AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET DEPLOYMENT AND

GOVERNANCE

Martin H. Knahl

Network Research Group, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, PL4 8AA, United Kingdom

Keywords: Internet governance, ICANN, ISOC, IETF, WSIS.

Abstract: Internet governance is concerned with the global management and operation of key internet resources.

Given the global nature and reach of internet based services, technological as well as political aspects and

considerations are interwoven and cannot be separated. This paper analyses current trends and

developments regarding internet deployment and governance and is considering future developments. The

paper suggests that governments as well as market governance will remain present for the network access

and content. Is is further argued that internet governance is having more diversity with respect to

governance and more prominent network governance than other communication channels. The paper further

considers future developments and proposes alternative perspectives.

1 INTRODUCTION

Internet governance refers to the global management

and operation of the key internet resources such as

the IP address allocation or domain names (Collins,

2006; Mueller, 1999). It is widely seen as a technical

and political process (Kleinwaechter, 2004). The

operation of the internet is relevant for the global

economy and the internet provides a globally

adopted communication medium. Thus political and

technological aspects are interwoven and cannot be

separated. This paper identifies and outlines the

most relevant internet deployment implications. It

then identifies the key players and developments

affecting internet governance. Current trends and

arguments with respect to internet governance are

put into context and evaluated. The paper further

analyses future developments and proposes a set of

alternative perspectives.

2 INTERNET DEPLOYMENT

The deployment and growth of internet services and

online participation (Gibson, 2005) is facilitating the

development from legacy network infrastructures

towards new network infrastructures. The shift from

circuit switching to packet switching is further

affecting governance. Both legacy and new network

infrastructures require regulation if they are to serve

the public’s interest (e.g. enable competitive access

to the local loop for the provision of broadband

services or fair allocation of IP addresses).

A number of architectural and technical aspects

are fundamental for the operation of the internet and

the provisioning of internet services (e.g. addressing

and naming) must be tightly-controlled and

supervised (as opposed to market driven

governance). It is required to have an ultimate

authority with respect to address (and domain name)

distribution to avoid (or resolve) potential

addressing and naming disputes and ambiguities. On

the other hand competition will ultimately benefit

customers in areas such as network access (e.g. with

respect to performance and prices).

However government intervention may be

required to facilitate the provisioning of affordable

internet services and to nourish competition. For

example in the United Kingdom Oftel has intervened

on a number of occasions to create conditions for a

competitive and user-centred market (Collins, 2006).

Example interventions include Oftel’s directives

forcing BT to introduce Flat Rate Internet Access

Call Origination (FRIAC), to implement local loop

unbundling or the release and pricing of wholesale

datastream products. On a European level the

telecommunication industry has been transformed

from predominantly uncompetitive state monopolies

governed by a detailed (and rather restrictive)

framework of regulations into a competitive market

(Christou, 2006). The European Commission is

largely responsible for the related legislation and the

promotion the recent liberal, multi-layer approach to

governance of the telecommunication market and

industry (Christou, 2006; Sandholz, 1998). These

examples suggest that regulatory intervention is

required to address the market position (and its

impact upon competition) of major

247

H. Knahl M. (2007).

AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET DEPLOYMENT AND GOVERNANCE.

In Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies - Society, e-Business and e-Government /

e-Learning, pages 247-250

DOI: 10.5220/0001284402470250

 SciTePress

telecommunication players. This is making fair,

efficient and transparent network and internet

governance a prerequisite for the operation and

development of the internet.

3 GOVERNANCE BODIES

Several assumptions prevail with respect to internet

governance: that internet governance is distinct from

governance of other media (e.g. television), that it is

extending effectively through the whole internet

community or that it is market driven. However a

number a key players and driving forces behind the

evolution of the internet put those assumptions in a

different light and impact upon the current and

future development of the internet. From a European

perspective the European Union Framework

Directive excludes key elements such as internet

addressing and naming from national bodies’

responsibilities. Governance of the internet is

divided between different institutions. This current

state of the art, the activities and authority of these

are highly contested and remain uncertain.

