THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK

Peirce and Stamper

A. J. J van Breemen

ICIS, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Keywords: Architectonic of sciences, Peirce, Semiotic framework, Semiotic ladder, Stamper, Firstness, radical

subjectivism, Secondness, Actualism, Thirdness.

Abstract: The strength of Stamper resides in his keen eye for the situatedness of knowledge, the strength of the

founder of semiotics, Ch. S. Peirce (1839-1914), resides in his architectonic approach to processes of

knowledge generation and in his subtle, albeit unfinished semiotics. In this paper I confront both

approaches. The aim is to find a meeting ground. To that end I compare Stamper’s semiotic ladder with

Peirce’s classification of the sciences. A first result is a distinction between two views on the semiotic

ladder: 1. an outside perspective on an information system, in which the levels can be studied as if they are

not interdependent and 2. an inside perspective, in which the path from input to response is followed. In the

latter case the levels must be regarded as interdependent.

1 INTRODUCTION

The impact of Peircean semiotics in the information

sciences is to a large extend mediated by Morris’

behaviourist interpretation of semiotics. In Sign

processes and the sheets of semeiosis (Breemen &

Sarbo 2007a) we argued against the restrictions

Morris placed on sign processes. For us, in

contradistinction to Morris, sign processes:

(1) include mental phenomena (stimulus,

response and conditioning through reinforcement

will not do);

(2) include processes in inorganic nature;

(3) do cover all forms of behaviour;

(4) do as a rule generate new signs.

The most important consequence of Morris’

denial of the above four statements for information

science, so we claimed, is the severing of

information systems from organizational systems of

whatever kind by regarding an information system

as a sub-system that delivers services to another type

of system (Cf. D. Falkenberg et al 1998, p.15.)

which governs the interplay of presumably

disconnected processes of semiosis. In this manner

the study of the representational side of information

processes tends to get severed from the interactional

or social side. The price to be paid is that the

oftentimes intricate relations between both

dimensions remain opaque and the question of

responsibility cannot be properly addressed.

A direct recourse to Peirce, however, will not

solve the problem. For, although his way of thinking

was subtle enough to enable him to repeatedly

address issues that follow from the basic social

character of information processes –as, for instance,

his dialogical approach to quantification, generalized

by Hintikka into a game theoretical semantics,

testifies- his strong focus on science, conceived as a

project that in the long run will yield an ultimate

opinion that conforms to reality, prevented him to

systematically integrate the import of the

interactional element in semiotics.

I will use the work of Stamper as a catalyst in my

attempt to work towards a more integrated and a

more Peircean semiotic account of what is identified

as two separate systems in the FRISCO approach to

information systems. In particular the notions of

radical subjectivism and actualism will be utilized in

order to shift the focus from representations of

information systems (IS) towards representations of

For Peirce only death or total annihilation puts an end t

semeiosis, not so for Morris. For Morris statements see Morris

(1946, pp. 287-291).

The relative neglect for the normative sciences of aesthetics an

ethics, as compared to the abundance of attention for normative logic

can be understood against this background.

van Breemen A.

THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK - Peirce and Stamper.

DOI: 10.5220/0003258700870094

In Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Informatics and Semiotics in Organisations (ICISO 2010), page

ISBN: 978-989-8425-26-3

the interpretation processes that the agents may go

through when they partake in the realisation of goals

the IS is meant to fulfil.

It is not my intention to suggest that such a shift

ought to lead to a replacement of conceptual tools,

like replacing the ontology charts of the Semantic

Analysis method (SAM) with the interpretational

model we presented at ICOS 2007 (Breemen, Sarbo

& Van der Weide, 2007b). On the contrary, it may

be far more profitable to insert the interpretational

model in an agent node, of whatever agent type, in

the ontology chart in order to be able to zoom in on

a particular actor. But then it becomes of interest to

find out whether it is possible to find connections

between the semiotic frameworks of both

approaches that enables translation from one into the

other. It is this latter topic that I explore in this

paper.

