Cybersecurity Safeguards for the Automotive Emergency Response
Vehicles
Pasi Kämppi
1
, Paresh Rathod
1
and Timo Hämäläinen
2
1
Laurea University of Applied Sciences, Vanha maantie 9, FI-02650 Espoo, Finland
2
Department of Mathematical Information Technology, University of Jyväskylä, Finland
Keywords: Cyber Security, Safeguard, Cross-Border Collaboration, Information Security, Emergency Response
Vehicles, KATAKRI.
Abstract: A modern Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) is a combination of emergency services and functional mobile
office on the wheels. Researchers have observed that emergency response personnel including Law
Enforcement Authorities (LEAs), Police and border guards, could be on the duty while having possibility to
use same services compared to fixed office. During our research study, users have registered special demand
for mobile office. To meet this demand, designers and engineers have combined a modern vehicle platform
with computers, monitors, wireless connectivity and many other devices needed in everyday activities.
However, there is continue challenge, the standards are not covering information and cyber security properly.
This research paper fulfils that gap by applying the Finnish National Security Auditing Criteria version 2
(KATAKRI II) on eight asset classes that have recognised in Mobile Object Bus Integration (MOBI) project.
The outcome is a pragmatic solution that provides large set of safeguards for guaranteeing ERV information
and cyber security.
1 INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement authorities (LEA), including police
officers and border guards, are spending significant
of their day-to-day service time on the road. This
situation is demanding and their vehicles need to offer
same facilities compared to working in the office. To
meet this requirement, a modern emergency response
vehicle (ERV) is converted as an office on the wheels,
technically known as the mobile office. It is evident
that the mobile office has to meet high requirements
for data confidentially, integrity and availability
(CIA).
Currently, commercial vehicles are converted to
ERVs. Therefore, a common approach to reach CIA
requirement is to handle a commercial vehicle as a
vehicle platform and modify such vehicle platform as
per the LEA needs (Rajamäki, 2013). The vehicle
platforms are equipped with computers, monitors and
many other additional electronic devices. Many
researchers have reported that the standardization of
ERVs is very fragmented. In addition, many
associations have released the standards of their own
(Rajamäki, 2013; NFPA, 2016; FAMA, 2016). The
current standards are focusing on mainly safety,
performance and testing. On the other hand,
information and cyber security is usually out of the
scope. The new demands of ICT systems and
evolving threat vectors requires specific security
solution to address these issues.
The main purpose of this study is to propose the
novel solution for ERV information and cyber
security safeguards by applying environment and
technology independent Finnish National Security
Auditing Criteria known as the KATAKRI (an
acronym in Finnish language). The proposal covers
safeguards for vehicle preparedness, vehicle
equipment, vehicle interior design, integrated ICT-
and communications systems and power supply
system.
The paper is structured as follow: section 2
recognizes the research gap, missing cybersecurity
guidelines for ERVs, and makes review for existing
ERV standards, automotive standards and research
activities. In section 3 we present our research
approach and methodologies. Section 4 introduces a
case study; how a van sized ERV can be seen as
protectable asset. In section 5 we propose a practical
solution that fulfils the research gap; we propose a set
cybersecurity safeguards for ERVs. The last section,
KÃd’mppi P., Rathod P. and HÃd’mÃd’lÃd’inen T.
Cybersecurity Safeguards for the Automotive Emergency Response Vehicles.
DOI: 10.5220/0006587802910298
In Proceedings of the 9th International Joint Conference on Knowledge Discovery, Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge Management (KMIS 2017), pages 291-298
ISBN: 978-989-758-273-8
Copyright
c
2017 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
discusses about strengths, weaknesses and scalability
of proposed solution.
2 CURRENT STATE OF THE
ART AND RESEARCH GAP
The study started with literature review to find-out
how current ERVs and automobile industry are
addressing the information and cyber security related
standardization? The current-state-of-the-art also
reveals other aspects of ERVs; how researchers are
seeing modern automobile as protectable asset?
