Double Auction for Resource Allocation in Cloud Computing

Zhichao Zhao, Fei Chen, T-H. Hubert Chan, Chuan Wu

2017

Abstract

Cloud computing has become more and more popular as more companies choose to deploy their services and applications to the cloud. Particularly, trading unused cloud resources provides extra profits for companies with rapidly changing needs. Cloud market enables trading additional resource between buyers and sellers, where a buyer may have different valuations for different instances of the same resource due to factors such as geographical location, configuration, etc. In this paper, we study double auctions with non-identical items for cloud resource allocation, and develop a framework to decompose the design of truthful double auctions. We propose two auctions based on the framework that achieve: (i) truthfulness; (ii) individual rationality; and (iii) budget balance. We prove that the social welfare is constant-competitive to the (not necessarily truthful) optimal auction under certain distributions. We run simulations to investigate the social welfare achieved by our auctions. We use different probability distributions to capture various scenarios in the real world. Results show that our mechanisms generally achieve at least half of the optimal social welfare, while one auction achieves over a 0.9 fraction of the optimal in some circumstances.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Zhao Z., Chen F., Chan T. and Wu C. (2017). Double Auction for Resource Allocation in Cloud Computing . In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Science - Volume 1: CLOSER, ISBN 978-989-758-243-1, pages 301-308. DOI: 10.5220/0006145403010308


in Bibtex Style

@conference{closer17,
author={Zhichao Zhao and Fei Chen and T-H. Hubert Chan and Chuan Wu},
title={Double Auction for Resource Allocation in Cloud Computing},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Science - Volume 1: CLOSER,},
year={2017},
pages={301-308},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0006145403010308},
isbn={978-989-758-243-1},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Science - Volume 1: CLOSER,
TI - Double Auction for Resource Allocation in Cloud Computing
SN - 978-989-758-243-1
AU - Zhao Z.
AU - Chen F.
AU - Chan T.
AU - Wu C.
PY - 2017
SP - 301
EP - 308
DO - 10.5220/0006145403010308