is integral to sign the content so that a
secure electronic watermark cannot be separated.
As Fig. 2 shows, content is divided into six parts,
from 1 to 3 in the order of author creation the
primary content creates content when they edit and
synthesize content. Multiple authors showing an
example in which going edited and synthesized,
generally has role or sharing is defined in each
author. The i-order author, by combining the partial
contents i-1 order author has made, will complete
the content. Using the example of animation,
multiple primary authors can collaborate to produce
a coma, which is a small part of anime. The
secondary author can synthesize it. Work such as
music can also be performed and the tertiary author
can synthesize pictures and music. Therefore, the
scheme is set up so that the author control state is
already meeting.
4.4 Algorithm
Key Generation:
A generator is defined as ∈
. A signer selects
∈
∗
(all of the signer′s signature keys (private
key) will be with each different from them), and
calculates
.
Signature Generation:
(1) Original content A can be divided into areas
~
, for edit control.
→
~
(1)
(2) Content identifier ID, which generates the part
of content identifier ID
, is set as follows (i = 1,
···, 6).
∗
＝
ID||
||
(2)
(3) One signature is set in front of the existing data
, and the others are set between
and
when the addition of empty data is permitted.
Number of empty data is
.
, in which the
default is set as follows by using the dummy data
d.
..
∗
＝
||
.
||
(3)
(4) Each set of existing and real data in the state
transition determines the state (a)–(d). In
addition, empty data from the state transition
determines the state (g) and (h) .
(5) From
* and
.
*, we generate a hash
value.
＝
H(
*),
.
＝
H(
.
*)
(4)
(6) Individual signature are generated for change,
deletion, and addition of control
Chang:
||
||
||0
(5)
Deletion:
||
||
||1
(6)
Addition:
.
||
.
||||0
(7)
Author generates the following to produce the
ordered signatures.
(8)
In the content, to control change, deletion, and
addition,
,
,
output the allowed partial data
G
,G
,G
content.
Secondary author: second-order authors confirm
partial data G
,G
,G
and the editorial content in
accordance with the primary author’s editing control
set, whereby
(9)
(10)
ICE-B2015-InternationalConferenceone-Business
252
and thus create each aggregate signature
,
. In
the content, to control change, deletion, and addition,
,
,
output the allowed partial data
G
,G
,G
content. In order to updates the previous
signature, the ordered aggregate signature subtracts
it, adding its own updated signature.
The tertiary author (the last editor): third-order
authors confirm partial data G
,G
,G
and the
editorial content in accordance with the primary or
second author`s editing control set,
(11)
which creates an aggregate signature
.
Content A*={A
*,・・・,A
*},empty data
..
*,
edit permit data individually signing set all
components of G
,G
,G
, and these output an
ordered aggregate signature. All of this is public
information.
Data Update:
When the editor changes the partial data
* to
*
(
*→
*), the following process (i)–(v) is defined.
In addition, the expression for changing partial data
(9) and (10) is defined as shown in the procedures of
(12)–(15). In addition, the edited order aggregate are
`
,
`
. When changing
* to
*, the hash of
changed content is defined
`
,
`
.
After setting (a) is changed:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
(12)
After setting (b) is changed:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
(13)
After setting (c) is changed:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
(14)
After setting (d) is changed:
`
`
`
.
`
.
`
`
`
`
(15)
(i) Change:
*→
*,
,
＝ H( N
*),
,
＝
H||
||
,
||0
(ii) Deletion:
,
＝H||
||
,
||1
,
(iii) Hash value difference:
＝ H
|
|
,
||1
(iv) Addition of change case:B
.,
*←N
.,
*,
.,
,
’＝H(N
.,
*),
.,
/{
.,
},
,
,
＝H
.,
.,
,
||1
(v) Addition of deletion case:
,
,
＝H
.
.
,
||1
1. Determine edited partial data of
* or
..
∗
from original content *.
