Authors:
Yukou Kobayashi
1
;
Naoto Yanai
2
;
Kazuki Yoneyama
3
;
Takashi Nishide
1
;
Goichiro Hanaoka
4
;
Kwangjo Kim
5
and
Eiji Okamoto
1
Affiliations:
1
University of Tsukuba, Japan
;
2
Osaka University, Japan
;
3
Ibaraki University, Japan
;
4
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Japan
;
5
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea, Republic of
Keyword(s):
Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE), Threshold Cryptography.
Related
Ontology
Subjects/Areas/Topics:
Identification, Authentication and Non-Repudiation
;
Information and Systems Security
;
Insider Threats and Countermeasures
;
Security in Distributed Systems
;
Security Protocols
;
Security Verification and Validation
Abstract:
Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) allows a server to authenticate a user and to establish
a session key shared between the server and the user just by having memorable passwords. In PAKE, conventionally
the server is assumed to have the authentication functionality and also provide on-line services
simultaneously. However, in the real-life applications, this may not be the case, and the authentication server
may be separate from on-line service providers. In such a case, there is a problem that a malicious service
provider with no authentication functionality may be able to guess the passwords by interacting with other
participants repeatedly. Abdalla et al. put forward a notion of the server password protection security to deal
with this problem. However, their proposed schemes turned out to be vulnerable to Undetectable On-line
Dictionary Attack (UDonDA). To cope with this situation, we propose the Gateway Threshold PAKE provably
secure against this password guessing
attack by also taking the corruption of authentication servers into
consideration.
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