COMPLIANCE OF PRIVACY POLICIES WITH LEGAL
REGULATIONS
Compliance of Privacy Policies with Canadian PIPEDA
Nolan Zhang, Peter Bodorik
Faculty of Computer Science, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Dawn Jutla
Dept. of Finance, Information Systems, and Mgmt. Science, Sobey School of Business, Saint Mary’s University
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Keywords: Privacy Technologies, Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), P3P Agent, P3P Privacy Policy, Natural
Language Privacy Policy, Compliance of Privacy Policy with Legal Requirements, Classification of Privacy
Policy, Support Vector Machine, Decision Tree Analysis, Principal Components Analysis.
Abstract: The W3C’s Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is a set of standards that provides for representation of
web-sites’ privacy policies using XML so that a privacy policy can be automatically retrieved and inspected
by a user’s agent. The agent can compare the site’s policy with the user’s preferences on collection and use
of his/her private data. If the site’s privacy policy is incompatible with the user’s preferences, the agent
informs the user on the privacy policy’s shortcomings. The P3P specification defines XML tags, schema for
data, set of uses, recipients, and other disclosures for expressing web-sites’ privacy policies. It is important
for the user’s agent to determine whether the site’s privacy policy actually satisfies privacy regulations that
are applicable to the user’s current transaction. We show that the P3P specification is not sufficiently
expressive to capture all of the legal requirements that may apply to a transaction. Consequently, to
determine whether or not a site’s privacy policy satisfies the requirements of a particular law in question,
the site’s privacy policy expressed in the natural language must also be retrieved and examined. To
determine which legal requirements of a particular law are satisfied by the site’s P3P privacy policy, which
is an XML document, we examine the document’s XML tags - a relatively straight-forward task. To
determine whether legal requirements, which cannot be satisfied by using P3P XML tags, are present in the
site’s privacy policy expressed in the natural language, we use standard classification algorithms. As a proof
of concept, we apply our approach to the Canadian PIPEDA privacy law and show up to 88% accuracy in
identifying the legal privacy clauses concerning the Safeguard principle in privacy statements.
1 INTRODUCTION
Web-sites frequently request personal identifiable
information (PII) for various reasons, such as
personalizing customer experiences or conducting
financial transactions. Hence it is no surprise that
privacy has received a great deal of attention and
that laws, legislations, regulations, and standards
have been recently created/enacted to safeguard and
manage the privacy of personal information in the
digital world. Research and development on privacy
has led to supporting technologies and emerging
standards. Although most web-sites post their
privacy policies written in natural language, research
has shown that such policies tend to be written in
“legalese” and that people find them hard to read
and understand (Cranor, 2003). Furthermore, they
are hard to “digest” by automated agents. Yet, it has
also been shown that the issue of privacy is dear to
the hearts of web-users wherein privacy plays an
important role in fostering customers’ trust and
managing privacy well may lead to an increasing use
of the web in conducting business (Adams, 2000;
Ackerman and Cranor, 1999; Chellappa and Pavlou,
2000).
277
Zhang N., Bodorik P. and Jutla D. (2007).
COMPLIANCE OF PRIVACY POLICIES WITH LEGAL REGULATIONS - Compliance of Privacy Policies with Canadian PIPEDA.
In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on e-Business, pages 277-284
DOI: 10.5220/0002113202770284
Copyright
c
SciTePress
It has been opined that there are two motivations
for companies to be serious about privacy issues –
the carrot and the stick (Chan et al, 2005). The carrot
is improving the company’s image and strategic
differentiation by providing visible privacy
protection to users since studies show (e.g., (Adams,
2000)) that privacy is important to users as they
perform activities on the web. The stick is in the
form of privacy laws, regulations, business
associations’ standards and possible retributions if a
company does not provide privacy protection
according to applicable privacy regulations, e.g. the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Regulation P,
and Canada’s Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).
1.1 Semantic Web’s Support for
Privacy
Currently, the W3C’s Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P) recommendation is the most
mature to support privacy on the semantic web. P3P
specifies how web-sites can use XML with
namespaces to express their privacy practices related
to collection of personal data about users and usage
and distribution of such data. We standardly refer to
any web-site’s privacy policy expressed using the
P3P specification as a P3P policy. The specification
includes a schema for data, set of uses, recipients,
and other disclosures, and XML format for
expressing policies. It specifies also where privacy
policies are posted, so that they could be found by
automated agents, and how they can be retrieved
using HTTP.
