Authors:
Shuji Ohira
1
;
Kibrom Araya
1
;
Ismail Arai
2
and
Kazutoshi Fujikawa
2
Affiliations:
1
Graduate School of Science and Technology, Nara Institute of Science and Technology, Ikoma 630-0192, Japan
;
2
Information Initiative Center, Nara Institute of Science and Technology, Ikoma 630-0192, Japan
Keyword(s):
Automotive Security, Controller Area Network, Intrusion Prevention System, Operation System Kernel, Loadable Kernel Module.
Abstract:
Cyberattacks on In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs) are becoming the most urgent issue. The Controller Area Network (CAN), one of the IVNs, is a standard protocol for automotive networks. Many researchers have tackled
the security issues of CAN, such as the vulnerability of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and impersonation attacks. Though existing methods can prevent DoS attacks, they have problems in deployment cost, isolability of
a compromised Electronic Control Unit (ECU), and traceability for the root cause of isolation. Thus, we tackle
to prevent DoS attacks on CAN. To solve these problems of the existing methods, we propose an isolable and
traceable CAN-bus kernel-level protection called IVNPROTECT. IVNPROTECT can be installed on an ECU,
which has a wireless interface, just by the software updating because it is implemented in the CAN-bus kernel
driver. We also confirm that our IVNPROTECT can mitigate two types of DoS attacks without distinguishing
malicious/benign CAN identifie
rs. After mitigating DoS attacks, IVNPROTECT isolates a compromised ECU
with a security error state mechanism, which handles security errors in IVNPROTECT. And, we evaluate the
traceability that an ECU with IVNPROTECT can report warning messages to the other ECUs on the bus even
while being forced to send DoS attacks by an attacker. In addition, the overhead of IVNPROTECT is 9.049 µs,
so that IVNPROTECT can be installed on insecure ECUs with a slight side-effect.
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