The Internet Society (ISOC) is an international,

non-profit organisation formed in 1992 to provide

support for the internet standards and development

process. ISOC accomplishes this through

maintaining and supporting other internet

administrative bodies such as Internet Architecture

Board (IAB) or the Internet Engineering Task Force

(IETF). ISOC also promotes research and other

scholarly activities relating to the Internet. The IAB

is the technical advisor to the ISOC. The main

purposes of the IAB are to oversee the continuing

development of the TCP/IP Protocol Suite and to

serve in a technical advisory capacity to research

members of the internet community. IAB

accomplishes this through its primary components,

the Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet

Research Task Force (IRTF). Another responsibility

is the editorial management of the IETFs Request

for Comments (RFCs). IAB is also facilitating

external liaison between internet and other standards

organisations and forums. The vast majority of

internet related technological standards are

developed and specified by the Internet Society

(ISOC) and the units operating under ISOC: Internet

Architecture Board (IAB), Internet Engineering

Task Force (IETF), the Internet Research Task Force

(IRTF), the Internet Research Steering Group

(IRSG), Internet Engineering Steering Group

(IESG), and the RFC Editor. Whilst these

organisations are responsible to ISOC, ISOC aims to

ensure a large degree of independence in their

technical work. IETF is a loosely self-organized,

grass-roots technical group consisting of mainly of

researchers, vendors and networking industry. It is

acting as an activity of ISOC and has no formal

management. There is no formal membership and

generally, attendance at IETF meetings and

subscription to IETF mailing lists is open to all

volunteers. Participants are expected to contribute as

individuals, rather than as representatives of

companies or organizations. The IETF concerns

itself with the engineering and architecture of the

internet. It is the principal body that develops, tests

and implements new internet technological

standards, including protocols, that are published in

the form of Requests for Comments (RFCs). The

IETF relies on ‘volunteers’ (often representing the

interests of an industry stakeholder) and is using

"rough consensus and running code" results in a

potentially slow process the number of contributors

is either too small to make progress or too large (i.e.

making consensus difficult). For protocols like

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) which is

used to transport e-mail over the internet, there is

also considerable resistance to any change which is

not fully backwards compatible. Given the number

of contributors with opinions on standards issues is

very large, consensus mechanisms on how to

improve the standardisation process prove difficult

to realise.

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names

and Numbers (ICANN) is the non-profit corporation

that was formed by the U. S. government in 1998 to

assume responsibility for the IP address space

allocation, protocol parameter assignment, domain

name system management and root server system

management functions (in conjunction with Generic

Name Supporting Organisation, GNSO). This was

formerly performed under U.S. Government contract

by IANA and other entities. The IP Addresses are

allocated by means of a central authority that

franchises them to interested organisations. For

Europe ICANN has delegated authority to the

Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE).

However the independence and neutrality of

ICANN remained questioned (Mueller, 1999).

Although the ICANN’s board of directors was

composed of members from different regions of the

world to represent the heterogeneity of the internet

community the close relationship between ICANN

and the US government remained. The U.S.

government have been heavily criticised for using its

unique ICANN relationship to ICANN its

advantage. In one example, the administration of

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U.S. President George Bush objected to the .xxx

adult domain that eventually led ICANN to reverse

an earlier decision and reject the domain suffix

(Plau, 2006). However, the fact remains that some

analysts and researchers value ICANN as an

independent body representing the interests of the

Internet community as a whole whilst others refer to

it as a ‘public-private partnership’ (Collins, 2006;

Fromkin, 2003; Christou, 2006).

4 ANALYSIS

ICANN decides on new top-level domain names and

delegates the implementation and management of

existing and new domains. This process takes place

in conjunction with the Governmental Advisory

Committee (GAC). ICANN is intent on keeping the

existing model and aims to evolve rather than being

replaced by a new model of communal state-let

internet governance. On the other hand the

modelling and implementation of new structures for

internet governance is the clear intention of a large

proportion of the international community (Wray,

2005). The position regarded as control-oriented

approach proposed and supported by a number of

states (e.g. China, Pakistan) aims to create a new

governing council based in the United Nations (UN)

that would oversee and ICANN and to which

ICANN would be accountable. Another approach

envisages a ‘lightweight’ governance structure

(initially recommended by the EU) based on a

cooperation model encompassing governments,

industry and other relevant organisations dealing and

overseeing ICANN and a forum to provide a

recommendations and proposals for internet practice

and operation. At the same time a discussion

surrounding the possible control (i.e. censorship) of

control surrounds this discussion, with some players

seemingly more concerned with the control of

content than others (e.g. the official EU position is

that the cooperation model is not about content and

that it advocates free speech on the internet).

