policy models, including the Bell-LaPadula model
(1973), the BIBA policy model, Biba (1975) and
several multilateral security models. The Bell-
LaPadula model enforces confidentiality in a
multilevel secure system. Two key properties are
enforced; no read up and no read down. The BIBA
policy model enforces integrity and ignores
confidentiality. Multilateral security models
outlined by Anderson (2001) include
compartmentation used by the intelligence
community, the Chinese Wall model for preventing
conflicts of interest in professional practice and the
BMA model for information flows permitted by
medical ethics.
These large-scale security policy models have
been primarily of interest to the military, larger
enterprises, members of the information security
community and to security product vendors.
Over time, many information security standards
and guidelines have been proposed and developed,
for example, the “Common Criteria for Information
Security Evaluation” (1999) is used as the basis of
evaluation for security properties of IT products and
systems. Using common criteria enables
comparability between the results of independent
security evaluations. This is achieved by providing
a common set of requirements for the security
functions of IT products and systems and their
assurance mechanisms.
The evaluation process is used to establish a
level of confidence that the product and system
security functions and their assurance mechanisms
will meet the security requirements. This helps
system consumers determine whether the IT product
or system is secure enough for the intended usage
and to decide whether the implicit security risks in
using it are tolerable.
The ISO/IEC 17799 “Information Technology -
Code of Practice for information security
management” (2000) provides recommendations on
information security management to those who are
responsible for initiating, implementing or
maintaining security. It provides a common basis
for developing organisational security standards and
effective security management practice.
Organisations are invited to select recommendations
from the standard and use them in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations.
The code gives detailed recommendations and
objectives on security policy (providing
management direction and support for information
security), organizational security (managing security
within the organization), asset classification and
control (maintaining appropriate protection of
organizational assets), personnel security (reducing
the risks of human error, theft, fraud or misuse of
facilities), physical and environmental security
(preventing unauthorized access, damage and
interference to business premises and information),
communications and operations management
(ensuring the correct and secure operation of
information processing facilities), access control
(controlling access to information), system
development and maintenance (ensuring that
security is built into information systems), business
continuity management (counteracting interruptions
of business activities and protecting critical business
processes from the effects of major failures and
disasters) and compliance – (avoiding breaches of
any criminal and civil law, statutory, regulatory or
contractual).
Over many years security policy models have
been introduced and gradually evolved into detailed
and extensive information security standards,
guidelines and other comprehensively documented
forms of advice.
The maturity of a given organisation’s security
engineering process can be assessed using the
“Systems Security Engineering – Capability
Maturity Model” (1999) (SSE-CMM). The volume
of documentation and advice available may infer
that standards play a key role in information security
management.
However, Siponen (2002) raised several research
questions and asserts that information security
research in general, has focused on technical issues
(such as access control mechanisms). Additionally,
guidelines and maturity models, whilst
comprehensive, tend to be too broad and too deep to
be readily utilised by SMEs. SMEs are major users
of IT yet struggle to adopt it successfully. In later
research (2003) Siponen critically analyses some of
the “normative” information security standards,
including ISO/IEC 17799, “Generally Accepted
Principles and Practices for Securing Information
Technology Systems” (Swanson and Guttman,
1996), (frequently referred to as GASSP) and SSE-
CMM to argue that they do not provide a “silver
bullet”. The author comments for SMEs to use SSE-
CMM “may be totally irrelevant and perhaps even
detrimental”.
SMEs typically fail to implement effective
Internet strategies due to lack of information security
awareness, lack of technical skills and inadequate
financial resources. Awareness of information
security issues among SMEs is generally poor. The
authors believe a systematically developed
‘roadmap’ will enable an SME to map their security
requirements onto a practical and relevant set of
security solutions.
In this paper we present a mapping of the
Computer Security Expert Assist Team [CSEAT]
“Automated Information Security Program Review
Areas” (n.d.), onto the Alliance for Electronic
ICEIS 2004 - INFORMATION SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND SPECIFICATION
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