Paper Unlock

Authors: Tumpa Banerjee 1 ; Dinesh Kumar Pradhan 2 and Prasenjit Choudhury 3

Affiliations: 1 Siliguri Institute of Technology, India ; 2 Dr. B. C. Roy Engineering College, India ; 3 National Institute of Technology, India

ISBN: 978-989-758-187-8

ISSN: 2184-4992

Keyword(s): Resource Allocation, Combinatorial Auction, New FixedPrice, New Combinatorial Auction using LinearProgramming (New CA LP), Combinatorial Auction using Greedy, New Combinatorial Auction using Greedy Approach ( CAGREEDY-MODIFIED).

Related Ontology Subjects/Areas/Topics: Electronic Commerce ; Enterprise Information Systems ; Software Agents and Internet Computing

Abstract: Electronic commerce or e-commerce is the trading of products or services via internet. The product with little demand is generally sold in fixed price. However, when the demand of a product is huge, auction mechanism can be used to maximize the profit. Selling price of some inevitable products like medicine does not depend on the demand. Auction is the best method for selling products which provide maximum possible profit to the sellers and the buyers get the product in reasonable price. Today, a large part of e-commerce uses online auction for selling their products or to provide any service to the worldwide buyers. Winner determination and payment value calculation of combinatorial auction is a very complex task. The solution to this problem demands optimal result to the auctioneer within manageable time and the satisfaction of both the buyers and sellers in terms of profit. Most simple combinatorial auction already used by many websites for e-procurement is fixed price auction. Fix ed price auction is not truthful and gives more profit to the seller. In this paper we study different auction mechanisms for item procurement in e-commerce and proposed a new truthful auction strategy that outperforms the existing approaches in the context of time and truthfulness. (More)

PDF ImageFull Text


Sign In Guest: Register as new SciTePress user now for free.

Sign In SciTePress user: please login.

PDF ImageMy Papers

You are not signed in, therefore limits apply to your IP address

In the current month:
Recent papers: 100 available of 100 total
2+ years older papers: 200 available of 200 total

Paper citation in several formats:
Banerjee, T.; Pradhan, D. and Choudhury, P. (2016). Efficient Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms in Electronic Commerce.In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 2: ICEIS, ISBN 978-989-758-187-8, ISSN 2184-4992, pages 290-297. DOI: 10.5220/0005838202900297

author={Tumpa Banerjee. and Dinesh Kumar Pradhan. and Prasenjit Choudhury.},
title={Efficient Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms in Electronic Commerce},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 2: ICEIS,},


JO - Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 2: ICEIS,
TI - Efficient Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms in Electronic Commerce
SN - 978-989-758-187-8
AU - Banerjee, T.
AU - Pradhan, D.
AU - Choudhury, P.
PY - 2016
SP - 290
EP - 297
DO - 10.5220/0005838202900297

Login or register to post comments.

Comments on this Paper: Be the first to review this paper.