information barriers or high costs existing in
obtaining the internal information of an enterprise,
the external capital market can not conduct
continuous fine-tuning to the company based on the
market conditions, while the internal capital market
is superior in the authenticity, timeliness and
accuracy of the information, and has an advantage on
the adaptability to the market environment
(Williamson, 1975). Myers and Majluf (1984), Stein
(1997) also provides the same evidences.
Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) built a
model on the basis of Grossman and Hart ownership
theory. They said that in the internal capital market,
corporate headquarters (the investor) is the direct
owner of the assets of divisions that utilize funds, and
has residual control rights, while the investors of the
external capital markets are not the direct owner of
those assets. Due to this essential difference, the
enterprise messaging, monitoring and incentives
produce different results between internal capital
markets and external capital markets. In the internal
capital markets, the corporate headquarters with the
residual control rights can better supervise and
motivate departmental managers.
When there is information asymmetry between
external investors and company management about
the company assets value and expected return on
investment projects, the securities issued by high-
quality companies to finance investment projects
may be undervalued, because companies may not
obtain sufficient funds at a reasonable cost, they have
to give up some projects with a positive net present
value (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Stulz (1990)
pointed out that since the creation of a strong internal
capital markets in diversified companies, it will
effectively solve the problem of insufficient
investment, so diversified business operations than
single enterprises can make greater use of the
investment opportunities that present value is
positive, which will enhance corporate value.
2.2 The Theoretical Basis for the
Ineffective Internal Capital Market
Due to the agency problem, influence costs and
abuse of free cash flow, the internal capital market is
inefficient or even ineffective in capital allocation.
Scharfstein and Stein (2000)believed a good
investment project suffers relative under-investment
and a poor investment project enjoys over-
investment. With regard to the causes of "Company
socialism", Scharfstein and Stein (2000) continued to
analyze and found that this was due to the department
manager's rent-seeking behavior. Rajan, etc. (2000)
study have also reached the similar conclusion.
Managers have the tendency of over-investment
with the remaining cash flows (Jensen, 1986, 1993),
and the organizational structure of large enterprise
provides more cash flow for managers, which thus
easily leads to over-investment. Free cash flow
theory
suggests that due to the temptation of a
number of factors, entrepreneurs prefer to invest in
the project that would not increase shareholder
wealth as opposed to paying the dividend, such as
the money for its own on-the-job
consumption
(purchase of commercial aircraft), or the
consumption for honor(for social contributions, etc.).
2.3 China's External Capital Market
Efficiency and the Empirical
Evidences
In China, the external capital market is inefficient,
which has been proved by a large number of research
literature. The first is the low efficiency of the
banking system. Lu Jianxin(2008) argued that the
bank-led financing model prevails in China, but for
quite a long time, China's banking resource allocation
is based upon the administrative relations. As the
backbone of the banking system, state-owned
commercial banks inject their credit facilities into the
state economy whose economic contribution rate is
not high. As a result, input and output are
significantly mismatched, funding does not flow into
sectors of high efficiency, and the allocation of
resources is markedly ineffective. Second, the
efficiency of China's stock market is rather low. Yu
Qiao (1994) , Wu Shinong(1996), Chen Xiaoyue, et
al (1997), Han Liyan and Cai Hongyan (2002),
Zhang Bing and Li Xiaoming (2003), and Zeng
Yamin (2004) have used different methods to study
the stock market efficiency and reached the
conclusions that China's stock market is ineffective
or inefficient.
3 EVALUATION MODEL
SELECTION OF INTERNAL
CAPITAL MARKET
EFFICIENCY AND
EVALUATION METHODS
3.1 Internal Capital Market Efficiency
Evaluation Model Selection
Measurement methods of internal capital market
IS INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKET OF CHINA LISTED COMPANIES EFFICIENT? - Empirical Evidences from Listed
Companies which Have Multiple Divisions in H-stock
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