Authors:
V. Hastagiri Prakash
and
Y. Narahari
Affiliation:
Indian Institute of Science, India
Keyword(s):
Grid computing, Grid scheduling, Resource management, procurement auctions, parallel flow, selfishness, rationality, incentives, VCG Mechanisms.
Related
Ontology
Subjects/Areas/Topics:
Agents
;
Artificial Intelligence
;
Distributed and Parallel Applications
;
e-Business
;
Enterprise Information Systems
;
Grid Computing
;
Internet Technology
;
Technology Platforms
;
Web Information Systems and Technologies
Abstract:
With major advances in computing technology and network performance, grid computing is strategically placed to become the future of enterprise and even personal computing. One of the most important issues concerned with grid computing is that of application scheduling. The type of scheduling algorithm used will depend on the type of the application. In a global grid setting, the individual users must be provided with an incentive to offer their resources. The situation becomes non-trivial because of the fact that these entities are intelligent, rational and selfish resource providers who, for strategic reasons, may not provide truthful information about their processing power and cost structure. In this scenario, apart from optimality of the algorithm used, strategy-proofness of the underlying mechanism becomes important. This paper presents a strategyproof mechanism based scheduling algorithm for parallel flow type applications in the form of a reverse auction.