2.1 ERV Standards
There are few forefront European and International
standards on building emergency vehicles. The series
of European Standards EN 1846-x focuses on three
areas of firefighting and rescue service vehicle: (1)
Nomenclature and designation, (2) Common
requirements - safety and performance, and (3)
Permanently installed equipment – safety and
performance (EC Cen EN 1846-2, 2009; EC Cen EN
1846-3, 2008; EC Cen EN 1846-1, 2011).
On the contrary, the US ambulance manufacturing
division (AMD) of the National Truck Equipment
Association released Ambulance Standards in year
2007. In 2014, the American Society of Automotive
Engineers also released updated and more advance set
of recommendations for ambulances and its safety
standards. These recommendation is cumulative
iteration and updates on KKK-A1822 document by
General Service Administration. Researchers have
often argued and questioned the KKK-A1822 for its
outdated recommendation not meeting modern
requirements. Our study demonstrated – European
and American ERV standards are lacking structured
recommendation for information and cyber security.
The most widely accepted and admired standards
for building emergency vehicles came from an
international non-profit organization, namely The
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA
have released a set of standards on fire and rescue
services, products and solutions. NFPA 414: Standard
for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-Fighting Vehicles and
NFPA 1917: Standard for Automotive Ambulances is
closely related to the Emergency Response Vehicle.
NFPA 414 revolves around the design, performance
and acceptance criteria for rescue and fire-fighting
vehicles. NFPA 1917 defines the design, performance
and testing requirements for ambulances. These
standards have specified targets such as aircraft vehi-
cles and medical emergency ambulances.
There are two more NFPA standards which
address education and training requirements for
Emergency Vehicles: NFPA 1071: Standard for
Emergency Vehicle Technician Professional
Qualifications and NFPA 1451: Standard for a Fire
and Emergency Services Vehicle Operations Training
Program. NFPA has considered international and US
Federal Specifications when developing these
standards. However, NFPA does not offer any
guidelines how to cover information and cyber
security when designing or testing ERV's.
The Fire Apparatus Manufacturers
Association (FAMA) is another non-profit trade
association which provides some guidelines for
emergency response vehicles. However, FAMA has
not released any public guidelines on how to build an
emergency response vehicle. Another similar work
found in the literature is from the Ministry of Health
and Long-term Care of Ontario, Canada. They have
released standards for the minimum acceptance
requirements for land ambulances. A diverse range of
studies have been done on various specific areas of
emergency vehicles including the dispatching system
(Han-tao et al., 2009) the intelligent navigation
system (Salehinejad et al., 2011) the vehicle location
finder (Alsalloum and Rand, 2006), the safety and
security of onboard personnel and customers (Perry
and Lindell, 2003), communication systems (Chen,
2010) and others.
2.2 Automotive Standards
Research study also suggests that automotive
standards are not widely covering information and
cyber security. Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) has released a few standards for covering
electric vehicles and diagnostics interface; SAE
J2186_200506: E/E Data Link Security,
J1939/73_20130: Application Layer – Diagnostics
and SAE J2931/1_201412: Digital Communications
for Plug-in Electric Vehicles. In nutshell, current
situation is not able to define automotive information
and cyber security systematically. Again, the
practices are very fragmented and seeks more
targeted solution.
Recently, Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) has put their effort and work towards
information and cyber security. They released their
guidelines, SAE J3061: Cybersecurity Guidebook for
Cyber-Physical Automotive Systems, in 2016. Their
approach is to find out if the existing concepts and
methods could be applied in automotive industry. The
demand to cover holistic automotive cyber security
created an opportunity for the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers and the Association of Global
Automakers to found Automotive Information and
Sharing Center (Auto-ISAC). Auto-ISAC combines
work forces of auto manufacturers, standardization,
other industry and academia to find out the best
possible solution regarding automotive cyber security
(Auto alliance, 2015).
2.3 Research and Innovation Activities
Academic researchers have also put significant effort
for automotive cyber security. Their focus is to handle
the combination of the vehicles and ICT as cyber
physical systems (Fallah and Sengupta, 2012;
McMillen and Sinha, 2010). Their research target is
to find out possible physical threats caused via ICT
instead of applying existing information and cyber
security frameworks in automotive ecosystem.
