Authors:
Lawrence John
1
;
Patricia M. McCormick
2
;
Tom McCormick
2
;
Greg McNeill
3
and
John Boardman
4
Affiliations:
1
Analytic Services and Inc., United States
;
2
Alpha Informatics and Ltd., United States
;
3
ExoAnalytic Solutions and Inc, United States
;
4
Stevens Insitute of Technology, United States
Keyword(s):
System of Systems, Extended Enterprise, Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Agent-based Modelling, Complex Dynamical Systems, Institutional Analysis, Organizational Norms, Organizational Behaviour, Systems Thinking.
Related
Ontology
Subjects/Areas/Topics:
Artificial Intelligence
;
Communication, Collaboration and Information Sharing
;
Knowledge Management and Information Sharing
;
Knowledge-Based Systems
;
Symbolic Systems
Abstract:
An extended enterprise is both a system of systems (SoS) and a complex dynamical system. We characterize government-run joint and interagency efforts as “government extended enterprises” (GEEs) comprising sets of effectively autonomous organizations that must cooperate voluntarily to achieve desired GEE-level outcomes. Our research investigates the proposition that decision makers can leverage four “canonical forces” to raise the levels of both internal GEE cooperation and SoS-level operational effectiveness, changing the GEE's status as indicated by the "SoS differentiating characteristics" detailed by Boardman and Sauser. Two prior papers described the concepts involved, postulated the relationships among them, and discussed the n-player, iterated "Stag Hunt" methodology applied to execute a real proof-of-concept case (the U.S. Counterterrorism Enterprise's response to the Christmas Day Bomber) in an agent-based model. This paper presents preliminary conclusions from data analysis
conducted as a result of ongoing testing of the simulation.
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