Authors:
Mónica Arenas
;
Gabriele Lenzini
;
Mohammadamin Rakeei
;
Peter Y. A. Ryan
;
Marjan Škrobot
and
Maria Zhekova
Affiliation:
SnT, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
Keyword(s):
Authenticity Verification Protocol, Authentication, Integrity, Provenance, Robustness, Formal Methods.
Abstract:
We study the challenge of authenticating objects. This problem is relevant when buyers need proof that a purchase is authentic and not fake. Typically, manufacturers watermark their goods, give them IDs, and provide a certificate of authenticity. Buyers, for their part, check the IDs and verify the certificate. However, even if manufacturers are honest online registration and verification are vulnerable to hacking; servers can leak private data; goods out-for-delivery can have the ID cloned and can be replaced with imitations. We propose a cyber-physical solution that combines physical properties and cryptographic protocols and that is robust against a curious registry server and attempts to physical manipulation. Security depends on two elements: (I) a material inseparably joined with an object from which we can generate digital identities and other cryptographic tokens; (ii) two novel cryptographic protocols that ensure data and object integrity and authentication of agents and obj
ects. Besides, we show that a material with all the desired security properties exists. We can use it to coat objects, and it has optical properties, such as unclonability, from which we can build secure cryptographic protocols. We formally prove our security claims with Proverif.
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