Petit et al., (2015) are presenting analysis for
potential risks for automated vehicles without any
standardised safeguards against potential threats.
They are using Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) to find out the most remarkable risks
regarding automated vehicles. Their research work
reveals many unseen trends. According to their
research the Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) will be the most vulnerable part of the
automated vehicle ecosystem, the observation
previously omitted by researchers. Famous hacking
conferences, like Def Con and Black Hat, are also
interested to share the latest findings regarding
automobiles and especially trendy cars. In 2013,
Hackers revealed the first vulnerabilities in Def Con
21 when they could control the car remotely
(Rosenblath, 2013). After Def Con 21 car hacking has
been permanently in the conference schedule.
3 RESEARCH APPROACH AND
METHODOLOGIES
This study focuses on developing a pragmatic
information and cyber security solutions for ERVs.
The research approach and methodologies are also
reflecting the solution oriented target. This research
study is aiming to develop a systematic information
and cyber security framework for ERVs using
inductive reasoning scientific method considering
specific analytic reasoning process. The method is
strongly based on providing solutions. The analytic
reasoning method draws the premises from unknown
to known with iterative process that develops
confidence in achieved solutions and hence ensures
the trust. In this method, the goal of analyst is to reach
a judgement about an issue or problem. The outcome
of analyses presents the tangible results in the form of
a product (Cook and Thomas, 2005).
The process starts with planning of proving
solutions to given issues. The planning phase includes
resource usage and timeline plan. The second step in
the process includes gathering and familiarizing with
available information on top of the already gathered
information. Next, the analyst hypotheses and
outlines multiple candidates with explanations.
Indeed, analyst aiming to reach a judgement by
evaluating alternative explanations. The whole
process allows to expand and broaden understanding
of analyst’s previous thinking. The final step allows
analyst to summarize the judgement with creation of
reports, documents and products. The inductive
reasoning method starts with the specific
observations and measures that allows to detect
patterns and regularities, and resulting into formulate
some tentative hypotheses to explore. Finally, the
explorations of hypothesis end with broader
generalizations, developing conclusions or drawing
model. In general, this research method is an
ongoing-iterative and highly collaborative process
where people, process and technology synchronously
scale to support cyber security reasoning, assessment
and actions to implement safeguards in ERVs.
4 A CASE STUDY – VAN SIZED
ERV
Typically, ERVs are built on the top of the
commercial vehicle platforms (Rajamäki, 2013). The
type or model of the platform is selected according to
purpose and need. There are several options available
on the market including sedan, wagon, van or truck.
In this study, we have taken a case of a van sized
ERVs.
The interior space of the van sized vehicle can be
modified and tailored according to customer need. In
our previous studies, we have piloted new approach
with Finnish Police (Rajamäki, 2013; Rajamäki and
Rathod, 2013). The Finnish Police has divided
interior space in three compartments; (1) Vehicle
Control (or) Driver’s Space (or) Cabin (2) Mobile
Office Space, and (3) Transport Space.
The driver space is reserved for the driver and his
pair. It contains all vehicle control related features
like steering, gear control and break control.
Additionally, there could be installed equipment that
is used in everyday activities; onboard computer,
touch screen display, keyboard, mouse, voice
communications equipment and extra batteries for
mission critical systems. The second compartment,
mobile office space, acts like an office and it is
designed to offer facilities for bigger operations when
the vehicle is parked and stabilized. It contains seats,
table, storage for equipment, printer and touch screen
display. The third compartment, transport space, is
reserved for prison or equipment transportation. It has
bench and locker. Following Figure-1 presents ERV’s
integrated system components:
Figure 1: ERV compartments and equipment integration.
For example, Figure 1 demonstrates (A) dedicated
start-up battery, (B) dedicated battery for equipment,
(C) inverter/charger with possibility for external
charging, (D) standby main unit for manual
equipment control & intelligent power management,
(E) on-board computer, (F) standby control panel/
display and (G) touch screen display, (H) keyboard,
(I) mouse, (J) voice communication equipment and
(K) data connection equipment.