In addition to a P3P privacy policy, the site must
also include, in the discuri XML element, the URL
of its privacy policy expressed in natural language
(which we assume to be English). Agents can thus
retrieve not only a site’s P3P policy but also the
applicable privacy policy expressed in natural
language, simply referred to as a natural policy.
A simple interaction of a P3P enabled web-site
and a user’s agent (web-browser) is depicted in
Figure 1. A P3P user agent uses the protocol defined
in the P3P specification to retrieve the privacy
policy from a web server (IBM’s web server in the
figure). Initially, the user agent sends a standard
HTTP request to fetch the P3P policy reference file
at www.ibm.com/w3c/p3p.xml. With the policy
reference file sent back by the web server, the user
agent is able to locate and download the P3P policy
file and compare it with the user’s privacy
preferences. If the retrieved policy satisfies the
user’s preferences, the web-page is retrieved;
otherwise the user is informed – the policy either
does not satisfy the preferences or the agent is not
certain and seeks further guidance from the user.
Preferences are expressed in a language, such as the
P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL),
Xpref, or Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL),
languages that are not considered to be user-friendly
(Hogben, 2003; Cranor, 2003).
1.2 Objectives
As mentioned previously, many privacy regulations
have been enacted in various countries. Users are
certainly interested whether a web-site’s privacy
policy satisfies not only the user’s preferences but
also requirements of applicable privacy laws. This
leads to a question: Is current P3P expressive
enough to represent requirements of applicable
privacy laws? Section 2 of this paper shows that it is
not and hence the user agent must retrieve and
analyze both of the site’s privacy policies, the P3P
policy and the privacy policy expressed in natural
language, and determine whether the site’s privacy
policy complies with legal requirements of a specific
law/regulation in question – how this problem can
be tackled is the objective of this paper.
Figure 1. Retrieving a P3P policy
The tags of the P3P policies are examined in
order to determine which portions of the particular
legal act under consideration are addressed by the
P3P privacy policy. The natural language policy is
also analyzed to determine whether it addresses legal
requirements that cannot or were not expressed
using P3P. We have experimented with this
approach by classifying privacy policies posted by
various organizations in order to determine whether
they comply with the legal requirements of the
Canadian Protection of Privacy Preference and
Figure 1: Retrieving a P3P policy.
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278
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). This paper
describes the approach and the results of
experimentation in detail.
1.3 Outline of Further Sections
Section 2 examines the PIPEDA (Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, 2000) in relation to the
P3P-defined format and determines that XML tags
are insufficient to describe all of the PIPEDA’s
requirements. Thus to determine whether a web-
site’s privacy policy is compliant to PIPEDA
principles, its natural language privacy policy must
be retrieved and analyzed in addition to the P3P
privacy policy. Section 3 describes how a
classification technique can be applied to a site’s
natural privacy policy in order to determine whether
it complies with PIPEDA’s legal requirements.
Results of experimentation are described in Section
4, while section 5 offers summary and conclusions.
2 PIPEDA PRINCIPLES AND P3P
XML TAGS
PIPEDA, which came in force in 2004, specifies 10
privacy principles to which any Canadian business
must comply when storing and managing private
data. As a consequence, any privacy policy a
business posts on its website must also satisfy, or
comply with, these principles. We have analyzed
these principles and compared them to the P3P-
defined XML tags in order to determine which tags,
if any at all, can be used to express any of the
PIPEDA principles. As Table 1 shows, P3P defines
corresponding tags for seven of PIPEDA’s
principles. For instance, the PIPEDA’s principle
dealing with identification of the purposes for which
personal data is collected can be expressed in a P3P
privacy policy using the tag <PURPOSE>.
Similarly, the PIPEDA’s principle of Consent can be
expressed in a P3P policy using XML tags
<REQUIRED> and <opt-in>.
There are three PIPEDA principles, namely,
Accountability, Accuracy, and Safeguards, for
which P3P does not define XML tags and, hence,
cannot be expressed in a P3P policy. Consequently,
the natural language privacy policy must be
retrieved and examined in order to determine
whether or not the site’s privacy policy complies
with PIPEDA.
Table 1: PIPEDA Principles and P3P Tags.
