Knowledge Artifacts: When Society Objectifies Itself in Knowledge
Andrea Cerroni
Dpt. of Sociology and SR, University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy
Keywords: Objectified Knowledge, Knowledge-society, Sociology of Knowledge, Knowledge Circulation, Social
Epigenesis.
Abstract: The paper deals with knowledge artifacts as knowledge socially objectified. A typology of knowledge is
considered, comprising forms (intellectual, practical, objectified); families (knowings, acquaintances,
acknowledges) and kinds (for objectified knowledge: encapsulated, environments, symbols). A model for
knowledge-society (as a new societal layer sedimenting over precedent ones) is also introduced in four logic
phases (generation; institutionalization; diffusion; socialization) in order to show the mechanisms for its
production.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the term ‘knowledge’ we make reference to
many different ‘things’. In this paper I will deal with
the concept of knowledge artifact, which has been
recently reconsidered as a multidisciplinary concept
to focus on in the intersection between informatics
and the humanities (Cabitza and Locoro, 2014). To
this aim, I will treat knowledge artifacts as
objectified knowledge (tangible forms), after Marx
(1858), i.e. one of the three forms in which
knowledge comes under own direct disposal, the
others two forms being practical knowledge
(resident within a large but definite social species)
and intellectual knowledge (the explicit or the taken-
for-granted forms widely shareable and so the only
considered by the Enlightenment epistemology).
However, a whole typology (Cabitza et al. 2014;
Cerroni to be published) comprises these three forms
of knowledge directly acquired (the family of
knowings) and other forms gained in two other ways
of acquiring knowledge: through a social network of
acquaintances and through external and internal
acknowledgements. Few words for the last two will
be enough for our ends. On one side, the family of
acquaintances comprises knowledge I can more or
less easily reach through my own social network,
similarly to the social capital. On the other side, the
family of acknowledgments comprises knowledge
capacities attributed to me by others, maybe just
stuck, and which, in the long run, become
acknowledged as my own conscious knowing.
Let us now focus on objectified knowledge.
2 ARTIFACTS AS OBJECTIFIED
KNOWLEDGE
This is a wide species of knowledges, indeed.
A first kind is encapsulated in physical objects:
food made in a well-established gastronomical
tradition, objects made by an artisan or an industry
(e.g., a compass), tools for making either other
objects (e.g., an assembly robot) or other knowledge
in some form (e.g., a word processor) etc. The value
we can enjoy using such objects comes without
necessarily having to de-capsulate the knowledge
therein. In effect, sailors have been using compass
far before having developed a theory of magnetism.
We do not even need neither to know the recipe in
order to enjoy good food nor to be a program
developer in order to write a good book using a
word processor, even if we should have some benefit
in being a great chef or a good a programmer. When
we do not have the expertise to de-capsulate the
knowledge inside our object, however, we have to
rely on some expert, quite often anonymous
agencies, with a more or less blind trust. The endless
fiduciary chain thus born links our daily life with
huge other people so that the most educated and
connected people of the entire human history are by
far the less suited to survive by their own means to
the challenges of common daily life (this is the
paradox of the knowledge society). The reason for
such situation is obvious: knowledge has been
growing faster than our personal education and our
acquaintances. While life-long learning is an answer
Cerroni, A..
Knowledge Artifacts: When Society Objectifies Itself in Knowledge.
In Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Knowledge Discovery, Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge Management (IC3K 2015) - Volume 3: KMIS, pages 429-435
ISBN: 978-989-758-158-8
Copyright
c
2015 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
429
to the need of education, new media are an answer to
the need of social cooperation: knowledge has an
unbeatable cooperative and not simply additive
nature.
A second kind of objectified knowledge is not
encapsulated inside objects, but rather aroused by
cultural/artistic goods or environments as paysages.
When we enjoy seeing, hearing or ‘living’ a piece of
art we realize that knowledge is therein and we have
the opportunity to use it for future uses or, possibly,
creations, too. This knowledge educates our esthetic
sense, supplies us with the comprehension of a
singular author or historical epoch, a human
situation and much more: we can introject it as our
own (cognitive, relational, emotional) system-of-
reference. The Stendhal syndrome, also named
Florence syndrome or hyperkulturemia, can be
considered as a sort of information overload,
occurring when we do not have the time and/or the
opportunity to metabolize it within our own
knowledge assets. Think of visiting artistic towns
such as Florence or closed locations so dense in
knowledge as Sistina Chappelle in Vatican City. In
such cases, clearly extremes of a continuous (wide
open paysages – closed environments), knowledge is
what transforms stark matter in an artifact, a piece of
marble in a Michelangelo’s Prigione, a natural
landscapes in humanized paysages as a wild lagoon
into the lagoon-town of Venice, or the experience
with a pile of software & hardware components into
a pretty new life experience with the electronic
device I just bought to my children. We can benefit
from such knowledge through a simple sensorial
‘immersion’; however, the more we know before,
the more we can ‘extract’ from it in view of our own
interest, of course. Similar argumentations can be
made for artificial environments, where
hyperkulturemia is frequent in own experience while
surfing within the web, moving across multiple
electronic devices more or less interconnected each
other and connecting within social networks with
other people.