4.1 Protectable Assets
The ERV design process is highly demanding. The
rigorous process should be able to cover required
aspects, including information and cyber security.
Our previous study focused on user-centric research
and it produced user requirements specification based
on the real needs of the Finnish police officers
(Rathod and Kämppi, 2013). The outcomes of the
research study have recognized eight main categories
within ERV assets to be protected, as presented in
Figure 2, including Emergency Response
Preparedness, Vehicle Features, Vehicle Equipment,
Interior Space and Cabin Design, ICT Systems, Data
Communications, Voice Communications and Power
Supply Systems. The scope of previous study did not
cover information and cyber security including
recognized processes, features, systems and devices.
The risk and threat vectors have been significantly
increased since our previous studies. In this study, we
will use recognized processes, features, systems and
devices as assets and functional requirements (FR)
with information and cyber security safeguards.
Figure 2: ERV protectable assets categories.
5 SOLUTION - CYBERSECURITY
SAFEGUARDS
In the second phase of the study, we have identified
appropriate standard for applying cyber security
safeguards using Finnish National Security Auditing
Criteria (KATAKRI) for ERVs (Finnish Ministry of
Defense, 2011). The KATAKRI provides significant
standardized way to implement cyber security
auditing criteria and apply relevant safeguards. The
secure ERVs demands protections of different asset
classes and components. Following subsection
explains our proposed solution and outcome of pilot
case.
5.1 Emergency Response Preparedness
The emergency response preparedness functional
requirement is focusing on making sure the ERV is
ready on a standby for operation at any time. ERV
preparedness can be ensured by three different type
of checks and quick functional auditing; routine
check, before mission check and after mission check
(Rathod and Kämppi, 2013). The routine check is
based on car manufacturers’ recommendation and it
is made on mileage or time basis. The routine check
is comparable for any vehicle maintenance program.
The before mission check is made by vehicle
embedded diagnosis system and ERV personnel.
When the ERV is powered on, vehicle embedded
diagnosis system starts and indicates immediately if
something is wrong. Next, the ERV personnel will go
through a checklist according to their mission. After
mission, the ERV personnel will check the vehicle
again and they will report observed faults (if any) to
maintenance personnel.
The regular maintenance program should contain
procedures for maintaining required information and
cyber security level. At first place, there should be
clear policy how the system is documented and how
the documentation is updated, who has rights to install
new hardware and software and what criteria must be
followed in system acceptance process. All devices,
software and licenses should be registered to avoid
situations where expired license or software could
cause security vulnerabilities.
To guarantee system confidentially, integrity and
availability, all new hardware and software need to be
verified in testbed before integration into real ERV. It
is also important that ERV configuration changes can
be made only by authorized personnel. Test accounts
and test data should be removed when they are not
needed anymore. As there is need for frequent
maintenance cycle for engine or brakes, same
principle should be applied also with ERV ICT-
systems. Software and security updates need to be
installed in regular basis, systems need to be scanned
frequently to find out possible vulnerabilities and
vehicle body need to be checked for tracking or
espionage devices. After maintenance work systems
should be locked and vehicle is checked according
clear desk policy.
5.2 Vehicle Features
The features of emergency response and patrol
vehicles are extremely critical to provide effective
and timely incident response. Some of the emergency
vehicle features accelerate the performance and
increase the safety of personnel (Wang and Shih,
2013). The list of required features comprises a broad
range of aspects that are embedded with the vehicle
platform including car size, sustainable functioning,
ground clearance and performance of car, vehicle
type, interior and exterior of vehicles and others. But
the nature of the car is changed dramatically during
last decades. A modern car is like data center on the
wheels and it can contain 50-70 Electronic Control
Units (ECU) that are responsible for e.g. cruise
control, navigation and safety systems (Larson and
Nilsson, 2008). Cars are also connected to background
systems and it increases possibilities for having
vulnerabilities via wireless networks.