2 PEIRCE, STAMPER AND THE

SOCIAL ELEMENT

An important difference between Peirce’s and

Stamper’s conception of information processes

follows from their respective overall goals. Whereas

Peirce’s main interest is to deliver a contribution to

the project of science in a way that is reminiscent to

the work of Comte (save the latter’s positivistic

philosophy), Stamper is less restrictive, since he

wants to understand information processes in all

kinds of organizations, not only in the project of

science. Here I will only hint at one consequence of

this difference in orientation. I do this with the help

of an idea of the Chinese philosopher Master Meng

(372-289 BC).

Master Meng, living in troubled times, suggested

a remedy to the hardship farmers suffered as a result

of the greed of the ruling classes. The well-field

system, he conceived, foresaw in the subsistence of

farmers by subdividing the land in pieces of nine

fields. Each of the eight fields surrounding the

central field would be worked by a family and the

fruit of that labour would be theirs. On top of that all

eight families would have to work on the central

field in order to provide the ruler with the means to

organize labour on behalf of the common good. See

figure 1.

Figure 1: Xu Guangqi’s representation of master Mengs

nine field system

iii

or the position of Peirce.

Now, substitute interpreting systems for the

families of farmers, substitute science for the central

field, and add to that a goal that instigates the

individuals to value individual information processes

incompatible with the (methodical) demands of the

central field as bad because they lead to false

statements (beliefs) and processes that do contribute

true statements (beliefs) according to the rules as

good.

Thus, the field-well system can be read as a

simile for Peirce’s intellectual orientation.

Figure 2: The effect of multiple goals or the position of

Stamper.

Against this background: Stamper asks how we

can understand what happens if different nine field

units intersect, for instance because differentiating

economic activity leads to conflicts of norms and

interest, see figure 2. Part of the answer, of course,

are the concepts of NORMA (Liu 2000) and the idea

of agents rooted in and influenced by information

fields. These have to bring out the (semantic)

differences between the different units and sub-units.

The question here is not who values the social

element higher, for both are truly convinced of the

social character of thought. The question is in what

way respect is being effectuated. Gazendam and Liu

(2005) point the way to an answer when they remark

that in ontology charts for Stamper society is the

root agent. Peirce would specify for his research

program the root agent as the society of investigators

that strives to unravel the secrets of reality. Reality

iii

The drawing and the explanation are to be found in C. Lindqvis

(2007).

It is of interest to note that Peirce includes emotions in the class o

appearances that is continually contradicted by testimony and typifies

them as the source of error (Cf. CP 5.234).

ICISO 2010 - International Conference on Informatics and Semiotics in Organisations

being defined as ‘that upon which agreement will be

reached in the indefinite future, if only research is

pushed far enough’.

A clear indication that this is

the stance taken is to be found in the distinction

Peirce made between man as an individual and man

as a personality. As an individual man is regarded as

the source of error (Cf. CP 8.12). As a personality

man is looked at as the unit of consistency. Closely

connected to this is Peirce’s opinion that man is

immortal only to the extent that he as a true symbol

has a lasting effect on future thought (Cf. CP 7.593,

7.594).

It is tempting at this point to take recourse to

Peirce’s architectonic classification of the sciences

and to remark that the difference between Peirce and

Stamper must be understood as a difference in

generality: Peirce is working on the philosophical

foundations of the (special) sciences and Stamper

works within one of the special sciences or even

within the applied sciences. In the next paragraph I

will treat this subject in more detail, here I only

point to some obstacles for such an interpretation:

1. Although informatics or information science

may have started as computer science or just as

an information technology, nowadays, as de

Tienne puts it, it has become ‘a confluence of

studies in artificial intelligence, cybernetics,

cognitive science, formal logics and other

related activities that study how natural or

artificial systems represent, transform, and

communicate information […].’ (De Tienne

2006) As a consequence information scientists

nowadays raise questions that for Peirce

belonged to the sub-branches of philosophy.

vii

2. Although Peirce was a strong advocate of the

scientific enterprise, his conviction that science

evolved out of ordinary thinking guaranteed

semiotics to encompass all information

processes.