2. Depending on the type of editing conducted, the
following processing is performed. However,
* represents the original partial data,
* is
change data,
..
∗ is additional empty data,
..
∗ is exiting data from the previous
empty data and (j = 0, ..., 6).
Control Change Pattern:
(a)→(a): (i),
←
∪
,
, (ii), (12),
←
∪
,
(a)→(b): (i), (12),
←
∪
,
, (ii)
(a)→(c): (i), (ii), (12),
←
∪
,
(a)→(d): (i), (ii), (12)
(a)→(e):
* as empty data (i),
←
∪
,
’, (ii),
(12),
←
∪
,
(If the deletion of data of the
position is disallowed, do not perform
←
∪
,
)
(a)→(f): N
* as empty data (i), (ii), (12)
(b)→(b): (i),
←
∪
,
, (iii),
←
∪(
,
), (13)
(b)→(d): (i), (iii),
←
∪(
,
), (13)
(c)→(d):
∖{
}, (14)
(c)→(f): N
* as empty data A
*→ N
*,
,
＝
H(N
*), σ/
,
∖{
}, (iii),
←
∪(
,
),
(ii), (14)
(e)→(a): (i),
←
∪
,
, (ii),
←
∪
,
, (12)
(e)→(b): (i),
←
∪
,
, (ii), (12)
(e)→(c): (i), (ii),
←
∪
,
, (12)
(e)→(d): (i), (ii), (12)
(g)→(a): (iv),
←
∪
,
,
,(v),
←
∪
,
,
, (15)
(g)→(b): (iv),
←
∪
,
,
’, (v), (15)
(g)→(c): (iv), (v),
←
∪
,
,
, (15)
(g)→(d): (iv), (v), (15)
(g)→(h): (15)
ContentControlSchemetoRealizeRightSuccessionandEditControl
253
3.
is aggregated, empty set data ε, to generate
the signature
and editing historical data r.
(16)
4. Updated content, individual signature collection
,
,
aggregate signature
`
or
and ε,
hash difference value
,
and editing history
data r. Its
its signature, all are output to the
verifier.
Verification:
I. Verify articulated content identifier ID in the
partial data is equal to A *.
II. In addition, the verifier generates the following
from additional empty data
.
* that has not
been added. In addition, ←
∑
is verified
from additional data
.
III. If verification is correct, to verify any omissions
to the ID of the partial data. Partial data identifier
ID
of all partial data
is used to verify
whether the data are in ascending order, with the
exception of the order of additional empty data if
verification is correct.
IV. We confirm that the actual data exists with a
hash value difference in
and that the actual
data does not exist with the hash value difference
in
. If they are correct, we verify the
signature using the hash value difference.
＝
,
||
＝
,
,,
(17)
V. If verification is correct and it generates a hash
value
,
=H(
*) of the partial data, it
calculates a hash value for the original data.
,
,
(18)
VI. Validate the following:
,
,
,
,
∙
,
,
,
∙
,
,
,
,
(19)
5 SAFETY
This scheme indicates that it is safe when following
an attack. The original content creator and i
following author can justifiably claim the copyright.
The responsibility for content creation note to clarify.
This satisfies in full the requirements described as
follows.
Aggregate Signature Validity:
We next describe the prevention of forging of author
signatures. Even a third party does not participate in
the aggregate signature used to obtain all public
information, which indicates that forging an
aggregate signature is difficult.
Disguised Participation Prevention:
For third parties not involved in content creation, the
inability to make chased responsibility for the
content freely. In other words, for the signer
participating in the aggregate signature, adding a
third party who is not participating in the aggregate
signature as a free signer is difficult.
Collusion Attack Inability:
Two people is next to a certain piece of content
performing the signature creation. To escape
responsibility, the two people are for contents that is
created by the collusion. In other words, for the
signer that participates in aggregate signature,
collusion is difficult to be denied participation in
aggregate signed.