KATAKRI does not provide directly any
safeguards for vehicle specific features. Anyhow, the
latest research results can be used to complete
KATAKRI. Larson et al states that connected vehicle
enables remote software updates for ECUs, same time
also the number security risks increases (Larson and
Nilsson, 2008). Wang et al (2014) found that the
vehicle internal communication network, Controller
Area Network (CAN), does not provide message
authentication mechanism. This vulnerability makes
possible to control ECUs via On Board Diagnostics
(OBD) interface. In practice, the attacker could control
ECUs via USB or Bluetooth enabled OBD-adapter.
Checkoway et al., (2011) raises even more potential
vulnerabilities. They state that embedded CD-drive,
internal Wi-Fi, embedded Bluetooth, smart phone
integration possibilities, remote keyless entry and Tire
Pressure Management System (TPMS) could open
doors for attackers.
There is no comprehensive list for vehicle features
related safeguards available, we can make some
recommendations. We recommend protecting OBD
service interface in a way there is no possibility to
install devices for unauthorized access. We also
recommend disabling Bluetooth, avoid using smart
phone integration and following latest research results
to get up to date information about car related
information and cyber security vulnerabilities.
5.3 Vehicle Equipment
Police officers, firefighters, public safety officers and
other personnel of emergency response carry various
types of equipment in their vehicles (Rathod and
Kämppi, 2013). Some of them are use specific like
speed radars, explosion meters, carbon meters and
thermal cameras. There are also many commercial
devices used in the ERV. We can name navigators,
cellular phones, voice recorders, printers and USB-
sticks. As a summary, the list of the used equipment
can be long and heterogeneous.
Before installing any new equipment in the ERV
it should be ensured that installation process follows
company policies, new device meets specified
technical requirements and security controls are
protective enough without having negative effect for
usability. New devices should have possibility for
mass memory protection and the mass memory
should be removed or erased if the device is sent for
maintenance. Printers require memory encryption
features. All unused Bluetooth- and WLAN-
connections are disabled if they are not used and
secured. As a basic principle, there must be verified
that new devices do not create any new information
and cyber security risks. When the new device is
installed, the device hardware and software
information need to be updated to vehicle specific
register. Updated register makes possible to schedule
needed software updates in conjunction with vehicle
maintenance program.
5.4 Interior Space and Cabin Design
The design principles for interior space and cabin has
important role in everyday activities. Design
principles focus on the interior design and build of the
vehicle, considering the optimum use of available
space, ergonomics, safety, material consumption and
easy maintenance.
TIn information and cyber security point of view,
we could concentrate on data confidentially and
availability. Interior space should offer lockable
storage space for confidential material. For data
availability, there should be available suitable space
for ICT-systems and cable routings.
5.5 ICT Systems
The MOBI project introduced an approach where
ERV is equipped with rugged on-board computer
with Windows OS, touch screen displays, keyboard,
mouse and printer. This approach is very flexible and
it enables users to access their software applications
including office, email, diary, and reporting.
Additionally, there could be included portable
devices like laptops and tablets. Figure 4 describes
typical ICT-system setup in the ERV.
KATAKRI offers very comprehensive set of
safeguards that can be implemented in on-board
computer. The most important safeguard is properly
configured host based firewall and malware
protection application. KATAKRI defines that only
predefined traffic is allowed and denied traffic is
logged. There should be also a clear policy for
firewall configuration, documentation and frequent
rule base review. Operating system needs to be
hardened; only needed services are activated,
applications have minimal number of user rights,
mass memory is encrypted, default passwords are
changed and all unnecessary physical interfaces are
disabled. And finally, all detected security breaches
need to be logged.
5.6 Data Communications
A mobile office requires data communication channel
that can guarantee data transmission confidentially,
integrity and availability. The most economical way
is to use commercial mobile networks due the fact
that dedicated authority networks are optimized for
voice communications (Boris and Wood, 2013).
Anyhow, commercial networks are not optimized for
availability in critical communications point of view.
The availability requirements can be fulfilled by
special devices, multi-channel routers, which are able
to combine several data bearers as a single transparent
data bearer. The multi-channel router offers local data
connectivity for end users via both wired and wireless
Wi-Fi connections.
The most important safeguards for external data
communications is support for strong data encryption
and possibility to use redundant connections. Secret
keys for encryption are used only by authorized users.