Peirce’s preference for scientific reasoning shows

itself nevertheless. For example in the disbalance in

attention paid to the sciences of aesthetics and ethics

as compared with his attention for the other branches

of philosophy.

3 STAMPERS LADDER AND

PEIRCE’S ARECHITECTONIC

OF THE SCIENCES

Stamper’s semiotic ladder (see figure 3) grew out of

the distinction Morris made between three angles

from which signs can be studied: the syntactic, the

semantic and the pragmatic. Although Morris

division was inspired by the work of Peirce and

widely accepted by the semiotic community, it is

hard to see how it could fit in Peirce’s research

program (Cf. Cordeiro & Filipe 2004). And indeed,

it is hard to find a satisfying counterpart for Morris’

distinctions in Peirce. The most obvious candidates

are the subdivisions of normative logic in the

architectonic of sciences drawn up by Peirce (see

figure 4), i.e. speculative grammar, critical logic and

speculative rhetoric. But if we realize ourselves that

the other, more common name for speculative

grammar is semiotics, then the correspondence with

syntactics becomes problematic. As a consequence

of the extensions made by Stamper, however, a

comparison still may be useful.

Figure 3: Stamper’s semiotic ladder. Note that although

there are differences between information processing man

and computers from an engineering point of view, from a

semiotic point of view the similarities prevail. So, it ought

to be stated as The Human/IT-platform.

The first thing to note is that Peirce classifies

sciences, while Stamper classifies dimensions or

levels that can be distinguished in the study of

information systems. Along one line of reasoning it

can be argued that the levels must be applicable to

any interpreting system, e.g. also to a brain devoted

to the scientific enterprise. For, whatever the

systems goal, the dimensions must be present. Along

another line of reasoning it can be argued that the

extremes of the ladder –the social and physical

worlds- are the object of the sub-branches of the

special sciences –the psychical and physical- in the

architectonic presentation of the sciences by Peirce

(Cf. Figure 4).

Peirce’s concept of reality is dynamical and entails the passage

from the irregular to the regular (Cf. CP 1.175).

Note that agents in ontology charts are taken in their personalit

character only.

To determine the place of information science in Peirce’s

classification of the sciences is not easy. Information science

spreads out over the applied sciences, the special theoretica

sciences and philosophy and contributes to them by demandin

more rigor.

THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK - Peirce and Stamper

Figure 4: Peirce’s mature classification of sciences.

viii

The

numbers indicate categorical values. Notice that if we

discard esthetics and ethics, the sub-branches of logic fill

the 2.2.x range.

Both lines of thought would be more clearly

distinguished if besides figure 3, a figure would be

made in which the six level-names are modified by

the suffix ‘aspect’, e.g. physical aspect instead of

physical world. The steps of the ladder would thus

specify the different aspects that can be

distinguished in each information process. Each next

step up could be imagined to rely on the steps below,

i.e. without existence (physical aspect), no pattern

(empirical aspect), etc. If the relation between the

aspects is conceived in this way, then at least in this

respect a similarity with Peirce’s classification of

sciences exists.

With Peirce, the ‘lower’ sciences are involved in

the higher: mathematics is involved in philosophy

and the special sciences, phenomenology is involved

in the normative sciences, aesthetics in ethics, etc.

Since this idea of involvement is a consequence of

Peirce’s categorical scheme and since that scheme

also steered the arrangement of sign aspects and

interpretant aspects (Breemen & Sarbo 2009), in

principle the categorical scheme of Peirce might

prove very helpful for the development of

architectonic approaches, like Stamper’s, to

information systems.

