As stated in the previous section, the neural
synaptic matrix T
0
is a singular matrix. Thus, the
matrices T
s
, T
r
and T all are singular matrices. For any
given matrix T
0
, T
s
and T
r
, T is relatively easy to
compute according to matrix theory. However, for
any given higher order matrix T
s
, T
r
or T, it is
computationally infeasible to find permutation matrix
H
s
or H
r
. i.e. Only Hessenberg transform of matrix in
the method of conventional matrix decomposition can
succeed in finding permutation matrix. However, the
difficulty of computation can not be overcome.
Firstly, when any square matrix is transformed a
Hessenberg matrix, the complexity of computation
time is O (n
3
), where n is the order of T. Secondly, the
decomposition of Hessenberg matrix is not unique
(Chen, 2001). For any n order square matrix, the
number of Hessenberg decomposition is over 2
n
.
Thus, it is computationally infeasible to traverse the
space of Hessenberg matrices for any synaptic matrix
when n is larger.
As illustrated in the previous section, our
cryptosystem is designed based on the
chaotic-classified properties of the OHNN. It is
impossible to find the private key H by using
chosen-plaintext attack or known- plaintext attack at
present (Guo, 1999). Furthermore, the proposed
cryptosystem is uneven in the encryption and
decryption process, i.e. it uses a random substitution
during the encryption and auto-attraction during the
decryption. Differential cryptanalysis methods cannot
unfold our proposed cryptographic scheme because
of these uneven processes. Only an exhaustive search
based on the statistical probabilities of plaintext
characters can succeed in breaking our proposed
cryptosystem. However, the breaking cost of this
method is very high. i.e., for N =32, some 10
20
MIPS
years would be required for a successful search,
which is well above the acceptable security level of
current states, i.e., 10
12
MIPS years.
On the other hand, the necessity of our
cryptosystem is that the attractors are randomly
substituted by the messages in their domains of
attraction to eliminate the statistical likeness of the
plaintext and avoid this attack based on the statistical
probabilities of plaintext characters. So that, in the
encryption process, the number of messages in the
domain of attraction is another key parameter for the
security of our proposed cryptosystem. If the PRG for
random substitutions in our cryptosystem is designed
to have temporal variations, the same message in the
plaintext can be encrypted to different cipher texts at
different times. To break our proposed scheme using
probabilistic attacks requires that one store all the
information of the attractors and their domains of
attraction, which is not practical even when N is
reasonably large, i.e., N =32.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We propose a new public-key cryptosystem based on
the chaotic attractors of neural networks. According
to above discussions of the new cryptosystem, the
proposed scheme has a high security, and is
eminently practical in the context of modern
cryptology. Neural networks rich in nonlinear
complexities and parallel features are suitable for use
in cryptology to meet the requirement of secure
communication of IPng, as proposed here. However,
we do not know whether the new public-key
encryption scheme described in this paper can be kept
from new types of attack. The exploration into the
potential relevance of neural networks in
cryptography needs be studied in detail.
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