Ref. in
PIPEDA
Privacy Principles Corresponding P3P Tags
4.1 Accountability NONE
4.2
Identifying
Purposes
<PURPOSE>
4.3 Consent <REQUIRED>, <opt-in>
4.4
Limiting
Collection
<PURPOSE>
4.5
Limiting Use,
Disclosure, an
d
Retention
<PURPOSE>,
<RETENTION>,
<RECIPIENT>,
<POLICY>,
<opturi>
4.6 Accuracy NONE
4.7 Safeguards NONE
4.8 Openness <POLICY>, <discuri>
4.9 Individual Access <ACCESS>
4.10
Challenging
Compliance
<DISPUTES-GROUP>
3 CLASSIFICATION OF
NATURAL PRIVACY POLICY
The objective is to classify a web-site’s privacy
policy to determine whether it satisfies the
PIPEDA’s principles. The user agent first examines
the site’s P3P policy, expressed using XML. It
examines the presence and content of any tags that
correspond to the seven PIPEDA principles – a
relatively straightforward task.
To determine whether the site’s stated privacy
practices comply with the PIPEDA’s principles of
Accountability, Accuracy, and Safeguards, which do
not have any corresponding P3P tags, in our current
implementation of the user’s privacy agent, the site’s
natural language privacy policy is analyzed by a
standard classification algorithm, which first needs
to be trained.
For training, a data set for each privacy principle
is collected, labelled, and classified by a human
trainer as either addressing a PIPEDA principle or
not. In order to improve the information gain of the
selected feature privacy principle, a privacy policy
file is divided into smaller files, which are labelled
independently. Then standard classification
algorithms are trained by the labelled training data
set, and thus the predicting model learns through the
training process.
To test the coverage of a privacy policy file, the
file is divided into smaller files, and then the
predicting models are used to label each of the
COMPLIANCE OF PRIVACY POLICIES WITH LEGAL REGULATIONS - Compliance of Privacy Policies with
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smaller files. Conceptually, if the smaller files are
labelled by all three PIPEDA principles, and the
seven P3P tags were found in a separate pre-process,
then the privacy policy addresses all ten PIPEDA
principles.
3.1 Checking P3P Policy
To check that the P3P policy satisfies the seven P3P
principles that have corresponding P3P-defined
XML tags, the tags were stored in a tree structure as
defined in the P3P tag hierarchy.
The input to the agent is a web site’s URL, and
the P3P policy file is automatically retrieved based
on the P3P specification that the Policy Reference
File is located at “well-known” location. The agent
constructs the Policy Reference File’s URL from the
web site’s URL, i.e., appending “/w3c/p3p.xml” to
the end of the web site’s URL. The agent fetches
both the natural language policy and the P3P policy.
The natural language policy is retrieved at the URL
specified by the <policy> tag, and converted into a
plain text file without any HTML tags, images and
hyperlinks. While parsing the P3P policy file, every
tag is checked against a decision tree representing
the structure of P3P XML tags shown in Figure 2.
This is used to determine whether appropriate
tags that correspond to the PIPEDA privacy
principles are present and with appropriate content,
that is with further appropriate embedded tags. For
instance, checking the P3P policy located at
http://www.ibm.com determines that it has
appropriate tags for 7 of the PIPEDA principles and
the output is shown in Figure 3.
3.2 Classifying Natural Language
Privacy Policy
To check that the fetched natural language policy
addresses the PIPEDA’s principles of
Accountability, Accuracy, and Safeguards, two well
known classification algorithms were chosen,
Support Vector Machine (SVM) and decision tree.
We report here on applying the method only for the
Safeguards principle. Here we explore only the
proof of concept and determine the baseline
performance rather then finding the best
classification algorithm for this particular
application. SVM was chosen because for some
classification applications, such as described in
(Chen et al, 2004), it produced the best results as
compared to a number of popular algorithms.
Decision tree analysis was chosen for comparison
Figure 3. Checking PIPEDA Principles Using XML Tags
Figure 3: Checking PIPEDA Principles using CML Tags.
Figure 2. P3P XML Tags Decision Tree
Figure 2: P3P XML Tags Decision Tree.
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purposes to a middle-of-the-road classification
algorithm.
3.3 Data Collection and Labelling
Our data set consists of privacy policy files from
Canadian organizations’ web sites. We examined
them and manually classified them to either having
satisfied or not having satisfied the Safeguard
principle. We then selected an equal number of
positive (satisfying the Safeguard principle) and
negative (not satisfying the Safeguard principle)
privacy files, at 110 each. For labelling purposes, the
following aspects were considered:
Personal information should be protected by
proper security safeguards to prevent loss, illegal
access, unstated disclosure, or modification.