The session management should meet requirements;
re-activation of closed session is prevented; inactive
sessions are terminated and the length of the session
has certain time limit. And finally, routing messages
are verified and filtered. If the data connection is
shared locally for the end users by Wi-Fi, the
connection should be protected according best
practices. The Service Set Identifier (SSID) needs to
be hidden, users are authenticated and the connection
is encrypted by IEEE 802.11i (WPA2) and the system
uses private IP-addresses for the local
communication.
5.7 Voice Communications
Voice communication systems include dispatching
systems, telephone systems, public reporting systems,
and radio systems (Welch et al., 2013). Voice
communication systems provide the following
functions: communication between the public and
emergency response agencies, communication within
the emergency response agency under given
conditions and communication among emergency
response agencies (Boris and Wood, 2013).
The most used technologies for voice
communications are Terrestrial Trunked Radio
(TETRA), TETRAPOL and Project 25 (P25). The
technologies are designed to meet high security and
availability requirements for critical voice
communications. Anyhow, we can present a few
safeguards for handheld terminals. The terminals
should be protected by password if feasible and all
additional connection types like Bluetooth and Wi-Fi
should be disabled if they are not needed. Mass
memory is encrypted and the system should support
terminal remote management (locking and erasing).
5.8 Power Supply System
The power supply system acts very important role in
any modern vehicle. In case of ERV the situation is
more critical. ERVs are loaded with additional
equipment that requires extra power to guarantee
maximum availability.
The situation could be solved by installing two
separate batteries in ERV; one battery for vehicle
infrastructure and one battery for additional
equipment. The battery system should be designed
properly and it should have enough capacity for
standby missions, possibility for external charging
and it should have real time indication for low
charging level (Kämppi and Rathod, 2013).
Researchers have worked on finding a holistic
solution and finally using NFPA 110 where power
systems include “power sources, transfer equipment,
controls, supervisory equipment, and all related
electrical and mechanical auxiliary and accessory
equipment needed to supply electrical power to the
load terminals of the transfer equipment” (NFPA,
2016). Researchers also suggested using alternative
power systems during failures of the main power
systems, for example Emergency Power Supply
System (EPSS). In electric vehicles, the integrated
on-board batteries could solve power supply related
problems.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented and discussed, the modern
emergency vehicle is a very complicated combination
of different technologies and assembly. The relevant
standardization is focused to cover safety,
performance and testing issues. Information and
cyber security is still uncovered although ERVs has
been equipped with additional equipment during
many years.
In this study, we made a feasibility study how
KATAKRI audit criteria could be applied with van
sized ERVs that are equipped with additional devices
and ICT-technologies. We found that KATAKRI
does provides large set of safeguards if we are
protecting legacy systems or on-the-self products;
commercial hardware and standard operating
systems. We also discovered that maintenance of the
additional technology, including hardware and
software, should be integrated as a part of vehicle
maintenance program. Continuous maintenance is the
key issue for maintaining reached level of
information and cyber security.
It is obvious that the traditional information and
cyber security standards and frameworks, like
KATAKRI, are not able to cover unidentified or
unknown information and cyber security risks of
modern vehicle platforms. Traditional information
and cyber security standards and frameworks can be
used as guidelines but there is needed a lot of research
work to recognize vehicle platform related
information and cyber security risks.
Anyhow, the proposed model is vehicle platform
and technology independent solution. It can be
applied for any type of vehicle including van, sedan,
truck, hybrid or electric vehicles as long as the vehicle
platform is integrated with additional legacy
hardware and software. Secondly, the proposed
model is extendable and it can be complemented with
more comprehensive risk analysis procedure if there
is any deeper integration with vehicle platform
computing systems. The future research work should
concentrate for covering ERV as one protectable asset
including vehicle platform and additional equipment
and software as a whole.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research study could not have been smooth and
applied without support of Finnish Emergency
Response Organisations including Finnish Police,
Airbus-Finland, Research Lead Rajamäki, J., and
working life organisations. We also appreciate Laurea
University of Applied Sciences and their students to
be part of Learning by Developing RDI work. We are
acknowledging and thanking your contribution.
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