The three most general categories are irreducible to

each other, interdependent and present in every

experience. The categories are: 1. Firstness or

qualitative possibility, 2. Secondness or actuality,

and 3. Thirdness or mediating law. It is important to

note already here that the categories can be applied

to themselves in order to yield ever more detailed

sub-branches. And indeed, as a matter of fact, in the

classification of sciences each of the sciences,

regarded on itself, is of the third category -as is all

cognition- but in relation to each other they can be

provided with categorical values that state their

relative positions and they can again be sub-divided

according to the categorical scheme as the division

of philosophy shows.

Mathematics, in relation to philosophy and the

special sciences, is a First because ‘[…] it meddles

with every other science without exception.’ (CP

1.245) and

[…] does not undertake to ascertain any matter of fact

whatever, but merely posits hypotheses, and traces out

their consequences. It is observational, in so far as it

makes constructions in the imagination according to

abstract precepts, and then observes these imaginary

objects, finding in them relations of parts not specified

in the precept of construction. CP 1.240

Philosophy is, according to Peirce, a Second because

it is involved in the special sciences, but not in

mathematics. This follows from its task, which is

[…] to find out all that can be found out from those

universal experiences which confront every man in

every waking hour of his life, (philosophy: the author)

must necessarily have its application in every other

science. For be this science of philosophy that is

founded on those universal phenomena as small as you

please, as long as it amounts to anything at all, it is

evident that every special science ought to take that

little into account before it begins work with its

microscope, or telescope, or whatever special means

of ascertaining truth it may be provided with. CP

1.246

Another way to put this is to say that philosophy is

of the second category because the actuality of

experience comes into play.

Before I proceed with a treatment of

phenomenology and the normative sciences, the key

parts of this paper, a closer look at a difference

between Peirce and Stamper is useful.

3.1 The Detached Eye of the Logician

and Actualism

The development of Peirce’s semiotics did get off

the ground with his On a New List of Categories

(1867) and went on until his dead in 1914. The

central question in On a New List of Categories

viii

Constructed from CP 1.180-1.283, 1902/03.

It can be argued that metaphysics is misplaced in th

classification. If it is regarded as the First of the special sciences,

then the scheme of sciences (1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) is identica

with Peirce’s scheme of interpretant aspects. Besides that,

uilding domain specific ontology’s is by now daily business i

information science.

ICISO 2010 - International Conference on Informatics and Semiotics in Organisations

already is: How do we bring the manifold of sense to

unity? (Cf. CP 1.546) This question clearly deals

with our faculty of understanding. Peirce’s

development of technical terms in semiotics

however starts with the distinctions to be made with

respect to (outward) signs. It is only after the turn of

the century that a theory of interpretants

(interpretants to be distinguished from interpreters

that process or develop the interpretants suggested

by the sign) comes in sight. A consequence thereof

is that although the work on the categories is

profitable for the sign theory, it is only with the

emergence of the theory of interpretants that a more

material, semiotic approach towards the process of

conception, that brings the manifold of the senses to

unity, becomes feasible.

On the assumption that it makes no sense to

make distinctions with regard to the sign if they

don’t play a role in the process of their

interpretation, we did show in (Breemen & Sarbo

2007a) that it is possible to assign for each sign

aspect an interpretants aspect. Although all

ingredients were present, Peirce did not come that

far. The interesting question is: “why not?” The

short answer is that he looked at the matter with the

rather detached eye of the logician, as is exemplified

in the following quote.

It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a

quasi-mind; for if we regard it as an outward object,

and as addressing itself to a human mind, that mind

must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only

after that consider it in its significance; and the like

must happen if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-

mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that

quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding that

determination as the sign. EP 2 p.391 1906

Here it is admitted that in order to interpret

signs, it is needed to first apprehend the sign as an

object, but Peirce immediately makes clear that

nothing is lost if we skip this step by supposing the

sign as an object already to be grasped by a quasi-

mind. And indeed, in his personal Logic Notebook,

October 8

1905,

we find a categorical ordered

listing of sign aspects that flows over in a listing of

interpretant aspects. In this list, however, the first

triad of interpretant aspects is missing. These are

precisely the interpretant aspects that cover the

apprehension of the sign as an object.