When personal information is recorded on paper,
organizations should have physical security
methods, such as locking filing cabinets,
controlling access to offices.
Internally, an organization should have
organizational security measurement, such as
educating employees on privacy awareness and
restricting access on a “need-to-know” basis.
Organizations should utilize secure web
technology, such as HTTPS, SSL, encryption and
password authentication.
When the retention period has expired,
organizations should have appropriate procedures
to dispose or destroy the collected personal
information.
The files were pre-processed in the usual manner
by converting all text to lower case, filtering with a
list of stop words and stemming using Porter’s
stemmer algorithm (Porter, 1997). See (Zhang,
2006) for details.
3.4 Matrix Dimension Reduction
Both decision tree and SVM algorithms take a term
matrix as input. The matrix is composed of rows
representing data files in the datasets and columns
representing word stems in all the positive training
data files. Presence of a word stem in each data file
is recorded by a binary value. Since the term matrix
is the co-occurrences between word stems and data
files, “the context for each word becomes the data
file in which it appears” (Bellegarda, 1998). An
important property of this term matrix is that two
words with similar meaning are expected to appear
in the same class documents (Bellegarda, 1998).
Therefore, the term matrix was used as input to
represent the training data files. In one test run, a
200 * 737 matrix was generated, where 200
indicates the number of the training data files, and
737 indicates the number of word stems in all of the
positive training data files.
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) (e.g.,
(Partridge and Jabri, 2000)) was used to transform a
large set of uncorrelated variables into a smaller set
of correlated variables. It was used to identify any
data patterns and reduce the input matrix
dimensions. Since there are 737 (the number of word
stems) columns in the matrix, in the worse case, 737
principal components could be generated by using
the PCA algorithm. To visually identify the data set
pattern, we only kept the first three principal
components, which have the greatest contribution to
variance and thus reducing the number of columns
in the matrix from 737 to 3. That is, these three
principal components explain the most important
features related to the Safeguard principle in each
data file. Projection of the matrix into three
dimensions is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Projected dataset for 3 principal components
There are two distinguishable clouds in the
figure that represent the respective positive and the
negative classes. (Since these clouds are clearly
visible only when the figure is viewed in colour
(clouds are in blue and green colours), an ellipsis has
been added to the figure to identify one of the
clouds.) It is obvious that the two classes are well
defined by their own features. By further using a
classification method, such as the SVM-based
methods or decision tree based methods, these two
classes can be identified.
3.5 Applying Classification Algorithms
We used SVM non-linear classification with RBF
(Radial Basis Function) kernel function to separate
our training data points into two classes. The SVM
version of the program has two parts, i.e., training
Figure 4: Projected dataset for 3 principal components.
COMPLIANCE OF PRIVACY POLICIES WITH LEGAL REGULATIONS - Compliance of Privacy Policies with
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281
Figure 6 11-Fold Cross Validation
su bse t 1
sub se t 2
sub se t 3
sub se t 4
subse t 5
sub se t 6
sub se t 7
su bse t 8
sub se t 9
sub se t 1 0
sub se t 1 1
Figure 6: 11 Fold Cross Validation.
and predicting parts. In the training part, the
program takes a matrix generated from the training
dataset as input, and outputs an SVM model. In the
predicting part, the program predicts unknown files
using the SVM model. Training inputs a matrix of
test data files and outputs (classification) labels for
the test data files.
Our decision-tree version of the agent
implementation takes a training data file matrix and
a test data file matrix. To shrink the tree size, both
matrices’ columns are reduced to three dimensions
using the PCA algorithm discussed above.
Consequently, the time spent on building the tree
and predicting unknown files is much shorter. While
training the decision tree algorithm, the decision tree
is built. The test data files are labelled by using the
constructed decision tree. The outputs are the labels
for the corresponding test data files. The decision
tree built by the agent program is shown in Figure 5.
3.6 Validation
We used the K-fold cross validation technique
(Leisch, Jain, and Hornik 1998), which is an
improved version of the Holdout method, for both
SVM and the decision tree versions of the
classification algorithm. The method separates the
dataset into K subsets, and the classification
algorithm gets trained and tested K times. At each
training and testing cycle, K-1 subsets together are
used as training dataset, and the one subset left is
used as testing dataset.