Lastly, the third kind of objectified knowledge
collects peculiar aspects of social symbols, such as
religious ones, nation flag, or any other artifact with
symbolic value. In these cases knowledge is not to
be found inside the stark object, but it is shared
within a social community acknowledging the
symbolic meaning while acquiring it as (part of)
own identity. However, everything has (can have) a
symbolic component, for some people. Even an
equation may become an icon (e.g., E=mc
2
) being
tattooed on the back. A gesture may become a social
practice of mutual identification with hierarchical
and/or strong political meaning (e.g., raising the
right hand to the cap; outstretching the right arm;
raising a clenched fist, the right rather than the left,
colored rather than not). It is particularly interesting
the case of concrete objects and other artifacts.
Think of dozens of town named Venice in Northern
and South America, the European ‘Venices of the
North’, Asian ‘Venices in the Orient’: we recognize
both symbolic value addition to real towns and a
‘disneyfication’ of a symbol-town (Settis 2014). The
same transformations occur to any consumer object
through fashion, fads and foibles. Sometimes, the
same occurs to artistic or intellectual production, as
well. All of these families are made of knowledge
tacit(ated) (Polanyi 1969); they are dead knowledge
(cf. dead/living work in Marx 1858), explicit to
someone but not (necessarily) to the specific user,
who, instead, has to work creatively (consciously or
not) in order to bring it back to life as a living
knowledge. Moreover, a commodification of
knowledge can either enhance the knowledge-value
of an artifact or wasting it, definitively.
As we see, the net result of creating and using
knowledge depends on its circulation, from the first
stage of innovation to its common use and, possibly,
its abandonment. Indeed, this conception of
knowledge as a shared understanding is in close
connection with the three Indo-European roots of the
Latin word cognoscentia (cfr. Eng. cognizance; It.
conoscenza; Fr. connaissance; Sp. conocimiento;
Port. conhecimento), from which the English
‘knowledge’ comes. They are: (1)*kom: Lat. cum
meaning together-with and/or near-to; (2) *gn: Eng.
to Know meaning a savoir; (3) *sk: Lat. scire, Eng.
sced, meaning to distinguish.
3 EPIGENETIC KNOWLEDGE
CIRCULATION (EKC)
In spite of the growing attention that has been
devoted to knowledge outside philosophy in a
growing number of disciplines during the last
decades, the only theoretical model relevant for
applications in innovation studies still is the
Nonaka’s model of knowledge (e.g., Nonaka and
Takeuchi 1995). We don’t consider the ‘Triple helix
model’ (e.g., Etzkowitz, Leydesdorff 1995), another
model once proposed, as it is not able to take into
account the knowledgeable citizens that are now
having growing attention from innovation studies
and science production and communication (e.g.,
Wynne 2007, Destro Bisol 2014, Austen et al. 2014),
too.
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Figure 1: The circulatory model.
Knowledge-society has become a locus within the
analysis of the contemporary society (e.g., Richta
1966; Bell 1967; Masuda 1981; Stehr 1994; Castells
1996; European Commission 1997; World Bank
1999; David, Foray 2003; European Commission
2007; Rohrbach 2007; Fagerberg et al. 2012),
sometimes confused with information society, but
always with big changes envisaged both for
organizations (e.g., Nonaka, Takeuchi 1995; Stewart
1997; Davenport, Prusak 2000) and science
community (e.g., Gibbons et al. 1994; Dasgupta,
David 1994).
However, it is better to think about knowledge-
society as a layer of contemporary society,
functioning through the mechanism of producing
knowledge by means of knowledge, with surplus of
knowledge (Cerroni 2006; Cabitza et al. 2014;
Cerroni to be published). Of course, such knowledge
is never ‘pure’, but may be ‘developed’ as a linear
combination of its components, as already seen,
within a multidimensional space of ideal-types of
knowledge.
Then, we can now look at the knowledge-society
as a new social layer added via knowledge
productions, sedimented over pre-existing layers (in
primis, industrial-society). We call such a way of
development social epigenesis, in close analogy to
recent epigenetics within biological science (e.g.,
Rose, 2005).
