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unlike the reality of the real-world financial markets.
In the design we used here, there is only one continu-
ous trading period and liquidity is constantly replen-
ished in a drip-feed manner. If we had used the tradi-
tional, unrealistic, experiment design, there are good
reasons to believe that the superiority of slow-trader
markets would simply not have been revealed. Con-
firmation of this, however, will require further com-
parative experiments using the traditional framework.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Equipment costs for constructing De Luca’s Open Ex-
change (OpEx) system were met by a research grant
from EPSRC made to D. Cliff, number EP/I001603/1.
Primary financial support for D. Cliff’s research
comes from EPSRC grant EP/F001096/1; J. Cartlidge
is supported by EPSRC grant EP/H042644/1; C.
Szostek’s PhD research is funded by EPSRC via
the Bristol Centre for Complexity Sciences. M. De
Luca’s PhD research is partially supported by funds
from the University of Bristol Merchant Venturers’
School of Engineering. Thanks to Syritta Algorith-
mics Ltd for their assistance with funding the rewards
we used as incentives in our experiments. We are ex-
tremely grateful to all the participants of our experi-
ments at the University of Bristol.
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