In January 2002 the United Nations General

Assembly issued a proposal on Information and

Communication Technology (ICT) issues leading

towards the World Summit on the Information

Society (WSIS) series of United Nations sponsored

conferences (Kleinwaechter, 2004) . The task of

organising and running the WSIS leading to the

global summit of Tunis in November 2005 was

delegated to the International Telecommunications

Union (ITU). The ITU can be seen as a potential key

player in counterbalancing the power of the US

government and ICANN. However the internet

community seems unconvinced of ITU’s ability to

play a constructive role in the development and

governance of the internet (e.g. given failure of

‘global’ standards such as the OSI model and its

perceived history of bureaucracy and sluggishness).

At Tunis discussions over internet governance and

the role of ICANN dominated the conference,

leading to the “decision” to leave overall control

with ICANN. Additionally it was decided to

establish the purely consultative Internet

Governance Forum (IGF). Supporters of the

outcome argue that the concern over US dominance

over the internet (e.g. with respect to freedom of

information) are insubstantial and that the US will

guarantee the best possible development of the

internet. However the given status quo remains

controversial and contested given its strategic

economic, cultural and technological importance

(Christou, 2006; Collins, 2006). It can be argued that

further refinement of internet governance must be

linked to wider regulatory changes of a

predominantly globalised economy and international

governance.

A number of critics of the United Nations led

IGF are concerned by the lack of any decision-

making abilities with respect to the core aspects and

issues surrounding internet governance. A recent

IGF meeting in Athens was overshadowed by

discussions of the role of ICANN and the clashing of

opinions. Whilst European Union endorsed an

announcement by the U.S. Department of

Commerce to consider ending its control of ICANN,

the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

regarded the same issue as making "little or no

change" (Blau, 2006). Given the lack of any real

decision-making abilities makes it difficult to

evaluate the results or recommendations from the

IGF at this stage.

It is therefore clear that institutional (e. g.

originating from government) as well as market

governance are present for the network access and

content. Additionally network governance is having

a major impact upon these aspects and is further

strongly present in the control and operation of the

internet. Furthermore it becomes clear that the

internet is having more diversity with respect to

governance and more prominent network

governance than other communication channels (e.g.

based on legacy network infrastructures). This

suggests that network governance and self regulation

have the potential to contribute towards efficient and

constructive governance. However, this discredits

the notions of ‘market knows best’ and that the

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internet is distinct from issues surrounding legacy

media. It can be argued that cases such as the .eu

Top Level Domain (TLD) provide evidence of

international private-public governance in the

internet community and that this reflects the

development towards post-regulatory state

governance (Christou, 2006). Institutions and

institutional cooperation have been essential to the

development of the internet. The IETF and ICANN

provide an interesting contrast of different

organisational and internet governance cultures. It

can be argued that ICANN has partly ‘failed’

because it represents a move away from traditional

internet self-governance and given its close links to

the government of a nation state (i.e. the US). It can

be argued that ICANN’s effectiveness has been

impeded by a lack of sense of itself and by its

dependence upon the US government to legitimate

its rule and that the resulting lack of an established

culture has undermined the achievement of an

effective and successful modus operandi (Bowrey,

2005). On the other hand the IETF always had a

clear mission statement and ‘voluntary’ participation

which has enabled it to evolve and renew itself.

Given the predominantly technical nature of its tasks

facilitates an open, fair and transparent modus

operandi.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND

OUTLOOK

The internet is best understood as a network of

networks with a multitude of interconnected and

layered aspects as opposed to one closed medium or

infrastructure. It can be compared to a dynamic

organism with constantly changing operational and

governance requirements. Hence it can not have a

single, centralised and unified all-encompassing

governance organisation. The tendency to think of

the internet as a unity that can be regarded in

isolation is not reflecting the nature of the

communications phenomenon. The critical issues are

whether technical and operational standards are set

according to specific interests. Hence internet

governance becomes a political issue. Certainly

control might be exerted to undermine the interests

of the internet community.

Ultimately the challenge is to find a way to

implement and operate a new governance system

that will meet the requirements of the 21

century. A

successful diplomacy for the information age will be

much more complex and interconnected. There will

be more stakeholders than governments (e.g. private

industry and civil society), all with different interests

on different issues.

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