Author:
Johannes Feichtner
Affiliation:
Institute of Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Austria, Secure Information Technology Center – Austria (A-SIT) and Austria
Keyword(s):
Static Analysis, Slicing, Android, iOS, Cryptography, Application Security.
Related
Ontology
Subjects/Areas/Topics:
Applied Cryptography
;
Cryptographic Techniques and Key Management
;
Data Engineering
;
Databases and Data Security
;
Information and Systems Security
;
Security and Privacy in Mobile Systems
;
Software Security
Abstract:
Many applications for Android and iOS process sensitive data and, therefore, rely on cryptographic APIs natively provided by the operating system. For this to be effective, essential rules need to be obeyed, as otherwise the attainable level of security would be weakened or entirely defeated. In this paper, we inspect the differences between Android and iOS concerning the proper usage of platform-specific APIs for cryptography. For both platforms, we present concrete strategies to detect critical mistakes and introduce a new framework for Android that excels in pinpointing the origin of problematic security attributes. Applied on real-world apps with cryptography, we find that out of 775 investigated apps that vendors distribute for both Android and iOS, 604 apps for iOS (78%) and 538 apps for Android (69%) suffer from at least one security misconception.