We chose K = 11 to make each slice contain
exactly ten files. That is, the dataset is divided into
11 subsets, and the program executed with different
training and testing files 11 times. At each
execution, both versions of the program are trained
with 100 positive data files and 100 negative data
files, and tested with 10 positive data files and 10
negative data files, i.e., with a total of 20 files. Both
SVM and the decision tree versions of the program
were trained and tested by the same dataset for each
test run.
Table 2: Example of Stem Words Frequency.
Appearance Frequency Stem Words
414 inform
220 person
215 secur
173 protect
156 access
65 unauthor
64 encrypt
59 employe
52 provid
50 measur
Figure 5. Decision Tree
Figure 5: Decision Tree.
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At each round of training and test evaluation, the
frequency of each stem word’s presence in the
positive training dataset is produced so that the input
matrices can be generated. Table 2 shows the first 10
of the most frequent stem words for one instance of
the execution.
The semantic meanings of these most frequent
stem words are related to privacy and safeguard. For
example, “access” and “unauthor” can be used in
sentences restricting the access to the collected
personal information. In addition, most of these stem
words are the key words which were used while
collecting and classifying the training and testing
dataset.
The results of classification are shown
graphically in Figure 7, with the overall average of
87.7% for SVM and 80% for the decision tree. As
expected, the SVM algorithm performed better. As
can be seen, however, both versions of the
classification algorithm did not perform well at the
7th test run, at which the SVM version had 80%
accuracy, while the decision tree version had 65%
accuracy. In the case of this run, test files overlapped
with each other and it was difficult to distinguish
between them. The files were also located far from
the concentrated area, which means that these files
do not have as many features as other files located in
the concentrated area.
4 RELATED WORK
The RDF-Group (2007) provides several
complementary ontology classes for the legal
domain: Actor (individuals and groups), Drama
(events – both discrete and open-ended), Prop
(Products and legal properties), Scene (place and
time), Role, Script (document type), and Theme
(topics of script or drama). OntoPrivacy (Cappelli et
al, 2007) builds on Legal-RDF, reusing some of its
classes, to model Italian privacy legislation.
A prototype implementation of one layer of the
model for a privacy ontology for Canadian
legislation was developed in (Jutla and Xu, 2004)
using OntoEdit ver. 2.6.5, and Sesame. The
prototype contains concepts and relationships
pertinent to PIPEDA. To show proof-of-concept, the
authors developed and successfully tested commonly
used queries, such as “Does PIPEDA address
privacy concerns about user monitoring?”
Gandon and Sadeh (2004), Jutla et al (2006), and
Rao et al (2006) explore the use of semantic web
technologies to support privacy and context
awareness in e-commerce and m-commerce. They
choose ontology languages, e.g. OWL and ROWL,
to represent contextual information including
privacy preferences. To achieve privacy compliance,
a privacy compliant architecture, called Enterprise
Privacy Architecture (EPA) (Karjoth and Schunter,
2002) has been proposed and extended (Karjoth et
al, 2003). The privacy management framework
proposed in (Anton et al., 2004) addresses privacy
management problems which firms face, and which
are not solved only by languages such as P3P and
IBM’s Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language
(EPAL) (Backes et al, 2004) to support privacy
policy enforcement within an enterprise.
5 SUMMARY / CONCLUSIONS
We show that the P3P privacy policy language
cannot express all of the requirements of a privacy
legislation, such as PIPEDA and, consequently, the
privacy policies expressed in the natural language
need to be examined. We also show that standard
classification algorithms are useful in assisting the
user to determine whether or not a privacy policy,
expressed in natural language, satisfies particular
requirements stipulated by a privacy law or
regulation.
There are a number of laws/regulations that may
be applicable to any of the users activity on web in
which exchange of personal information occurs – for
instance, privacy laws at the federal level and then at
the state/provincial level, and yet, possibly,
standards for a particular vertical business domain
created by, say, a business association, may be
applicable. To use our approach, for each
law/standard, a mapping to P3P specification would
need to be performed. Furthermore, for any privacy
requirements, of a particular law/standard, which
cannot be mapped to the semantic web’s P3P
specification, training of classification algorithms
would have to be performed. Such training is a
substantial task with a resulting classification
algorithm’s prediction accuracy that cannot be
guaranteed. On the positive side, training activities
need to be done only once while their results can be
used by any user agents.
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