5.1 Aggregate Signature Validity
Forging an aggregate signature is difficult. Consider
for the following example of the aggregate signature
, as discussed in the previous section. If
counterfeiting
is made difficult, aggregate
signature validity is ensured. An Attacker A play
that the random verification key to be treated as the
verification key is one of the signer has the input
value.
Depending on whether the hierarchy is assumed
to output all of the signature and verification key
pair the rest. If Attacker A is successful, to input
value, aggregate corresponding to the assumed
hierarchy. Attacker A can then output the signature
. This means that a successful
has been
forged. In this case, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1: In the random oracle model, forgery
is difficult and the BLS signature forgery is
equivalent to difficulty of
.
Proof 1: A is an attacker attempting to forge
, B
is an attacker attempting to forge a BLS signature.
The fact that A attacks succeed if B’s also
succeed is self-evident. Thus, by showing that B
attacks succeed if A’s succeed, we show that both
attacks are equivalent. First, Attacker B holds a
verification key
. In addition, a response to the
random and signature oracles is responded. For this
verification key
,
can be represented and B
is set to unknown value of
(Boneh, nd.).
B to run the A as Honest Player. Here and B give
ICE-B2015-InternationalConferenceone-Business
254
`
to A. A outputs a pair of verification keys:
`
and the other signature key `
. In addition, A
determines `
by the response to the random and
signature oracle in order to reply to B. B use `
in
(12),
`
`
‘
(20)
Because it can be calculated, the BLS signature ‘
(Boneh, 2001) corresponding to `
can be created.
Thus, a B attack is successful and the aggregate
signature
is proven to be safe.
5.2 Disguised Participation Prevention
Disguised participation refers to attacks added to the
fraud systematically the signer. For example, a
signer does not participate in signature schemes. In a
scheme, aggregate signature
contains all of the
things that the participating signer indicates that dale.
In other words, as a means of intervention, a free
signer is considered a new
. If the validity of this
signature
is denied, it is proved
Certification 2: A third party not participating as
an attacker does not participate in the content, to
make information from their signature key. Generate
from public information, the aggregate
signature to the content though because it is forged
as participating. Thus indicating that the
is
inconsistent. If A is not responsible for the content,
the data have not been edited. It can be seen that no
information exists for A because in the control state
of the editing control of Fig. 2. Consequently, that it
does not exist in the control state is apparent. Thus,
A is without permission and put a signature on the
content, it is difficult to make responsible.
5.3 Collusion Attack Inability
A collusion attack is one that holds by shape to
make responsible for the other person to escape the
responsibility or virtual person. This part shows the
adjacent
of the aggregate signature
of forgery is considered to be satisfactory if it
can be shown that difficult.
Certification 3: To indicate that a forged hash
value of content
with signer key
shows an
adjacency relationship is acceptable. However,
forging
is difficult using Proof 1. Consider the
safety of the alternative.
For a single content from the (13), it can be
expressed only adjacent two adjacent relationship.
(21)
This is represented by the product and becomes
. In other words, this
is
forged by collusion with the adjacent signer, and,
therefore, changing to `
`
is possible. This
was collusion adjacent author of
`
`
it is possible to be in _(21) become such a key,
virtual signer `
,`
, it is possible to escape as
the responsibility of the content. A means to prevent
this, as it is one of the signing keys for element
∗
.
Any two sets of values of the sum to be selected are
the elements providing a key space K (Erdös, 1980)
such that a unique signature key becoming the
element of K can be avoided. Accordingly, while
lowering the safety of the key can be considered, we
can safely increase the number of bits.
6 SUMMARY
Secondary use of editors within the scope of an
author's intention is easy. Editing control and rights
inherited notation have not been simultaneously
realized using conventional methods in constructing
a practical system. This proposed system showed
that it is safe by using a security prevention.
By using this service, anyone who produces
content may prove right. In addition, secondary
users can inherit information related to the original
content. Original content containing edit controls
can indicate the intention of the primary author. This
is the case for incorrect content as well, because the
service side is willing to regulation, it has become a
safe service.
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