We will see

in paragraph 4 that taking an actualist

xii

stand

(Gazendam & Liu 2005), forces one also to take into

account that first stage of the interpretational

process.

3.2 Stamper’s Ladder Revisited

In figure 5 I present the aspectual view on the

semiotic ladder. The difference between both ladders

is twofold. First, while in the received view

perspective there may or may not be

interdependencies between the levels, in the

aspectual perspective I assume there are

interdependencies. Note that the steps of the

aspectual ladder relate with the sub-branches of

philosophy in Peirce’s classification as an aspect

approach relates to a received view approach or, as

Peirce would have it, as the utens of a certain kind of

habits relates to the docens of the same kind of

habits. The different moments that can be discerned

in the utens of a process of interpretation are reified

into relatively independent levels. Here resides the

ground for hope to be eventually able to trace back

the different steps of the semiotic framework to a

general description of interpretation.

Second, the aspectual ladder describes what must

be assumed present in any information process, the

sciences ladder divides and distinguishes sub-

domains of all possible information processes. This

difference is akin to the difference between a

universal (or cenoscopic) ontology and domain

specific (or idioscopic) ontology’s (Breemen &

Sarbo 2009).

Stamper’s ladder of views starts with the

physical world. That may be a good choice for the

received view approach, for an aspectual approach, I

think, it is better to follow Stamper’s principle of

radical subjectivism. But if we do so value the

perceiving mind, we are better off with

phenomenology at the first steps of the aspectual

view ladder.

Manuscript 339 according to the Robin catalogue

For Peirce scholars: this probably is the reason why Peirce neve

tried to categorically relate the emotional, energetic and logica

interpretant, with the immediate, dynamical and normal interpretant.

xii

This does not imply throwing away the first and third category, i

only admits that to start with some actual arousal of the mind may be

good strategy.

THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK - Peirce and Stamper

Figure 5: Stamper’s ladder adapted to an aspect view and

their roughly corresponding terms in Peirce’s semiotics.

Note that both Peirce -in his work on interpretants- and

Stamper work with two trichotomy’s while three

trichotomy’s are needed to describe a sign in its most

general characteristics. A description of processes of

interpretation by an agent ought to take account of all

three trichotomy’s.

Space forbids tracing out the relation between

Stamper’s ladder, the aspectual ladder and the

interpretational model we derived from Peirce’s

work on signs and interpretants (Breemen & Sarbo,

2009). Since, however, any attempt in that direction

must invoke the phenomenology and the semiotics

of Peirce, in the remainder of this presentation, I will

start that enterprise with the first steps, the steps that

cover the apprehension of the sign as an object (The

steps distinguished under the heading IT-platform).

The first thing to do is to zoom in from the

arrangement of sciences to the object covered by the

sub-branches of philosophy or, better still, we must

zoom in on the most general characteristics of any

interpretation process that relates to the sub-

branches of philosophy as the praxis (utens) relates

to the teaching (docens) of the praxis.

3.3 The Docens and the Utens of the

Sciences

Peirce makes a clear distinction between everyday

reasoning and controlled or scientific reasoning. It is

captured with a distinction between the docens and

utens of logic:

[…] In everyday business, reasoning is tolerably

successful; but I am inclined to think that it is done as

well without the aid of theory as with it. A logica

utens, like the analytical mechanics resident in the

billiard player's nerves, best fulfills familiar uses. CP

1.623

This distinction is consonant with the general

character of philosophy and with specialized

science, so the utens – docens distinction covers not

only what offers itself to the mind (the subject of

philosophy), it also includes the trajectory from the

receptors to the brain, the brain and the motor

system. For, a description of the analytical

mechanics of motor movement clearly seems a

subject for one of the special sciences. A more

radical subjectivist interpretation and description of

the utens of mathematical logic is provided by

Farkas and Sarbo, see the appendix of Breemen &

Sarbo (2009) for a succinct description. They called

it naïve logic because all Boolean operators are

uncritically applied and quantification and modality

are not covered.

xiii

It involves an ordering of the

Boolean operators, but the truth conditions do not

apply, it can be looked at as translations without any

check, besides a check on the completeness of

operators used.

xiv

It covers all we must assume the

mind is capable to at the moment it gets confronted

with “those universal experiences which confront

every man in every waking hour of his life” (CP

1.246).

