of its MBS division (Microsoft Business Solutions).
The MBS division is considered as one the core
areas within Microsoft's future grow. Like Sage a
leading Norwich UK based ERP producer
Microsoft's products focus on smaller business
(SME) rather than the core products of SAP and
Oracle which address large organisations.
And finally, very recently IBM announced to
take over the Canadian software company Cognos
for USD 5 billions (Wu 2007).
The competition and market consolidation is
mainly driven by the following factors.
(1) The ERP market for large organisations has
creased to grow rapidly. It has become a mature
market that is characterized by growth through
displacement. Only the market for ERP systems for
SME is considered to generate high growth rates in
the next years. Therefore new and established ERP
vendors introduce software products especially
designed for this clientele. For example -besides its
already established product lines for SME like
Business One - SAP recently introduced its Business
ByDesign applications (Prodhan 2007a) and has
started to even advertise its software on television.
(2) There is a technological shift from monolithic
ERP systems like SAP R/3 to open middleware
based systems that allow integrating and running
small software pieces from third parties. Besides
ERP vendors like SAP that introduced Netweaver
and Microsoft that promotes its .NET technology
software company, like IBM, that has no close
affiliation to ERP software are offering middleware
technology as platform to run business applications.
IBM promotes its middleware platform Websphere
as neutral and truly open since it has no ERP
package to sell with it like classic ERM vendors
have.
The network externalities are having a significant
influence how the ERP market of tomorrow will
look like, in particular which software companies
will dominate it.
The objective of this article is to qualitatively
analysis the strengths and weaknesses of leading
ERP software companies with respect to network
externalities and provide a roadmap for future
research. The complexity of this topic requires it to
limit our presentation to an overview on network
externalities and a short description of each factor
with respect to each company. So the paper also
functions as a guidebook for our ongoing research
where each factor is address in depths.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. The
next Section gives an introduction to the theory of
network externalities. In Section 3 we present the
results of a qualitative analyse of the positions of
some leading companies related to network
externalities. The paper concludes with a summary
in Section 4.
2 NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
2.1 Foundation of Network Theory
Often superior quality and state of the art technology
are regarded as the most crucial factors for a product
to become a success. However there are many
examples where inferior products and technologies
eventually dominate the market after they squeezed
out better products with superior technologies. So, in
literature, the question was addressed if such
occurrences can be considered as market failure (e.g.
Liebowitz, Margoli 1995b).
A classic example is the "battle" between several
video cassette recorder technologies (VCR) in the
eighties of the last century. Although Sony's
Betamax technology was considered to be the best
but it failed to become market standard. Instead the
VHS format of JVC squeezed Betamax out of the
consumer market and dominated the VCR area until
recordable DVD eventually replace video cassettes
(for simplicity we restrain from the consideration of
further VCR technologies like the European format
Video2000).
This, at the first sight, "odd" market behaviour
can be explained by network externalities. Basically
the idea of network externalities is as follows. The
utility of a technology is not only determined by its
quality but also by its diffusion, or in other words by
the size of its network:
u = q + n
with
u = utility, q = quality, n = size of the network.
Consider the video cassettes. The more
consumers own a certain format the more cassettes
are offered in video stores, the easier it is to
exchange cassettes with friends etc. In the end the
advantages generated out the network size are more
important than a marginally crisper video with a
slightly better sound of a technology that rarely
anybody else has.
JVC simply managed to achieve more users for
its VHS technology by quicker and better identifying
the consumers preferences and demands (Liebowitz,
Margoli 1995b) so that its inferior technology was
overcompensated by its larger network. Therefore,
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