Authors:
Jannik Dreier
1
;
Ali Kassem
2
and
Pascal Lafourcade
3
Affiliations:
1
Institute of Information Security, Switzerland
;
2
University Grenoble Alpes, France
;
3
University Clermont Auvergne and Limos, France
Keyword(s):
E-Cash, Formal Analysis, Double Spending, Exculpability, Privacy, Applied p-Calculus, ProVerif.
Related
Ontology
Subjects/Areas/Topics:
Data and Application Security and Privacy
;
Formal Methods for Security
;
Identification, Authentication and Non-Repudiation
;
Information and Systems Security
;
Privacy
;
Security in Distributed Systems
;
Security Protocols
Abstract:
Electronic cash (e-cash) aims at achieving client privacy at payment, similar to real cash. Several security
protocols have been proposed to ensure privacy in e-cash, as well as the necessary unforgery properties. In
this paper, we propose a formal framework to define, analyze, and verify security properties of e-cash systems.
To this end, we model e-cash systems in the applied p-calculus, and we define two client privacy properties and
three properties to prevent forgery. Finally, we apply our definitions to an e-cash protocol from the literature
proposed by Chaum et al., which has two variants and a real implementation based on it. Using ProVerif, we
demonstrate that our framework is suitable for an automated analysis of this protocol.