The first science that investigates the universal

experiences is phenomenology, but it only covers

the subject as appearance. This study yields the

universal categories as a principle to be used in the

construction of a model of our interpretational

process. In Speculative grammar or semiotics the

same appearances are re-investigated. This time

from the perspective of their character as a sign, that

must be grasped before it can evolve its meaning and

realize its effect. Together with the logica utens and

the matter and principles derived from

phenomenology, the technical terms of semiotics

must deliver the first building blocks for our process

model of interpretation. If we leave out the process

character, we have all that is needed to make a

ladder of the dimensions that must be distinguished

in any information system whatever. It does not

discriminate between organic and inorganic systems,

because aesthetics and ethics are not yet included.

4 THE SEMIOTIC SHEET AND

ACTUALISM

If “to all intents and purposes, without an actor no

reality exists” (Gazendam and Liu 2005), we do best

to start with the assumption of a receptive actor. Let

us call the mind of that actor the Semiotic Sheet (S

Since the S

itself is a sign, it has three modalities. In

its modality as a First (possibility, S

-P), at the

moment, it only contains the possibility to evoke the

xiii

Truth, modality and quantification come in after experience, so t

say.

xiv

Check failure leads to a feeling of uneasiness, to doubt that must b

settled in belief.

ICISO 2010 - International Conference on Informatics and Semiotics in Organisations

logica utens, that enables the ordered translation of

feelings through time along the steps of the semiotic

ladder by the sheet in its modality as a Third

(mediation, lawfulness, S

-L) on the occasion of a

feeling that occurs on the sheet, here and now, in its

modality as a second (actuality, S

-A).

What happens if a feeling (qualisign) presents

itself? That feeling must have a quality distinct from

what else is contained by the sheet: it is inescapably

there, here and now inscribing itself as an actual

feeling (sinsign) in a S

-A. Besides that it has a

definite quality that makes it the quality it is and that

has the potential to enter the stream of thought. But

only if there is a law or habit that takes this instance

of the quality as an instance of a type (mediation,

legisign). This is a very short summary of what we

find in Peirce’s phenomenological analyses.

In semiotic terms the phenomenological findings

can be presented in two ways. In terms of sign

aspects the feeling regarded as an existent feeling is

a sinsign, regarded as this quality it is a qualisign

and regarded as an instance of a type, it is a legisign.

If we shift focus to the process of interpretation we

find the emotional interpretant (qualisign) and the

physical energetic interpretant (sinsign). The

legisign counterpart is missing, as we showed that of

the nine sign aspects six are present in the

interpretant section (Breemen & Sarbo 2007a), see

figure 6.

Figure 6: The match of sign aspects (left) with interpretant

aspects (right). The match is ours. The interpretant aspects

that are missing in Peirce are in boldface.

The reason why Peirce did not identify the

missing interpretants himself may very well be that

he adhered to the scientific enterprise in which the

interpretant sign via the original sign better be

determined by the object only and not also by

peculiarities only pertinent to a given sheet.

But he

seems to have acknowledged this limitation for he

once complained that:

I have thought of the Object of a Sign as that which

determines the sign; and this is well thought. I have

thought of the interpretant as that which the sign

determines or might determine or should determine;

but this is not so well. For my idea of determination is

dyadic while the idea of the relation of the interpretant

to the sign is triadic. Peirce, MS 339 276r. April 2,

1906

Actualism brings out what is missing, since it

forces one not to abstract from the interpreting

agent. In figure 7 the evolution of the import of a

sign is given. The diamond left represent the S

-A

when it is confronted with a new feeling as an effect

upon a state. The question is how a sign is

apprehended as an object with the ability to address

the human information functions.

