Figure 3: Correlated sequences of activities.
should be efficient in order to keep a lightweight soft-
ware. Thus, we implemented mechanisms that allow
to aggregate the captured events and to help to visual-
ize the possible correlations.
First, the events of the same nature are temporar-
ily grouped into activities. Then, SYNEMA searches
for combinations of activities (from sensors of differ-
ent natures) that reveal complete sequences of attack.
For example, Figure 3 shows sequences of attacks that
combine a network activity (revealed by Snort or p0f),
an intrusion attempt (revealed by Snort or ssh), and fi-
nally a change on the filesystem (revealed by Osiris).
Remaining difficulties have to be addressed. First,
the rules for grouping events and activities need a lot
of human expertise. Second, it is a difficult challenge
to distinguish false positive correlations and to quan-
tify the accuracy of the proposed methodology. Third,
the experimental data are based on logs of honeypots
that are quite different from a real server. Current
work address the first two points, with the develop-
ment of a partially supervised learning module, that
helps to build the correlation rules and exclude the
rules that generate false positives.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper is presented a new tool, SYNEMA, that
allows to visually monitor the network and the ma-
chines of this network. SYNEMA aggregates multiple
sensors visualization in one single visualization dash-
board, for both network and operating system con-
cerns. The paper explains how SYNEMA can help the
security expert to visualize the logs. Current work fo-
cus on a correlation plugin suite for SYNEMA.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The initial development of SYNEMA has been the
pedagogical support of the algorithm and program-
ming lecture of ENSI de Bourges in 2009. We
would like to thank the engineering students of the
Security and Computer Science Master degree, who
participated to the development of some plugins of
SYNEMA. Our special thanks go to Zaina Afoulki,
Steve Dodier, and Timothée Ravier for their efforts
on the core of SYNEMA.
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