intruder does not have enough data to make an at-
tempt of breaking a message encrypted this way.
This means that the distribution of cryptographic
parameters vectors, through the central RKMM
module which is secured by RSA algorithm, can be
considered safe (Wobst, 2002).
2.2.3 Encrypted Data
Data sent by the RCM module is first transmitted
over the radio channel and then via GSM / UMTS /
TETRA links to their networks’ connection to the
Internet. Between the operator’s network and the
Data Acquisition Center (in short DAC) VPN tun-
nels that protect data transmitted over the Internet
have been compiled.
In addition, regardless of the security offered by
the technology used for data transmission, it was
decided to use the additional data encryption. En-
cryption algorithms supported by the RCM module
are: AES-128; AES-192; AES-256; Triple-DES.
These are algorithms approved by the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology and their safety is
estimated to at least 2030 (NIST, 2003-2007). There
is also an opportunity of easy migration to other
solutions.
RKMM is equipped with mechanisms to improve
the security of the system. It provides, inter alia,
easy change of the data encryption algorithm in a
situation of violation of any of the used algorithms.
2.3 Modular Architecture of RSMAD
System as a Form of Securing and
Increasing the System Reliability
This section will show the benefits of the modular
system structure and policies of limited confidence
in the RSMAD system. These benefits could be
presented on examples of various types of interfer-
ence in the system: acquisition of one of the RCM
modules, acquisition of one of the RUM modules,
eavesdropping of transmission in a wireless network,
eavesdropping of transmission in the Internet. Those
are the most probable attempts to intervene in the
RSMAD system. However, there is also some prob-
ability of attempts of unauthorized physical access to
servers on which RKMM, RLM, and RDM applica-
tions run. Physical security of the RSMAD system’s
servers unfortunately exceeds the scope of this pa-
per.
A hypothetical situation can be imagined that the
intruder steals a unit with an installed RCM module,
for its thorough analysis and to gain unauthorized
access to the RSMAD system.
The only data that can theoretically bring any
benefit to an intruder are: license number of the
RCM and IP addresses of the RKMM and the RDM
modules. Trying to use the license would not bring
any benefit, because each one is verified on-line
during its input. Address of RDM module allows
only access to the FTP server, with write-only per-
missions. RKMM IP address is useless, because this
module verifies the password which is implemented
in code of the software. Even if it would be over-
heard, in response to a query, the RCM module can
only get an encryption parameters vector containing
the information on encryption key with which the
messages are protected, but not the pictures stored
on this device.
In summary, the RCM module has been de-
signed so that a failure or attack on one traffic
enforcement camera does not endanger the safety
of the entire RSMAD system.
3 CONCLUSIONS
Solutions used in the RSMAD system, and espe-
cially its modular architecture are its major asset.
Security policy, developed specifically for the sys-
tem, provides a very high level of data security. It
should be noted that the maintenance of the RSMAD
system in continuous operation is crucial because
with the large number of supported devices, even a
brief failure could result in very large losses. Thus,
the system lets users to perform a software update on
individual devices without interrupting the operation
of the whole system. Flexibility that characterizes
this system allows its easy and sustainable develop-
ment and ensures low maintenance costs.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The project of RSMAD is realized under the re-
search - development grant R02 N 0034 06
in years 2009-2012 in the Department of Radio-
communication Systems and Networks, Faculty of
Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics at
Gdansk University of Technology in Poland. It’s
funded entirely by the National Centre for Research
and Development.
REFERENCES
KSSR DT 07.100 v. 1.0.1, 2009. General concept of
DCNET 2011 - International Conference on Data Communication Networking
92