Figure 7: The semiotic sheet inscribed by a feeling. The

left diagram describes the interpretation moments in terms

of Peirce’s sign theory, the middle in terms of Stamper’s

Ladder and the right in terms of Peirce’s interpretants. The

left diagram provides the actualist perspective by

emphasizing the intrusion of a feeling in an agent state, the

right diagram provides the radical subjectivist perspective

by emphasizing the feeling that develops its effect, the

middle diagram presents a detached view by leaving the

occasion and the experience on that occasion unidentified.

The first significate effect an agent experiences

is a feeling that intrudes. At this moment it is only

the experience of a quality without any

understanding, just an urge to resettle balance on the

sheet. It is associated with doubt, in Peirce’s doubt –

belief sequence, as belief is associated with the

normal interpretant. This moment is indicated with

emotional interpretant in the right diagram. They are

there for an instant and once gone, they are gone

forever, much to elusive to be distinguished in the

detached view (middle).

However short lived emotional interpretants are,

in their effect they are sorted out in a twofold way.

As a feeling of resistance (physical interpretant,

sinsign, existence) and as the one time quality or as

the configuration of qualities they are (mental

interpretant, icon, form). If we follow the sequences

of inscriptions and their forms separately we enter

either the physical or the empirical level in the

detached view.

In the next phase, coined abstraction by Farkas

and Sarbo, the iconic sinsign connects (index) with

what is contained in the sheet. On the one hand it

offers all its interpretational possibilities (immediate

interpretant, rheme), on the other, in order to be

effective, it must be recognized and treated as an

With Peirce ‘objective’ is not associated with the distinctio

etween external and internal to the mind, but with ‘dependent o

mind in general’ and ‘dependent only on a specific mind ’.

THE SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK - Peirce and Stamper

instance of a type by the sheet (legisign). A simple

example must suffice. The lady that can be seen

either as young or as old offers at least these

interpretational possibilities (immediate interpretant,

rheme). In what way it is seen at a particular

moment depends on the legisign invoked: the lady

either seen as young or old, not both. Note that it is

not yet seen as a young woman or as an old woman.

It still is just the image experienced as familiar.

In the detached view (middle diagram) the index

position is identified as the syntactical level, for, if

we take lots of occurring iconic sinsigns according

to the combinations they indexically lead to on

subsequent interpretation moments, we are looking

for the combinatory properties and we may start to

distinguish different types of combinations. Since in

the Rheme position all possible meaningful

combinations are offered, this must be the semantic

level. Interestingly, the legisign position does not

have a counterpart in the detached view. In part this

can be explained by pointing to the fact that it is

implied in the semantic level. But that is not the

whole story. In order to be able to dwell upon this

subject a bit more, I will skip the further assignment

of moments in the process model to ladder positions

and just give the correspondences in figure 7 without

any argument,

Another reason why the legisign position is not

recognized in the received view of the semiotic

ladder may be connected with a feat of the ontology

charts of SAM. The nodes represent affordances and

agents as a rule in general and not as particulars. The

exception is the root, that is taken to represent

society. By doing so entities like person tend to be

looked at from the point of view of the world

modeled in the charts. Characters of instances of

type person that fall outside the depicted world have

the same value as the individual has in Peirce’s

worldview, they are the source of error at the most.

This does not prevent those characters to be useful in

worlds depicted by other charts, but that falls out of

sight. Choosing unit of consistency instead of society

as epithet would enhance consciousness of the

potential and a source for agents to act adverse to the

goal of the world depicted. At the same time it

would invite to look at the agent as itself a unit that

strives to increase its consistency and that, taking

part in different information systems (Cf. Master

Meng), may be forced to take responsibility for its

acts in any one of them as a consequence of its role

in another. I suggest that zooming in on the

complexities that result is greatly enhanced by

projecting the process model of interpretation on the

agent nodes of the ontology charts. It would be of

assistance for any approach that tries to personalize

the response of information systems or of ambient

spaces to individual needs.

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