Comments. Proximity based methods can be based
on low cost hardware such as IR, ultrasound or Blue-
tooth beacons, allowing their cheap implementation.
In order to be part of a security relevant system, they
need to be combined with a location verification ap-
proach.
An alternative application for proximity based
systems are public WLAN-based positioning systems
(WPS). WPS uses existing wireless access-points and
a database holding their geodetic positions. A client
reports all currently received SSIDs to the system
which uses a multiple nearest-neighbor approach to
interpolate the possible position of the client.
3 LOCATION VERIFICATION
A major concept in this field is the verification of lo-
cation claims. It is described best by an example: A
certain device R claims to be located in a certain area
A. This area can be a single room or even a build-
ing. Every device located in this very area should be
granted access to a specific resource whereas devices
that are out of its boundaries must not get access. The
network infrastructure provides a verifier v. An entity
that is able to validate the claim of R according to the
in-region verification problem (Sastry et al., 2003).
Location verification can be used to extend loca-
tion determination methods and improve the security
and reliability. In some cases it may work without
requiring a dedicated location determination method
and be the base for a security related system. The
next sections present popular research and implemen-
tations in the field of location verification.
3.1 Distance-bounding Protocols
Stefan Brands and David Chaum proposed the first
solution to the problem of verifying the distance of
a prover to a verifier (Brands and Chaum, 1993) in
1994 by presenting the distance bounding protocol.
It is based on the timing delay between sending out
a challenge and receiving back the corresponding
response. In the following, Srdjan
ˇ
Capkun et al.
(Capkun et al., 2003) extended the protocol to
SECTOR, a mutual authentication protocol using
distance bounding. As vulnerabilities to this protocol
have been discovered, Dave Singelee and Bart
Preneel of the K.U. Leuven presented modifications
to render it secure against the so called terrorist fraud
attacks(Singelee and Preneel, 2005). Another solu-
tions, similar to the approach of Singelee and Preneel
has been published by Laurent Bussard (Bussard,
2004). In 2006, it was again Srdjan
ˇ
Capkun, this
time with Jean-Pierre Hubaux (Capkun and Hubaux,
2006), who advanced this distance-bounding location
verification by pairing it with multilateration. They
assume that an increasing number of verifiers also
increases the trustworthiness of a location claim as
an attacker needs to trick all verifiers at the same
time and with coherent spoofs. In 2010, Rasmussen
and
ˇ
Capkun demonstrated a practical implementation
of a distance bounding protocol (Rasmussen, 2010).
The implementation used custom hardware with
sub-nanosecond processing delay, and provided a
precision of approximately 15cm.
Advantages. The distance bounding protocols
measure the propagation delay of radio waves. Since
these waves travel at the speed of light, an attacker
is not able to mount a distance reduction attack.
Furthermore, some of the proposed protocols cryp-
tographically bind the distance bound to the prover ,
so that even man-in-the-middleattacks are unfeasible.
Disadvantages. Distance bounding protocols are
extremely sensitive to processing delays. A pro-
cessing delay of 1ns adds approximately 30cm to
the distance bound. A practical implementation of
such a protocol thus requires extremely fast hardware.
Comments. Distance bounding protocols are robust
against distance reduction attacks. However, such
protocols require fast hardware, so they may not be
suitable for implementation in current network de-
ployments. As an example, the 802.11 standard with
the a/b/g amendments has a time resolution of 1µs,
which corresponds to a distance error of approxi-
mately 300m.
3.2 The Echo Protocol
Naveen Sastry et al. (Sastry et al., 2003) from
the University of California, Berkeley developed
the Echo Protocol in 2003. The Echo Protocol is
extremely lightweight, and it does not require time
synchronization, cryptography or very precise clocks.
It is well suited for use in small, cheap, mobile
devices. The location determination process requires
RF and ultrasound transceivers. The protocol is
similar to the RF based distance bounding protocol,
the difference is that the response from the prover to
the verifier is transmitted as ultrasound rather than
RF. Since ultrasound travels at a much slower speed
than light, this approach allows for a higher degree
of precision when the processing time makes RF
based protocols unreliable. The Echo Protocol is
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