Moreover, if the function of sharing knowledge
is communicative (and cooperative), then, when
there is no communication, there is also no
knowledge, strictly speaking, although there may be
conspicuous personal understanding hidden into a
drawer (e.g., artisanal know-how).
To articulate a model for social production of
knowledge artifacts, we can now recall the three
main logical components of sociality: individuals,
knowledge, and society in the middle between the
two, with the role of medium. Individuals are more
and more understandable as knowledgeable citizens,
empowered in knowledge and vested of public
rights/responsibilities. Society comprises the
primary field of those people strictly cooperating
together (micro-society) and also the society at large
(macro-society). Communities of practice (Wenger,
1998) intersect the primary field via the strong
informal ties of a Gemeinschaft developed around
knowledge practices. Knowledge comprises any
form of heritage, as considered before.
4 A CIRCULATORY MODEL FOR
SOCIAL PRODUCTION
A functional model of circulation within the global,
knowledge-society now considers interactions
Knowledge Artifacts: When Society Objectifies Itself in Knowledge
431
between the individuals level and their societal
environment and between this environment and a
collective heritage (collectively named knowledge),
and vice versa. In doing so, we obtain four-phase
model as shown in Figure 1.
Clearly, the four phases are just logically
distinguishable, neither in re nor in time (as they are
in other models). Let us now look a little closer to
the four phases, focusing on knowledge artifacts.
4.1 Generation
Generation (G) comprises production of new pieces
of knowledge, i.e., those processes in which the
individual provides knowledge to its own knowledge
institution (team, community or formal
organization). An artifact is partly due to true
innovative processes (ideation, action or
construction) but also to novel combinations of
already available knowledge of any kind. Anyway, it
is important to draw attention from (actual and
potential) publics of an innovation so as to enhance
the possibilities of future innovations.
4.2 Institutionalization
The institutionalization (I) of knowledge consists in
the identification, selection, coding, validation,
corroboration, design and settling of the local
knowing community in order to share knowledge
claims both internally and with the wider society. A
knowledge artifact is, then, acknowledged by a
community and/or the society at large, as
meaningful. The role played by institutions is in
reducing variants coming from the generation phase
and also adding a public value.
4.3 Diffusion
The diffusion (D) of knowledge so institutionalized,
however, is not a mere transfer of something which
is already pre-formed, but it is rather the
‘percolation’ through the wider society. This process
makes a knowledge artifact accessible to the active
involvement of other subjects –the community
members, the consumers – possibly giving rise to
new and different institutionalizations (artifacts
and/or other knowledge kinds). A participatory
decision-making and creative uses of this knowledge
by workers, customers/users and citizens creates a
shared value (open innovation: Chesbrough 2003).
Knowledge artifacts, then, may diffuse in their
explicit content, in their practices and in their
objectified knowledge. The intellectual knowledge
diffuse through the language of communication. The
practical knowledge diffuse through the social
exchanges within the daily life. The objectified
knowledge diffuse as objects (material and
symbolic) circulating within society.
Anyway, the role played by other individuals is
de facto a creative production rather than passive re-
production, so stimulating a ‘spontaneous’
innovation.
4.4 Socialization
Through socialization (S) knowledge is passed
through markets (commercialization), social strata
(communication strictu sensu) and generations
(education and learning), while being more or less
legitimated by public opinion, and eventually
forensic practices (e.g., Jasanoff 1995; Lynch 2008)
and other regulations. Of course our use of the term
socialization is quite different from Nonaka’s one,
being in compliance with the use of sociology. In
this phase, knowledge artifacts get internalized and
acquire a normative value, possibly becoming a
reference both publicly sanctioned and privately
interiorized, e.g., as a recognized artistic object, a
technological forerunner, a must.
Knowledge artifacts, then, end up raising
expectations, and dissatisfactions, too, along a
characteristic hype curve, out of which they become
either art or rubbish, an outdated relic or a classical
reference.
Innovation (δ), in the end, emerges from a
(logic) cycle as shown in Figure 2, where it is
indicated that, at the end of a clockwise cycle, the
available knowledge increases and spiralizes
becoming socially pervading.
We should also consider as a counter-clockwise
cycle either the anticipation as pro-jected effects
while designing or the shared culture intro-jected by
actors and/or institutions. However, the model, as
any model, is just an epistemological tool for
making understanding and experience, not a
metaphysical mirror for ‘Reality’.
The stratification of knowledge layers (made of
knowledge of any kind) makes the innovation
process path-dependent. If this process takes place
when the conditions of the previous levels are not
equal, it may end up amplifying these uneven
conditions. Circulation does not brings about
equality in itself, but rather rises divides in access
(primary) and, still more subtly, in use (secondary).
Indeed, it enhances pre-existing divides to which
adds its specific divides, in absence of a proper
governance of a public good.
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Figure 2: The model for innovation.
5 CONCLUSIONS
It should be clear that the distinction into three forms
of knowledge correspond to the three dimensions
abovementioned. The ideal-type of intellectual
knowledge is the most close to the more vast and
lasting heritage of human genus (e.g., Pythagoras’s
theorem, Homer’s Iliad etc.). The ideal-type of
practical knowledge is shared by many individuals
of some generations within a particular social form,
historically and geographically well-delimited. The
ideal-type of objectified knowledge is confined to an
object (or environment), directly perceivable
through the senses and strictly defined within space
and time.
In the end, we should deal with knowledge as a
multidimensional space described through a 3x3x3
matrix of ‘pure states’: three dimensions
(individual/delimited, social/aggregated,
cultural/wide), three forms (intellectual, practical,
objectified) and three families (knowings,
acquaintances, acknowledgements). Here we also
noted three kinds within objectified knowledge. In
the more general case, however, knowledge appears
in a ‘mixed state’ that we can develop as a peculiar
series of ‘pure states’ (ideal-types).
We noted that knowledge-society can be thought
as a process of producing knowledge through
knowledge; however, we have also to observe that
such process, not only doesn’t deteriorate the
knowledge that is used, but it generate new
knowledge that can be ‘externalized’, and a surplus
of knowledge ‘internalized’ by the users, too. If I use
more times the ‘same’ knowledge (e.g., Pythagoras’
theorem, the compass) I augment my own capacity
to extract value from it: this is the meaning of know-
how. If others use it, and a circulation process is
active, everybody will benefit of such added value
(we now have a better Euclidean geometry than
Pythagoras or Euclid themselves; we have more
refined uses of a compass and also better ‘compass’
then Chinese had over 1000 years ago). The process
guiding knowledge-society, then, is self-catalytic if
and only if a knowledge circulation is guaranteed.
This is the reason why we have to deal with
knowledge as a (global) public good (Callon 1994,
Stiglitz 1999), settling conditions to stimulate an
active, wide cooperation without exclusions, in order
to let knowledge itself flourish. In our previous
analysis it means to go beyond the digital divides of
first order (technology access) empowering each
citizen’s knowledge capital. In other words, it means
to enhance the diffusion of already available
knowledge (knowings), to let proliferate the social
opportunities of knowledge exchange
(acquaintances), and, to use a couple of sociological
concepts, to lower the symbolic violence (Bourdieu)
onto citizens while enhancing their capability of
sociological imagination (Mills) (acknowledge).
Lastly, we see that knowledge artifacts are cases
of knowledge that is objectified by and within a
collective agent: the subject of (co)production being
shortly society.
The case for Ict artifacts deserves a deeper
insight. They are, indeed, (a) a product, (b) a
process, and (c) an enabling technology.
Knowledge Artifacts: When Society Objectifies Itself in Knowledge
433
(a) Ict artifacts are products always having a
material basis, even as material machinery, and so
they are vehiculated by a general circulation of
knowledge.
(b) However, Ict is also a process of
communication, i.e., in our model, itself circulation
in all its phases. They enhance the capacity to
institutionalize knowledge, making more visible and
manageable the knowledge generated and act on the
diffusion phase both expanding modalities and
empowering participants. However, they also have
effect onto socialization both in reaching people and
in giving them new opportunities to generate new
knowledge.
(c) Moreover, Ict is a vehicular technology,
enabling any knowledge to fill in our perceptive
experience, empowering, enhancing and virtualizing
presences in it. Rather than to a dematerialization,
our lives are undergoing to a re-materialization
driven by new technologies. Apart from Ict, other
vehicular technologies are biotechnologies and
nanotechnologies. Through such vehicular
technologies, not only is the intellectual knowledge
enabled to enter any object, but also practices (from
automation to web interactions).
As far as possible concrete uses of the concepts
and models here introduced, suggestions can already
be seen in various areas of research, such as
participative informatics (Cabitza et al. 2014; cfr.
Carroll, Rosson 2007), agricultural knowledge and
innovation systems (Di Paolo and Vagnozzi 2014;
cfr. EU SCAR 2012), open science and citizen
science prospects (e.g., Destro-Bisol et al. 2014; cfr.
Austen et al. 2014).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank three reviewers for their warm
acceptance of a previous version of the present paper
and for useful suggestions to improve it.
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